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ABSTRACT

This dissertation offers an account of the moral permissibility of criminal
punishment. Punishment presents a distinctive moral challenge in that it involves a
community’s inflicting harm on individuals, treating them in ways that would typically
be morally wrong. We can distinguish a number of different questions of punishment’s
permissibility. This dissertation focuses on four central questions: (1) Why may we
punish? Why is it in principle permissible to inflict harm on criminal offenders? (2) Why
should we punish? Is there a compelling reason to do so? (3) How may we punish? What
principles should constrain impositions of punishment? And finally, (4) who is properly
subject to punishment? Rather than expect to answer all of these questions by appeal to
the same moral principle, this dissertation contends that the questions should be seen as
distinct, and thus as appropriately answered by appeal to distinct moral considerations.
Ultimately, the dissertation concludes that an institution of punishment that aims at
deterrence, constrained by considerations of retribution and reform, is permissible insofar
as the institution is among the mutually beneficial practices with which community
members have reciprocal, fairness-based obligations to comply.
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INTRODUCTION
Disaggregating the problem of punishment

This dissertation offers an account of the moral permissibility of the legal
institution of punishment. As an institution, punishment presents a distinctive moral
challenge in that it involves a political community’s inflicting harm on some of its
members, treating them in ways that would typically be morally wrong. Why are those
who break the law subject to the state’s imposing on them the sort of harms that are
characteristic of punishment? Most theorists of punishment, like most members of the
public, believe that punishment is indeed permissible. Nevertheless, providing a
satisfactory explanation of why this is so has proven to be a thorny task, and this has led a
number of theorists to argue in favor of abolishing the practice. Given how pervasive
punishment has become — roughly one in every 31 American adults was in jail or prison,
on probation, or on parole in 20081 — the prospect that the abolitionists may be right,
that the practice may be morally impermissible, is a particularly troubling one. In this
dissertation, however, I contend that punishment, properly constrained, can be
permissible.
The question of punishment’s moral permissibility is actually not one question but
several. This dissertation focuses on four central questions: (1) Why may we punish?
Why is it in principle permissible to inflict harm on criminal offenders? (2) Why should
1

U.S. Department of Justice, “Total Correction Population,” Bureau of Justice Statistics. Online at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=11 (accessed Oct. 8, 2010).
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we punish? Is there a compelling reason to do so? (3) How (especially, how severely)
may we punish? What principles should constrain impositions of punishment? And (4)
who is properly subject to punishment?2 Disaggregating several distinct questions of
punishment is a strategy endorsed perhaps most notably by H. L. A. Hart, who
distinguished the question of punishment’s general justifying aim (i.e., why should we
punish) from questions of its just distribution (i.e., who may be punished and how
severely). Hart saw the seemingly intractable debate between consequentialists and
retributivists about punishment’s justification as a product of the tendency to
oversimplify, to treat punishment as if it could be justified by some single moral principle
or consideration. He wrote:
To counter this drive, what is most needed is not the simple
admission that instead of a single value or aim (Deterrence,
Retribution, Reform or any other) a plurality of different
values and aims should be given as a conjunctive answer to
some single question concerning the justification of
punishment. What is needed is the realization that different
principles (each of which may in a sense be called a
‘justification’) are relevant at different points in any
morally acceptable account of punishment.3
Like Hart, I believe a defense of punishment requires answers to several distinct
questions, answers that may appeal to different moral considerations.

2

We might also ask who may permissibly do the punishing. I do not address this question explicitly,
although it implicitly falls out of my account (in chapter 1) of punishment’s in-principle permissibility that
only the community’s legal authority (rather than, say, the victims of the crime) may permissibly impose
punishment.
3

H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford
University Press, 1968), p. 3.
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I. Why may we punish?
Although I agree with Hart about the importance of disaggregating various
questions of punishment, I structure the questions somewhat differently than he did. Hart
indicated that punishment’s general justifying aim must be determined first, and that once
this aim is known, it is then left to decide (based on distinct considerations) who may
properly be punished, and how severely. As he put it, “in relation to any social institution,
after stating what general aim or value its maintenance fosters we should enquire whether
there are any and if so what principles limiting the unqualified pursuit of that aim or
value.”4 As a number of scholars have argued, however, a normatively prior question to
punishment’s aim is whether the practice itself is morally permissible. Given the value
that liberal political communities such as ours place on individual autonomy, there
appears to be a strong prima facie case against any institution that is centrally concerned
with restricting individuals’ freedoms. Defenders of punishment must explain, then, why
a community’s political authority can be justified in “treating some of its citizens in ways
that it would be clearly wrong to treat others.”5
Appeal to various aims will by itself typically be insufficient to justify
punishment. We might think, for instance, that deterrence is a significant social benefit of
punishment, but most of us would object to a practice that called for occasionally
punishing innocent people even if this could be demonstrated to increase the deterrent
impact significantly. Thus deterrence alone is an insufficient justification of the practice.
4

Ibid., p. 10.

5

David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (New York City: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 29.
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What we first need is an account of why, in principle, the practice of imposing harms on
people in the ways characteristic of punishment is permissible. If it is not, then appeal to
whatever positive aims will be insufficient to justify the practice.
In chapter 1, I defend the claim that punishment is in principle permissible.
Specifically, I develop a version of the fair play view, according to which the
permissibility of punishment derives from reciprocal obligations shared by members of a
political community. Because community members benefit from general compliance with
the rules of the community, they incur a presumptive, fairness-based obligation to
reciprocate by complying. On the standard fair play account, criminals gain an unfair
advantage over other community members, and punishment is thus permissible as a
means of removing this advantage. I contend, however, that this standard account is
unsatisfying, largely because there is no advantage that an offender unfairly gains, in
proportion to the seriousness of her crime, relative to other community members
generally. Instead, I offer a more straightforward fair play account, according to which
the rule instituting punishment as the response to crimes is itself among the community’s
mutually beneficial rules; as such, the rule instituting punishment is among those with
which community members are presumptively obliged to comply. For offenders,
compliance entails accepting being subject to punishment. This appeal to the reciprocal
obligations that emerge in a political community explains why restricting the liberties of
offenders is in principle permissible.

4

II. Why should we punish?
Even if punishment is in principle permissible, however, a full defense of the
practice also requires an answer to the question of why we should want to punish. If there
is no compelling reason to impose harms on certain individuals, no good that would come
of it, then even if this institution can be shown to be permissible in principle, it may in
practice be unjustified. Jeremy Bentham argued that “all punishment is mischief: all
punishment in itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted,
it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.”6
Although I don’t share Bentham’s view that utilitarianism can ground a complete
justification of punishment, I agree with him that an adequate defense of punishment
requires that we provide a compelling answer to the question of why we should want to
punish, of what good will come of it.
The fair play account I develop in chapter 1 depends on the claim that community
members receive significant benefits from the institution of punishment. On my account,
the chief benefit of such an institution is that it helps protect the security of community
members by acting as a deterrent of crime. The aim of deterrence has frequently been
criticized, however, as inconsistent with treating offenders with appropriate respect as
persons. Opponents have leveled the broadly Kantian charge that deterrent systems of
punishment use offenders as mere means to the social end of crime reduction, rather than
respecting them as ends in themselves. This objection has been fleshed out in different
6

Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L.
A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 158.
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ways, and in chapter 2 I consider three prominent versions of the objection: (1) that
deterrent systems of punishment treat offenders as mere means to some social good (i.e.,
crime reduction); (2) that deterrent punishment implicitly excludes offenders from
membership in the moral community; and (3) that such punishment offers community
members the wrong sort of reasons for compliance with the law. I contend that, contrary
to these various challenges, deterrence as an aim of punishment is in fact consistent with
respecting offenders as moral persons.

III. How may we punish?
Next, even if the institution of punishment is in principle permissible, and even if
we have some compelling and permissible reason(s) to want such an institution,
particular impositions of punishment may still fail be impermissible if these punishments
are excessive, or inhumane, or otherwise inappropriate. A defense of punishment thus
requires an account of how punishments should be constrained, in their mode and
severity, so as to treat offenders with respect as moral persons. Philosophers and legal
theorists typically cite the retributivist principle that punishment should be only to the
degree that is morally deserved as though this constraint is sufficient. The notion of
desert, however, has proven notoriously difficult to flesh out. This has led critics to
conclude that the retributivist constraint is of no use in answering the question of how we
may punish. In chapter 3, I offer a partial defense of the retributivist constraint, arguing
that the notion of desert may provide some, albeit imperfect, guidance in determining
how to punish. Nevertheless, I contend that the retributivist constraint is insufficient to
6

ensure that offenders are treated with appropriate respect as moral persons. This is
because retributivism focuses entirely on what is the morally deserved response to the
given crime. In fact, however, what treatment a person deserves may also be a matter not
only of what she has done, but also of who she is, and even of who she can be. Because
retributivism evaluates desert by focusing only on the crime committed, in many cases (in
particular, cases of the most serious crimes) the retributivist notion of desert may indicate
punishments that many of us will regard as overly harsh. This indicates that the
retributivist constraint is insufficient, and that some additional constraint is needed to
ensure that punishments treat offenders with appropriate respect.
In chapter 4, I argue for such an additional constraint, one grounded in
considerations of reform. I first flesh out a Kantian conception of contempt and highlight
certain troubling features of contemptuous treatment. In particular, contempt is personrather than act-focused; it is pervasive; it presents its object as inferior, if not altogether
worthless; and it is cold and dismissive, i.e., it gives up on its object. Next I contend that
punishments treat offenders with contempt if, in their mode or degree, they tend to
undermine offenders’ prospects for moral reform. On my account, such punishments are
therefore impermissible. Unlike certain reform-based accounts, however, my view does
not require that reform must be a positive aim of punishment — only that punishment
should not tend to undermine the prospect of reform. Taken together, chapters 3 and 4
conclude that punishment should be constrained not only by retributivist considerations
of desert, but also by considerations of moral reform.

7

IV. Whom may we punish?
Finally, we might ask who is properly subject to punishment. Generally, an
answer to the in-principle permissibility question will imply an answer to this question of
who may be punished. For instance, for those who contend that punishment is
permissible because criminal wrongdoers forfeit their right against punishment, it will
follow straightforwardly that punishment is permissible only of criminals (because only
they have forfeited this right). Similarly, the fair play account I develop in chapter 1
implies that only criminal offenders are subject to punishment — they made themselves
liable to punishment when they failed to comply with the mutually beneficial rules of the
political community.
Even if we accept the fairly uncontroversial view that only criminal offenders are
subject to punishment, however, a further question of who may be punished arises when
we move from the context of domestic crimes to international crimes, such as crimes
against humanity and genocide. Such crimes are perpetrated by groups; that is, they are
made possible by the contributions of many individuals acting, to some extent, in concert.
Some scholars have thus argued that punishments for international crimes should target
the groups (typically states), as groups, rather than only targeting individual group
members. There is a presumptive case against such a scheme, however, because of the
very real danger that the harms of such punishments will distribute to all group members,
many of whom may have played no role in (or even worked against) the crime. Collective
punishment’s advocates appear to have available three lines of response to this challenge:
They may (1) argue that the harms of collective punishment can in fact be distributed
8

among group members in a justified way, (2) acknowledge that collective punishment’s
harms will distribute unjustly but contend that this presumptive injustice is overridden by
the good that will be accomplished (or harm averted) by punishing groups as groups, or
(3) contend that collective punishment can be imposed in ways such that the harms don’t
distribute among group members. In chapter 5, I examine each of these responses. I argue
that none succeeds in overcoming the presumptive case against collective punishment.

9

CHAPTER 1
Fair play and the in-principle permissibility of punishment

Since H. L. A. Hart famously distinguished three different questions of criminal
punishment — why should we punish, whom may we punish, and how much may we
punish — responses to this disaggregation strategy have been mixed. Some have argued
that it is ad hoc, and that Hart’s appeal to consequentialist considerations in answering
the first question and nonconsequentialist considerations in answering the second and
third creates a dialectic instability in his view. Others have endorsed the disaggregation
strategy but have argued that a normatively prior to the question of why should we punish,
which Hart called punishment’s general justifying aim, is the question of whether the
practice itself is morally permissible.1 As these scholars point out, to demonstrate that
there is good reason to X does not yet establish that it is permissible to X. On this view,
defenders of punishment must first explain why a community’s political authority can be
justified in imposing on them the sort of harms that are characteristic of punishment,

1

C.f., K. G. Armstrong, “The Retributivist Hits Back,” in H. B. Acton, ed., The Philosophy of Punishment
(London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 141; David Dolinko, “Some Thoughts about Retributivism,” Ethics 101:3
(1991): 537-59, on pp. 539-41; and Matt Matravers, Justice and Punishment (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford
University Press, 2000). Matravers writes that “punishment theory must concern itself with the morality of
attaching the threat of sanctions to rules (as well [as] the morality of imposing those sanctions on particular
people). And whilst it seems plausible to think that the point of threatening sanctions must have something
to do with preventing offending …, that is not the same as arguing that preventing offending through the
threat and imposing of sanctions is morally permissible” p. 7. Note also the distinction between the moral
permissibility question and the “whom may we punish?” question: The answer to the latter question might
be, e.g., “only those culpable for criminal wrongdoing,” but this answer would, in itself, say nothing about
why punishment, i.e., the infliction of intentional harm, is a morally permissible response to criminal
wrongdoing.
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harms that would be clearly impermissible if inflicted on law abiders. As David Boonin
writes:
Even if we assume that those who break the law are
responsible for their actions and that the laws they break
are just and reasonable, this practice raises a moral problem.
How can the fact that a person has broken a just and
reasonable law render it morally permissible for the state to
treat him in ways that would otherwise be impermissible?2
I refer to this throughout as the question of punishment’s in-principle moral
permissibility. If the institution is not in principle permissible, then appeal to whatever
positive aims will be insufficient to justify it.
In this paper, I offer a defense of punishment’s in-principle permissibility. My
account is a version of the fair play view, according to which, briefly, the permissibility
of punishment derives from reciprocal obligations shared by members of a political
community, here understood as a mutually beneficial, cooperative social venture. Mine is
a nonstandard fair play account, however, in that most fair play accounts aspire to offer
unified theories of punishment — that is, they employ considerations of fair play to
ground not only punishment’s in-principle permissibility, but also its positive aim as well
as sentencing guidance. By contrast, my fair play view is more modest; it seeks only to
provide an answer to the permissibility question. I contend that in this context, modesty is
a virtue. Because my account offers only an answer to the in-principle permissibility
question, but not to the positive aim question or to questions of how we may punish, it
avoids certain powerful objections that have been raised against standard articulations of
2

Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 1.
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the fair play view. What’s more, as I argue below, my focus on only the permissibility
question is not ad hoc; to the contrary, a closer examination of the fair play view’s
evolution from a theory of political obligation to a defense of punishment indicates that
there are good reasons to expect that it is suitable as an answer only to the permissibility
question. Punishment’s positive aim and the constraints on how it is administered in
particular cases must be based on distinct considerations.
It’s worth emphasizing at the outset that the challenge with which I am concerned
here is not that this or that sort of punishment (or punishment for violation of these or
those laws, or within this or that political system) is impermissible, but rather that the
practice of punishing per se is impermissible. If this objection is correct, then all
punishment will be ruled out from the start. By the same token, even if, as I argue below,
considerations of fair play can ground a satisfactory answer to the in-principle
permissibility question, actual inflictions of such harm could nevertheless be
impermissible — e.g., as a response to unjust or unreasonable laws, or when inflicted to
an excessive degree or in an inhumane manner, etc. My concern in this chapter is thus not
to provide a complete justification for punishment, but rather to establish that, and
explain why, punishment is in principle a permissible response to criminal violations.
In section I, I examine the standard articulation of the fair play view. I consider
how the view, first offered as an account of political obligation, has been extended to
justify punishment, and why this justification ultimately fails. In section II, I develop my
alternative version of the fair play view, on which the defense of punishment’s inprinciple permissibility follows more straightforwardly from fair play’s answer to the
12

political obligation question. I contend that my version of the view fares better than
standard articulations on a number of counts. Finally, in section III, I consider certain
objections to my view. As will become clear, these objections essentially are objections
to the fair play view of political obligation — and although I do not attempt here to offer
a full defense of this broader view, I do at least aim to address particular concerns that
may emerge from my inclusion of punishment among the rules to which we have a moral
obligation to comply.

I. The standard fair play account and its drawbacks
According to the fair play account, a political community can be understood as a
cooperative venture in which each member benefits when there is general compliance
with the rules governing the venture. The fact that each member benefits from the
compliance of other members generates an obligation to reciprocate by similarly
complying. Thus Hart wrote,
[W]hen a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise
according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who
have submitted to these restrictions when required have a
right to a similar submission from those who have
benefited by their submission.3
As espoused by Hart, the fair play view grounded a reciprocal obligation to
comply with the rules of a mutually beneficial political community. It said nothing about
3

H. L. A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?” The Philosophical Review 64:4 (April 1955): 175-91,
reprinted in Jeremy Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1984), on p.
85. For a similar articulation of this view, see John Rawls, “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play.” In
Law and Philosophy: A Symposium, ed. S. Hook (New York City: New York University Press, 1964), pp.
9-10.
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what would be a justified response to those who failed to meet this obligation. Several
theorists of punishment, however, have used the principle of fair play as their foundation
in developing a defense of the practice of punishment. The crucial claim for extending
the fair play view to justify punishment is that when a member of the community chooses
not to comply with the community’s laws, she takes an unfair advantage relative to her
fellow community members. That is, she unfairly benefits twice: Like everyone, she
reaps the benefits that general compliance with the law makes possible, but she
additionally benefits in that she, unlike her fellow community members, doesn’t constrain
her behavior in compliance. Typically, then, on fair play accounts the offender is
portrayed as a free rider, and punishment is defended as a means of removing the
offender’s unfair advantage by imposing a burden on the offender proportionate to the
additional benefit she unfairly gained through her crime. As Herbert Morris writes,
“Justice — that is, punishing such individuals — restores the equilibrium of benefits and
burdens by taking from the individual what he owes, that is, exacting the debt.”4
The standard articulation of the fair play view of punishment is inadequate in two
key respects: The first is that the fair play view often misconstrues what makes a criminal
act worthy of punishment, or as R. A. Duff writes, “it offers a distorted picture of the

4

Herbert Morris, “Persons and Punishment,” Monist 52 (1968): 475-501; on p. 478. For other notable
elaborations of the fair play view, see Jeffrie Murphy, “Three Mistakes about Retributivism,” Analysis 31
(1971): 166-9; Michael Davis, “How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime,” Ethics 93 (1983): 726-52,
and “Criminal Desert and Unfair Advantage: What’s the Connection?” Law and Philosophy 12 (1993):
133-56; George Sher, Desert (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Richard Dagger,
“Playing Fair with Punishment,” Ethics 103 (April 1993): 473-88.
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punishment-deserving character of crime.”5 That is, we tend to think that a person who
has, for instance, tortured someone should be punished not because she has gained an
unfair advantage over other members of the community generally, but rather because of
the heinous moral wrong she has committed against her victim. In other words, we do not
typically think of serious mala in se crimes such as torture, murder, or rape as primarily
matters of free riding.
The second deficiency of standard fair play accounts involves the specification of
the offender’s unfair benefit. Put simply, there doesn’t seem to be any advantage that an
offender gains, in proportion with the seriousness of her crime, relative to community
members generally.6 Here I briefly consider three suggestions for this unfair advantage.

5

R. A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2001),
p. 22.

6

It’s worth distinguishing two types of benefits that are not intended by any of the fair play advocates.
First, the benefit gained by an offender is not characterized as a moral benefit. M. Margaret Falls criticizes
the fair play view as being incompatible with “the tradition that says willing the moral good is the highest
human good and therefore doing evil harms the evildoer.” M. Margaret Falls, “Retribution, Reciprocity,
and Respect for Persons,” Law and Philosophy 6:1 (1987): 25-51, on p. 31. I think it’s fair to say, however,
that the fair play view operates within a tradition that recognizes a distinction between moral and prudential
benefit, which believes that the latter does not necessarily collapse into the former, and which holds that an
offender gains some prudential benefit through her crime. (Of course, if it’s true that what is prudentially
good for us reduces to what is morally good for us, or even if any ostensible prudential benefit a criminal
gains would be outweighed by the moral harm so that the criminal should be understood as harming herself
all things considered, this will only support my conclusion below: that the fair play view cannot
demonstrate an advantage that the criminal unfairly gains over others that is appropriately removed by
punishment.) Second, the benefit gained by the criminal is explicitly not characterized as the material spoils
of her crime. Thus, the relevant benefit unfairly gained by, say, the burglar is not the actual money or
property that she steals, nor is the tax evader’s relevant benefit the tax money she doesn’t pay. If the benefit
were characterized as the material gain from the crime, then removing this benefit would seem to be a
matter merely of requiring the offender to compensate her victim(s); punishment, understood as the
intentional imposition of hard treatment, would not seem necessary. For fair play defenders of punishment,
therefore, it is crucial that the unfairly gained benefit is something distinct from the ill-gotten material
gains.
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One option is that the offender gains freedom from the burden of self-constraint
that others accept in complying with the particular law that the offender violates. If so,
then the appropriate severity of punishment will be proportionate to the burden others
feel in complying with that law. But compliance with laws is often no real burden for
most citizens. In fact, compliance with prohibitions on egregious offenses (murder,
assault, etc.) typically is less burdensome than is compliance with prohibitions on lesser
crimes (tax evasion, jaywalking, etc.), given that we may be more often tempted to
commit the lesser crimes. Most of us are typically not tempted to commit murder or
assault anyway, whereas we may feel comparatively more tempted, on occasion, to cheat
on our taxes, jaywalk, etc. Thus relatively less serious violations will often appear to
merit relatively more severe punishments, a deeply counterintuitive conclusion.
Instead, perhaps the offender gains freedom from the burden of compliance with
the law in general. This general compliance, Richard Dagger writes, is a genuine burden:
“there are times for almost all of us when we would like to have the best of both worlds
— that is, the freedom we enjoy under the rule of law plus freedom from the burden of
obeying laws.”7 This route, however, appears to lead to the objection that all offenses
become, for the purposes of punishment, the same offense. Both the murderer and the tax
cheat have failed to comply with the rule of law generally while benefiting from the
general compliance of others. If the punishable offense is the same, however, then the
two cases appear to warrant equal punishments, and again, this strikes most of us as
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counterintuitive.8 Thus the particular- and general-compliance views appear
unsatisfactory.
A third account, by George Sher, holds that the offender gains an extra measure of
freedom, not from the burden of self-constraint, but rather “from the demands of the
prohibition he violates.”9 Sher writes: “Because others take that prohibition seriously,
they lack a similar liberty. And as the strength of the prohibition increases, so too does
the freedom from it which its violation entails.”10 Although Sher’s account appears to
avoid the counterintuitive sentencing implications that beset the previous two views, his
account faces its own problems. Specifically, it’s not clear in what sense the offender, by
committing the crime, gains freedom from the moral prohibition. As David Dolinko
points out, the criminal does not so much gain freedom as exhibit a freedom he already
had — “he must have been ‘free’ from the prohibition even before his lawless act (or he
could not have committed it!), and presumably, many law-abiding citizens are equally
‘free’ (in this sense) to violate the prohibition.”11 Ultimately, Sher’s account fares no
better than the particular- and general-compliance views.
If the relevant benefit that an offender unfairly gains is not any of these types of
freedom, then what else might constitute her unfair advantage? There certainly may be
other things that an offender gains through her commission of a crime. For instance, Jean
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Sher, Desert, p. 82.
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Hampton’s expressive retributivism holds that wrongful acts “convey — and work to
effect — the wrongdoer’s superior importance relative to the victim understood as an
individual or as a class of individuals.”12 Thus we might follow Hampton in regarding the
offender as gaining a sense of, and perhaps a realization of, relative superiority.
Hampton’s account is explicitly not a fair play account, however, as this ostensible
benefit to the offender, the superiority that the wrongful act expresses and seeks to
manifest, is a superiority to the particular victim(s), not to other, law-abiding community
members generally. For purposes of the fair play account, the punishable benefit must be
something that the offender gains relative to the community in general, as a result of
others’ compliance and her own noncompliance; that is, the benefit must be a result of
her free riding. And insofar as punishment is justified as a means of removing the unfair
advantage, this advantage must either be commensurate with the gravity of the crime or
else risk running afoul of our deeply held intuitions regarding proportionality of
punishment. Unfortunately for advocates of the standard fair play account, there just
doesn’t appear to be any unfair advantage that all criminals gain, in proportion to the
seriousness of their crimes, over other, law-abiding community members generally.
Dagger has rearticulated, and further developed, his view in a recent article titled
“Punishment and Fair Play.”13 Here he maintains that all crimes are indeed crimes of
unfairness, but he contends that they may be unfair not only in the sense of yielding
12

Jean Hampton, The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy, ed.
Daniel Farnham (New York City: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 131. See also Hampton, “A New
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unfair benefits, but also in undermining the political order. If we conceive of a political
community as a fair cooperative practice whose members have equal standing, Dagger
contends, then “considerations of unfairness can also justify the conclusion that some
offenses are more serious violations of equal standing and fair play than others.”14 For
instance, he writes:
The tax evader takes advantage of many people — millions
of them in many cases — but her offense typically does not
make it difficult for them to continue doing their part in the
cooperative practice. With the rapist, the murderer, and the
batterer, however, the offender has done something that
makes it difficult or even impossible for his victim to
contribute further to the ongoing cooperation. He has
offended against the interests and integrity of his victim, to
be sure, but he has also offended against the requirements
of a society based on fair play, and his offense is thus a
more serious crime of unfairness than the tax evader’s.15
There are, I believe, two significant problems with this argument. First, it’s not
clear that the rapist does make it more difficult for his victim than the tax evader makes it
for her victims to contribute further to the ongoing cooperation. As Dagger has (rightly)
characterized it, the relevant sense of cooperation here is cooperation in complying with
the law in general. When others exercise general compliance with the law, and when I
benefit from their compliance, then I have an obligation similarly to participate in the
cooperative venture (i.e., to reciprocate) by complying with the law. But although rape
clearly is a more egregious violation than tax evasion, it’s not clear that one way in which
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it is more egregious is that the rape victim’s ability to “further the ongoing cooperation”
by accepting the burden of compliance with the law is especially diminished.
Second, even if the more serious crime does more severely threaten its victim’s
ability to contribute to the fair cooperative venture, this does not demonstrate that such a
crime is a more serious crime of unfairness than the less serious crime. Put more simply,
an act may undermine fairness without itself being unfair.16 On the standard fair play
view’s characterization, crimes are unfair in the sense of free riding. Offenders accept the
benefits made possible by the general compliance of others with the law, and then they
choose not to reciprocate. It’s just not clear, however, that by more seriously undermining
the fair political order, an offender has therefore been more of a free rider. In fact, given
that the offender (like everyone) benefits from the cooperative venture, then to the extent
that she offends against the cooperative venture (by undermining the victim’s ability to
contribute to it), she is actually more likely to harm rather than benefit herself. Free riders
can only ride freely when the practice from which they draw benefits, but to which they
do not contribute, thrives. Thus it is unclear how, by more seriously offending against the
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cooperative venture, the offender would more egregiously free-ride than in cases in
which she less seriously offends against the cooperative venture.17
Ultimately, the fair play view is unable to provide a plausible, univocal account of
punishment that grounds not only its in-principle permissibility but also its positive aim
and sentencing guidance in particular cases. Traditional fair play articulations provide the
wrong answer, at least in many cases, to the question “why should we punish this crime?”
In addition, they are unable plausibly to specify any benefit that an offender unfairly
gains, in proportion to the seriousness of her crime, over law-abiding community
members generally. And although I believe Dagger’s recent fair play defense is a
significant improvement over traditional accounts, it is not ultimately an integrated
account. Rather, it implicitly appeals both to the traditional, deontological conception of
fair play as well as the consequentialist aim of preserving a fair political order. As will
become clear in the next section, however, I do not regard fair play’s inability to answer
all the questions of punishment (i.e., its inability to ground a unified account) as a
liability. Rather, on the account I propose, there is good reason to expect that the fair play
view will ground only the in-principle permissibility of punishment, and that
punishment’s aim and guidance regarding appropriate sentencing will require appeal to
distinct considerations.
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II. An alternative fair play account
Although I have argued against prominent fair play accounts of punishment, I
nevertheless find something intuitively appealing about the fair play account of political
obligation espoused by Hart and Rawls. In beginning to set out my own fair play account
of punishment, then, I believe Hart’s concise statement of the fair play principle bears
repeating:
[W]hen a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise
according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who
have submitted to these restrictions when required have a
right to a similar submission from those who have
benefited by their submission.18
So, as a member of a cooperative enterprise, if I benefit from others’ playing by
the rules, then I should play by the rules as well. But which rules? The rules most
frequently appealed to by fair play accounts of political obligation and of punishment are
the political community’s criminal statutes, the laws prohibiting, say, murder, theft, tax
evasion, drug trafficking, etc. Two features of such rules are relevant for present purposes:
First, they are the sort of rules with which we can comply (by not murdering or stealing,
by paying our taxes, etc.). Second, general compliance with these rules provides a
significant benefit. These are the two salient features for generating the fair play
obligation: If general compliance with a rule is beneficial to me, then I have an obligation
of fairness similarly to comply.19 In this section, I defend the claim that the rule
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instituting punishment as a response to crimes is itself one of the rules with which we
have an obligation of fairness to comply. Thus on my account, punishment is in-principle
permissible not because it removes some benefit offenders have unfairly gained relative
to law abiders. Rather, punishment is permissible because the rule instituting punishment
as a response to crimes is itself one of those rules with which we, who benefit from
general compliance with the rule, have a fair play obligation to comply. To defend this
claim, I need to say more about how I understand the rule instituting punishment as a
response to crime. In particular, I need to establish that this is the sort of rule with which
we can comply, and also that general compliance with this rule yields significant benefits.
The rule instituting punishment is a rule of remediation. Whereas criminal laws
tell us things such as “don’t commit murder” or “pay your taxes,” the rule instituting
punishment tells what is to be done when community members violate these laws. There
is nothing in the conception of a criminal law that entails that the law must be backed by
punishment.20 Indeed, other forms of response to the violation of such laws have been
suggested: nonpunitive censure or restitution, for example. Thus if punishment is to be
the response to criminal violations, this will be because it has been so designated by some
rule of the political community. Essentially, this rule takes the form of a conditional, and
20
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it says that if you commit a crime, then you will be subject to having your liberties
restricted in ways to which law abiders are not subject. The question, for present purposes,
is whether this is a rule with which we can comply, and if so, whether general compliance
with it yields significant benefits.
On first blush, it may seem that the suggested rule is not one with which we can
comply. That is, it might appear to be what Hart, in his The Concept of Law, called a
secondary rule rather than a primary rule. Put simply, Hart characterized primary rules as
imposing duties or obligations, and secondary rules as conferring powers.21 Unlike
primary rules such as “don’t commit murder,” the rule instituting punishment may appear
less the issuance of a command than an instruction to legal authorities as to what may be
done to us if we violate rules of the first type. I contend, however, that the rule instituting
punishment is not solely an instruction to legal authorities. A significant element of the
institution of punishment is that it communicates to, and indeed imposes obligations on,
citizens themselves.
To construe the rule instituting punishment merely as an instruction to officials,
e.g., “punish those who violate criminal statutes,” is to overlook an important
communicative element of punishment. The institution of punishment communicates to
citizens generally that the community condemns certain actions as morally wrong —
condemns them so strongly that it is willing to impose hard treatment on those who
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commit such actions.22 In my view, the central benefit of this threat of hard treatment is
its role in reducing the frequency of violations of community members’ security and
well-being. The institution of punishment, then, communicates the central importance
that the community places on protecting its members. Similarly, it asks its members, as
community members, to share in this commitment. And insofar as punishment itself plays
a key role in securing these important aims, the community asks its members to comply
with this institution.
Still, we might wonder whether — and if so, how — one could comply with the
rule instituting punishment? We tend to think of punishment, after all, as coercively
imposed on offenders who may be no more than passive recipients. I contend, however,
that the rule instituting punishment as a response to crimes is one with which we can
comply (or fail to comply). As I have indicated, I believe the rule instituting punishment
does communicate to community members, and it is a rule of remediation: It tells us that
if we commit some crime, then we should accept being subject to punishment as a
response. One way to comply, then, would be to constrain one’s behavior so as to avoid
being liable to punishment; another way to comply would be, if one has committed a
criminal offense, to accept the prescribed punishment. Conversely, one could fail to
22
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comply with this rule by committing a crime and attempting to evade apprehension (and
subsequent punishment). In other words, if the rule is stated as the conditional “if you
commit a crime, then you are subject to punishment,” then we can comply either by not
committing crimes, thus rendering the antecedent false (and the conditional itself trivially
true), or by accepting being subject to punishment, so that the consequent (and thus the
conditional) is rendered true. Both forms of compliance warrant further explanation.
First, we can comply by not committing crimes. A likely objection here is that
when we refrain from committing crimes, we comply not with the proposed rule of
punishment, but rather with the rule prohibiting the particular crime. I offer two
responses: In one sense, when we refrain from committing crimes, we comply with both
rules. We comply straightforwardly with the rule that says “do not murder,” and we
comply with the remedial rule (“if you commit a crime, then you are subject to
punishment”) by falsifying the antecedent and thus rendering the conditional trivially true.
In another sense, whether we can be understood as complying with the rule
instituting punishment may depend on our reasons for compliance. Antony Duff argues
that the criminal law of a liberal polity is best understood as offering moral reasons, not
prudential reasons, for compliance.23 I agree that the criminal law should offer moral
reasons. But unlike Duff, I believe the institution of punishment often permissibly offers
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prudential reasons for compliance.24 When we comply with the law because we accept
our community’s moral condemnation of the criminal act, we do not need the threat of
punishment to motivate our compliance. But inevitably, there will be times when the
moral appeal of the criminal statute itself is not sufficient to motivate us. In these cases,
the threat posed by the institution of punishment may provide a prudential incentive to do
what the moral reason was not sufficient to persuade us to do. I suggest that in cases
when we constrain our behavior not because of the moral reasons offered by the law itself
but because of the prudential reason presented by the threat of punishment, we may be
said to comply with the remedial rule: if you commit a crime, then you will be subject to
punishment.
A second way to comply with the proposed rule is by accepting, if we do commit
some crime(s), being subject to punishment. In my view, this rules out attempting to
evade apprehension or falsely representing oneself as innocent once one has been
apprehended (though it does not prohibit appealing to what one may believe are
genuinely mitigating circumstances). Also, the punishment itself may require an active
response from the offender. She may be required to pay a fine, to appear for community
service, or to meet with her probation officer. Even incarceration may require the
offender’s active participation: For instance, courts will in some cases require the
convicted person to report to prison on a certain date to serve her term.25 Thus those who
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commit crimes, although they fail to comply with the particular rules prohibiting the
crimes they commit, may still comply with the rule instituting punishment if they accept
being subject to punishment, in ways such as I’ve suggested here.
I conclude, then, that the rule instituting punishment is one with which we can
comply. The second question is whether general compliance with this rule yields
significant benefits. I doubt that we receive significant benefit from general compliance
of the second sort (accepting punishment if one has committed a crime), simply because
most people who have committed crimes typically do not accept punishment in ways
such as I suggested.26 Many people do comply, however, in the first way: by not
committing crimes. We should ask, then, whether general compliance of this first sort
yields significant benefits to community members. If so, then insofar as I reap these
benefits of general compliance, I have an obligation to comply as well.
To deny that general compliance with the rule instituting punishment yields
substantial benefits, one would need to demonstrate that the protections afforded to
citizens by the rule of law would not be significantly undermined if punishment were
abolished (perhaps to be replaced by some alternative, such as public censure or
restitution). Such an argument would thus need to refute the intuitively compelling and
widely accepted claim that punishment has a substantial deterrent effect.27 If general

that we engage them as active participants in their punishment, rather than passive recipients (see, e.g.,
Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community).
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Engaging with the important empirical debate about whether in fact punishment yields significant
deterrent effects is beyond the scope of this chapter. I note, however, that if there are no considerable
deterrent impacts from maintaining the institution of punishment, then the fair play account I have
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compliance with the rule instituting punishment does provide significant benefits, then it
falls within the scope of those rules to which the fair play account grounds an obligation
of compliance.
If the rule that says criminal violations are subject to punishment is among those
rules with which we are obliged to comply, then the remainder of my argument for
punishment’s in-principle permissibility follows fairly straightforwardly. Because having
a moral obligation to X implies not having a moral right not to X, it follows that none of
us has a moral right not to comply with this rule. Because, as I indicated earlier,
compliance for a lawbreaker requires accepting one’s punishment, it follows that no one
has a right not to be punished if she violates some criminal statute. The practice of
punishment in general, then, is not a violation of criminals’ rights.
To briefly sum up my argument to this point: Punishment is in principle morally
permissible not because it removes some benefit(s) that an offender unfairly gains in
failing to meet her obligation to play by the community’s legal rules; rather, it is
permissible because punishment as a response to crime is itself one of the rules with
which the offender, like all those who benefit from mutual compliance with the rules, is
obliged to comply. My fair play account of punishment just is the fair play account of
political obligation, along with the recognition that the rules of punishment are among

developed here would be unable to ground its in-principle moral permissibility. This fits with my own
intuition, however, as I believe that punishment’s yielding some significant deterrent benefit is a necessary
(albeit not sufficient) condition of the institution’s moral permissibility. In what follows, however, I assume
(in keeping with the predominant view) that the institution of punishment — or more specifically, general
compliance with the rule instituting punishment — does yield significant benefits to members of the
political community.
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those rules of the community that, when community members generally comply with
them, are mutually beneficial. In section III, I address what I take to be the most powerful
objections against the fair play view of political obligation. First, however, in the
remainder of this section, I want to consider a number of advantages to my view in
comparison with the standard fair play account of punishment.
Most importantly, my view fares better against the two objections to the
traditional fair play account of punishment that I discussed earlier. Consider the first
objection, that the traditional fair play account misconstrues why certain crimes merit
punishment. Murder, that is, does not seem to be centrally, if at all, a crime of free-riding
on other community members generally. My version of the fair play account, by contrast,
grounds only punishment’s in-principle permissibility. It does not follow from my
account that fair play considerations also supply the positive aim of punishment; thus my
account does not imply, for instance, that the murderer should be punished because she
was a free rider on members of the community generally. In my view, the central benefit
of the rule establishing punishment is that it gives citizens compelling reasons to comply
with the laws — i.e., it acts as a general deterrent — and thus helps to ensure the safety
and security of community members. Even if deterrence represents the reason we should
want an institution of punishment, however, the institution’s in-principle permissibility
will stem, on the fair play view, from the fact that an offender (like everyone else) reaps
the benefits of deterrence as a result of the general compliance with the rule establishing
punishment — thus the offender has an obligation of fairness similarly to comply.
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The second objection noted to the traditional articulation of the fair play view is
that there seems to be no benefit that an offender unfairly gains, relative to other
community members generally, through her commission of a crime. Because the
traditional articulation justifies punishment as a means of removing the unfair advantage,
the inability to specify such an advantage is obviously problematic. And accounts that
have specified some advantage appear to generate counterintuitive sentencing guidance.
Again, my account avoids this general line of criticism, as my view does not characterize
punishment as removing some unfairly gained advantage. Rather on this account,
punishment is permissible because the practice is among the rules of the cooperative
system to which general compliance yields certain benefits — benefits that offenders,
like everyone else, enjoy. This fair play account only establishes that, and explains why,
punishment is in-principle permissible. It does not claim also to answer the question of
what mode and degree of punishment are permissible in particular cases. This latter
question will depend on distinct moral considerations.
An implication of my account, then, as I have indicated, is that it is appropriate to
disaggregate various questions of punishment — in particular, (why) is punishment in
principle morally permissible? what is punishment’s positive aim? and what mode and
degree of punishment are permissible in particular cases? — and to answer these
questions by appeal to distinct considerations. Some may criticize this sort of
disaggregation strategy as ad hoc, but on the fair play view I have suggested, this
objection is unpersuasive. Again, my fair play account just is the fair play account of
political obligation, with the rules of punishment recognized to be among those rules to
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which the obligation of fairness extends. To require this account to ground not only
punishment’s in-principle permissibility but also its positive aim and sentencing guidance
would be as implausible as requiring it to ground specific conclusions about the other
rules of the cooperative enterprise. We don’t expect that the fair play view should tell us,
for instance, which acts should be required or forbidden by criminal statutes. Why then,
should we expect the same fair play view to generate rules about punishment? Rather
than its being ad hoc to distinguish the permissibility question from the other questions,
on the fair play view we have good reason to expect that the answer to the permissibility
question will not yield guidance regarding the other two questions.
As I have discussed, my account avoids what I take to be the two most powerful
objections to the standard fair play articulation. More generally, however, my account has
an advantage over any fair play account that defends punishment as a sort of appropriate
remediation for violations of the fair play obligation to play by the rules of the
cooperative venture. Such accounts require two substantial defenses: a defense of the fair
play account of political obligation itself, and a defense of punishment as a permissible
remediation for failures to meet the obligation defended in the first part. By contrast, once
we recognize that the rules of punishment are among those rules to which the obligation
of compliance extends, then on my account only one substantial defense is required: a
defense of the fair play view of political obligation. My view is in this regard sturdier
than standard fair play accounts of punishment, insofar as objections that purport to
undermine my view will undermine the standard articulations as well, whereas not all
objections faced by the standard articulations also threaten my account.
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Essentially, on my fair play account, whether the institution of punishment is inprinciple permissible will be determined by whether we have a moral obligation to
comply with the rules of our political community. Thus, this defense of punishment will
stand or fall according to whether the fair play account of political obligation is
persuasive. In the following section, I consider certain objections to my view. I do not
aim to provide a full defense of the fair play view of political obligation. I do, however,
consider what I take to be among the strongest objections to this broader view, and in
particular, their implications for my strategy of including punishment among those rules
with which we have a fair play obligation to comply.

III. Objections
The first objection I want to consider involves my strategy of deriving the moral
permissibility of punishment from an account of political obligation. On my account, the
rules instituting legal punishment are among those with which we are reciprocally
obliged to comply as members of a political community, here characterized as a mutually
beneficial, cooperative enterprise. According to the objection, therefore, this strategy
implies that punishment would not be morally permissible in the absence of such a
political community, viz., in the state of nature. Insofar as we have intuitions that
punishment would be morally permissible in the state of nature, then my account appears
deficient.28
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I actually have mixed intuitions about whether punishment would be permissible
in the state of nature. On one hand, I’m somewhat inclined to maintain that punishment
would not, perhaps could not, be permissible in such conditions. Those in a state of
nature might retaliate against wrongs perpetrated against them, but it’s not clear that
harming in this context, even if proportionate to the wrongdoing, would constitute just
punishment. Kant, for one, believed that just punishment is impossible in the state of
nature, because there is no public authority to settle disputes.29 If we accept the notion
that punishment, to be permissible, must be imposed by a proper authority with standing
to settle disputes between opposing parties, then it appears that such punishment is by
definition impossible in the state of nature.
On the other hand, it seems that I might permissibly impose intentional harm on
someone who has wronged me, even if there is no recognized authority to confirm that
punishment in such a case is permissible. If this is true, however, I contend that such
punishment would be morally permissible for roughly the same reasons that it is
permissible in a political community. In the state of nature, if George steals from Kramer,
and Kramer responds not only by retrieving his stolen goods but also by inflicting some
sort of harm on George, then presumably this will tend to deter others who might have
otherwise considered stealing from Kramer. Conversely, if Kramer didn’t respond, others
might take this as evidence that they could get away with similar behavior as George.
29
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Furthermore, when Kramer punishes George, seeing this may lead Elaine to think twice
not only about stealing from Kramer in the future, but about stealing from anyone. This is
because Kramer’s punitive response to George’s stealing may cause Elaine, especially if
she has witnessed others responding in similar retaliatory ways in similar circumstances,
to believe that this sort of response is the sort that tends to follow attempts at stealing. All
of this is just to say that general deterrence would be a significant benefit (arguably the
central benefit) of punishing wrongdoing in the state of nature. As noted above, the
deterrent effect will be particularly strong if those in the state of nature see wrongdoing
meeting with punitive responses with some regularity. That is, if individuals begin to
regard it as a sort of informal rule that wrongdoing is met with a punitive response, then
they may be persuaded to comply with this rule by constraining their behavior to avoid
the punishment. But if such compliance with this informal rule is beneficial to those in
the state of nature, then they have an obligation of fair play to comply with it as well,
either by appropriately constraining their behavior or by accepting the punitive response
when they do engage in wrongdoing.
On the view I have developed here, considerations of fair play could ground the
in-principle permissibility of punishment even in the absence of a formal cooperative
scheme, such as a political community. Whether it actually did ground punishment’s
permissibility would be a matter of whether (a) individuals came to regard it as a sort of
informal rule that wrongdoing is met with punishment, (b) recognition of the rule led to
general compliance with it (with compliance here taking the form of choosing not to
engage in wrongdoing so as to avoid punishment), and (c) general compliance with the
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rule yielded significant benefits for individuals. Although I have argued that each of these
requirements might hold in the state of nature, notice that the existence of a political
community governed by the rule of law makes each of them much more likely. In such a
political community, the rules of punishment are not merely regularities of behavior that
may come to be seen as informal rules; rather, they are set out formally, so that everyone
can clearly recognize them as rules of the community. The more clearly individuals
recognize the rules, the more likely they will be to comply. The greater the general level
of compliance, the greater will be the benefit — i.e., general deterrence — to community
members. Finally, the greater the benefit community members enjoy from the compliance
of others, the greater their (fair play) obligation is similarly to comply.
So to sum up my response to this first objection, punishment may be in-principle
permissible in the state of nature, but if so it will be because of the same considerations of
fairness that ground its permissibility in a political community. The fair play obligation to
comply with the rules of punishment will be significantly stronger, however, in a political
community than in the state of nature, because the benefits yielded by punishment will be
comparatively greater in a political community than in the state of nature.
The state-of-nature objection charged that the fair play view is insufficient in that
it can only establish punishment’s permissibility in the context of a cooperative social
order. A second line of objection contends that, even in the context of such a social order,
the fair play view is insufficient in that it can only establish the permissibility of
punishing those who benefit from the institution of punishment. The worry here applies to
the fair play view of political obligation generally. The objection is that, although the
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goods yielded by the cooperative social order may be generally beneficial, there may be
individuals for whom the costs of compliance with the rules of the scheme outweigh the
corresponding benefits. If so, then in such cases considerations of fair play seem ill-suited
to ground obligations of compliance. In the context of the rule(s) instituting punishment
of crimes, one might object that many criminals do not, all-things-considered, benefit
from the existence of such an institution (or, to put it another way, that the costs outweigh
the benefits). That is, we might be hard pressed to demonstrate that, say, an individual
serving an extended prison term is better off than she would have been had there been no
institution of punishment. In the counterfactual case, she might not enjoy the benefits that
punishment yields (general deterrence, etc.), but she also would not face the hardships
associated with the prison term. Thus on balance, one might argue that she would be
better off if there were no institution of punishment.30
Whether an individual being punished would be, on balance, better off in a
society with no institution of punishment is an empirical question. It is not obvious to me
that she would be better off in such circumstances. On one hand, without the prospect of
legal punishment to deter others from committing crimes, the individual’s own safety and
security (as well as that of her loved ones) might be significantly jeopardized. On the
other hand, if the person herself engaged in wrongdoing against others, the void created
by the absence of a legal institution of punishment might be filled by private vengeance.
This vengeance might be much more severe than the legal punishment that the offender
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would face.31 More importantly, however, as I noted earlier, the rule instituting
punishment as the response to crimes is best understood as a conditional: if you commit a
crime, then you will be subject to punishment. The rule thus offers individuals not only
the benefits of general deterrence (or perhaps special deterrence, incapacitation,
retribution, etc.) but also the opportunity to constrain their behavior so as to avoid
punishment. So to the prisoner who claims she has not benefited from the rule instituting
punishment, we might reply: “Is it more beneficial (a) that there be a rule that helps
protect you and your loved ones by deterring crimes and allows you the opportunity to
avoid being punished yourself, or (b) that there be no such rule, so that harms to you and
your family may go undeterred, and if you wrong others you will be subject to their
vengeance?” If we thus consider the benefits individuals receive from the institution of
punishment and the choice each person has to avoid punishment herself, then punishment
does appear, on balance, beneficial.32
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Lisa H. Perkins cites the hazards of private vengeance to ground her justification of punishment in
“Suggestion for a Justification of Punishment,” Ethics 81:1 (Oct. 1970): 55-61. See also John Locke,
Second Treatise of Civil Government, ch. 2 para. 13, in Readings in Social & Political Philosophy, ed.
Robert M. Stewart (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 15-6; John Hospers, “Punishment,
Protection, and Retaliation,” in Justice and Punishment, ed. J. B. Cederblom and William L. Blizek
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977), p. 35; and Nicola Lacey, State Punishment: Political
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One might press the objection by claiming that surely there may be those — mob bosses or drug lords,
for instance — for whom the legal institution of punishment is not, on balance, beneficial. I actually think
mob bosses and drug lords do benefit from, and actually depend on, the existence of institutions of law
enforcement and punishment to preserve the social order in which they illegally operate. Nevertheless, I
concede the general point that if examples can be produced of criminals who cannot be said to benefit from
the institution of punishment (yet for whom we nevertheless believe punishment is permissible), then this
represents a serious challenge to the fair play account. I submit that proponents of the fair play account of
punishment would do well to focus on objections such as this, rather than trying to establish what sort of
advantage an offender unfairly gains, relative to other community members, through the commission of her
crime. I thank Julia Driver for pressing me on this point.
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The previous objection contended that the fair play view is insufficient in that it
can only ground the permissibility of punishing those who benefit from the institution of
punishment. The final objection I want to consider charges that the fair play view is
insufficient in that it can only ground the permissibility of punishing those who accept
the benefits of this institution. It has been commonly suggested that my merely receiving
benefits from others’ compliance with the rules of a cooperative enterprise is not itself
enough to generate obligations on me to reciprocate.33 Rather, as A. John Simmons has
written, what is required is that I accept these benefits.34 With respect to certain kinds of
benefits, which Simmons calls readily available, determining whether we accept them is
fairly straightforward — if we seek them out and obtain them, then we have accepted
them. For instance, if I request and receive “special protection by the police, if I fear for
my life, say, or if I need my house to be watched while I’m away,” this would constitute
my acceptance of a readily available benefit.35 By contrast, many benefits of membership
in a political community are not the sort that we seek out; rather, they are open benefits,

33

Robert Nozick notably made the point that mere receipt of benefits is not sufficient to confer obligations
by way of this example: Imagine you live in a neighborhood in which a group of your neighbors buys a
public address system and decides to start a public entertainment program for the neighborhood (which
happens to comprise 365 neighbors). Each neighbor is assigned one day per year in which she is
responsible for running the PA system. “After 138 days on which each person has done his part, your day
arrives. Are you obligated to take your turn? You have benefited from it, occasionally opening your
window to listen, enjoying some music or chuckling at someone’s funny story. The other people have put
themselves out. But must you answer the call when it is your turn to do so? As it stands, surely not.”
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York City: Basic Books, 1974), p. 93.
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which we cannot avoid, except perhaps at great inconvenience.36 Examples of open
benefits include police protection, national security from external threats, assurance of
air- and water-quality standards, etc.
On Simmons’ account, acceptance of an open benefit normally involves “taking
the benefit willingly and knowingly,” where this requires, at least, (a) regarding the
benefit “as flowing from a cooperative scheme” rather than seeing it “as ‘free’ for the
taking,” and (b) thinking that the benefit is “worth the price we must pay for [it],” so that
given a choice of taking the benefit and accepting the concurrent burdens or rejecting the
benefit, we would take it.37 These are fairly steep requirements on what counts as
acceptance of a benefit. Not surprisingly, he concludes that many, perhaps most, citizens
do not meet these criteria for acceptance of benefits. Many do not notice or think much
about the benefits they receive from the political order, and many of those who do think
about these benefits mistakenly undervalue them relative to the corresponding burdens —
thus for Simmons they cannot be said to have accepted the open benefits in the sense
necessary to confer political obligation.
George Klosko has provided what I take to be a persuasive response to this
objection. Essentially, Klosko contends that acceptance, of the sort Simmons has in mind,
is not necessary in some cases for open benefits to confer fair play obligations. Klosko
contends that in situations where you benefit from our compliance with the rules of a
cooperative venture but do not yourself comply (i.e., in free-rider situations), fairness
36
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demands either (a) that you no longer benefit, (b) that we (i.e., the rest of us) be similarly
freed from the burden of compliance, or (c) that you start to comply.38 Open benefits, by
definition, benefit everyone — they cannot be provided generally but withheld from
certain members of the community. Thus with respect to open benefits, (a) is not an
option. Klosko argues that (b) also is not an option for certain open benefits, specifically
those that are indispensable to the welfare of all community members.39 National defense,
for instance, “is essential to the well-being of X and all its members, [therefore] it must be
provided. The consequences of nonprovision would be catastrophic for all concerned”40
— to the free rider herself as well as everyone else. Thus to allow that no one has the
burden of compliance (and thus to sacrifice the corresponding benefits) is not a
practically viable option. With (a) and (b) unavailable as options, only (c) remains — the
free rider is obliged to comply. Klosko writes:
It is difficult to imagine what Pickerel could say to the
members of X, who have provided him with national
defense, in order to justify his unwillingness to cooperate.
Because the benefits are indispensable, he could not say
that he does not want them. Nor could he distinguish
himself from the other X-ites because he has not sought the
benefits out. Because of the nature of national defense,
none of the X-ites have pursued them. The X-ites can be
presumed to differ from Pickerel in their willing acceptance
of the scheme’s burdens. But Pickerel’s unwillingness to
participate is difficult to defend. Unless there is some
morally relevant difference between Pickerel and the
members of X, his refusal to cooperate must be interpreted
38
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simply as a desire to profit from their labor without doing
his fair share, and so as a clear instance of free riding.41
Klosko thus concludes that we may be obliged to comply with rules that provide
us with open, indispensable benefits even if we have not accepted these benefits in the
sense Simmons requires. Note, however, that on this account, fair play only grounds
obligations to comply with the rules that provide open and indispensable benefits.42 The
relevant question for present purposes, then, is whether the benefits provided by the
institution of punishment are open and indispensable. I contend that they are both. As I
indicated earlier, I believe the central benefit of the institution of punishment is that it
gives genuine bindingness to the rule of law by providing significant incentives not to
violate legal rules (i.e., through general deterrence). In this way, the institution of
punishment plays a crucial role in ensuring the security of community members. If I am
right, then this seems fairly clearly to be an open benefit. Receiving this benefit does not
require actively seeking it, and in fact it’s not clear how we might refuse this benefit.
41

Ibid., p. 42. One might object to Klosko’s claim here by pointing out that a community member could
sincerely (albeit unwisely) claim not to want the benefits provided by national defense (or for our purposes,
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The benefit provided by punishment is also, I believe, indispensable. In describing
indispensable open benefits, Klosko writes that this class of benefits is likely quite small;
however, he maintains that it comprises, at least, goods necessary to protecting the
physical security of community members, such as national defense, protection from a
hostile environment, provisions for satisfying basic bodily needs, and notably, law and
order. “That we all need the public goods just mentioned regardless of whatever else we
need is a fundamental assumption of liberal political theory.”43 In particular, the
fundamental importance of security has been widely recognized by liberal political
theorists. As John Stuart Mill pointed out, security is a requirement for the enjoyment of
virtually all other goods:
… but security no human being can possibly do without; on
it we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the
whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing
moment, since nothing but the gratification of the instant
could be of any worth to us, if we could be deprived of
anything the next instant by whoever was momentarily
stronger than ourselves.44
As Mill recognized, whatever the things are that matter to us — whether these be
possessions, projects, relationships, or whatever — these things will typically have value
for us insofar as we can be secure in their pursuit or enjoyment. We buy things, and we
count on their not being stolen or destroyed by others; we travel, and we count on the fact
43
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that those around us will drive responsibly; we work to earn a living, and we count on the
fact that our employers will not take advantage of us. The rule of law plays a crucial role
in ensuring the security of all community members, and the institution of punishment
plays a crucial role in ensuring that the rule of law genuinely binds.45 Thus I conclude
that the institution of punishment provides an indispensable open benefit. As such, it
grounds a fair play obligation of compliance even for those who have not met Simmons’
standards for acceptance of the benefit.
This is not to say that the institution of punishment will therefore be permissible
no matter what punishments it prescribes in particular cases. As I have indicated from the
outset, the defense I have offered here is only of punishment’s in-principle moral
permissibility. That is, my argument has been that punishment per se, that is, the
intentional infliction of harm on criminal wrongdoers, does not in itself constitute a
violation of offenders’ rights. Particular instances of punishment, however, may still be
morally impermissible all things considered if they fail to treat offenders with the respect
to which they are entitled as moral persons. Again, I take it that my account is similar in
this respect to fair play accounts of political obligation generally. In other words, if
considerations of fair play ground an obligation to comply with criminal statutes, this
45

My claim here rests on two empirical claims, either of which might be challenged. One might contend
either that the security of community members does not depend on the rule of law, or alternatively that the
rule of law’s bindingness does not depend on the institution of punishment. Thus even if security is
understood to be an indispensable benefit, one might argue that punishment is not an indispensable means
to achieving that benefit. Arguing for these empirical claims is beyond the scope of this paper, but I
concede that if it could be shown convincingly that the security of community members could be ensured
as (or more) effectively by means other than a system of laws backed by punishment, then the case I offer
here for punishment’s in-principle permissibility would be correspondingly undermined. I am grateful to R.
A. Duff for pushing me on this point.
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surely is only a presumptive obligation. Such accounts would not ground (nor purport to
ground) an absolute obligation of compliance irrespective of the content of the statutes. In
fact, any plausible account of political obligation, be it grounded in considerations of fair
play, tacit consent, natural duties of justice, or whatever, will allow that in certain cases
we may be permitted, perhaps even required, to violate unjust laws (perhaps through civil
disobedience, or in extreme cases, even outright revolution). Nevertheless, there is a
presumptive moral obligation to comply with a community’s laws — and relevant for
present purposes, there is a presumptive moral obligation to comply with the rule
according to which one is subject to punishment when one has violated some criminal
statute. Thus the institution of punishment is in principle morally permissible.

VI. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have aimed to provide a more plausible version of the fair play
justification of punishment, one that follows more straightforwardly from the fair play
account of political obligation and also avoids the objections typically leveled against fair
play defenses of punishment. The merits of my account could be evaluated in a couple of
ways: First, we could ask whether, from within the perspective of the fair play view, my
account provides a more plausible route to grounding the permissibility of punishment
than do the standard articulations of the view. Second, we could ask whether the fair play
view itself is plausible.
Although I am obviously sympathetic to the fair play view itself (that is, to the
fair play view of political obligation), I have in this paper offered only a brief defense of
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this view against what I take to be the most powerful objections raised against it. A full
defense of the view is well beyond the scope of this paper. For others who would endorse
the fair play account of punishment, however, I suggest that the political obligation
question should take center stage. If the fair play view of political obligation can be
defended, then the fair play account of punishment follows straightforwardly.
My primary focus in this paper, however, has been with the first point. That is, I
contend that my fair play account is more plausible, as a fair play account of punishment,
than are standard versions of the view. As I have discussed, my account leads to the
implication that the question of punishment’s in-principle permissibility is distinct from
the questions of its positive aim and of how to punish in particular cases; answers to these
distinct questions will require appeal to distinct moral considerations. Rather than
regarding this implication as regrettable, however, I suggest that fair play theorists should
embrace it. As I have argued, doing so is not only defensible in its own right, but it also
allows the fair play view to avoid a number of unappealing implications. 46
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CHAPTER 2
Deterrent punishment and respect for persons

In the previous chapter, I grounded punishment’s in-principle moral permissibility
in certain considerations of fairness shared by members of a political community. Even if
punishment is permissible in principle, however, it may be unjustified all things
considered if there is no legitimate, compelling reason to have such a practice. In my
view, the reason we should want an institution of punishment is that it helps to protect
community members’ security and well-being by reducing criminal activity. In this
chapter, I defend deterrence as the central aim of punishment.
Deterrence-based accounts of punishment have been criticized frequently because
they are unable to rule out occasionally punishing innocent citizens, or disproportionately
punishing guilty ones, if doing so would yield net deterrent benefits.1 In response to these
sorts of objections, some theorists have argued that although considerations of deterrence
cannot ground a complete justification of punishment, they may nevertheless shoulder
some of the justificatory burden. Perhaps most notably, H. L. A. Hart contended that
consequentialist considerations such as crime prevention represent the central aim of

1

See, e.g., David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (New York City: Cambridge University Press,
2008), pp. 41-52; Deirdre Golash, The Case Against Punishment: Retribution, Crime Prevention, and the
Law (New York City and London: New York University Press, 2005), pp. 43-44; John Braithwaite and
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1990), p. 46; H. J. McCloskey, “Utilitarian and Retributive Punishment,” Journal of Philosophy 64:3
(1967): 91-110, on pp. 93-102, and “An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism,” The Philosophical
Review 66:4 (1957): 466-85, on pp. 468-69; and W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, U.K.:
Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 57.
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punishment, but that particular impositions of punishment should be constrained by the
familiar principles that only the criminally guilty should be punished, and only in
proportion with the seriousness of their crimes.2 Constrained by principles such as these,
deterrence as an aim of punishment looks significantly more appealing.
Even with these constraints, however, deterrence as an aim of punishment has
been subject to a further line of criticism. Here, the objection is not that in some cases
considerations of deterrence might permit the punishment of law abiders, but rather that
punishment aimed at deterrence fails to respect offenders as autonomous moral agents —
or in Kantian terms, as ends in themselves. This challenge is particularly powerful. It
does not merely charge that deterrent punishment might allow, in certain cases, the
disrespectful treatment of offenders; if this were the charge, then perhaps constraints
could be articulated, similar to the constraints against punishing the innocent, to rule out
such treatment. The objection here, however, is that punishment aimed at deterrence by
its nature fails to treat offenders with respect. If the charge is valid, then additional
constraints won’t help.3
This paper defends deterrence as an aim (in my view, the central aim) of
punishment against this objection that deterrent punishment fails to respect offenders as
moral persons. I examine three prominent ways in which this charge has been fleshed out.
2

H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (New York City: Oxford
University Press, 1968), pp. 8-13. See also Don E. Scheid, “Constructing a Theory of Punishment, Desert,
and the Distribution of Punishments,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 10 (1997): 441-506.
For a somewhat different sort of disaggregation of the relevant questions, see Ross, The Right and the
Good, pp. 61-64.
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p. 219.
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First, some theorists, such as Jeffrie Murphy, have objected that punishing with the aim
of deterrence uses the offender as a mere means to secure some social benefit, namely,
crime reduction. The second and third versions of the objection have been developed
thoroughly by R. A. Duff. A system of criminal law and punishment aimed at deterrence,
Duff claims, offers reasons for compliance that are inappropriate to autonomous moral
agents, and it implicitly excludes criminals from membership in the political community.
Duff offers these as aspects of the same line of critique, but I argue below that they are in
fact separate charges and thus merit distinct consideration. I contend that none of these
objections ultimately succeeds. That is, none of them establishes that punishment aimed
at deterring crime fails to demonstrate appropriate respect for persons. Specifically, a
deterrent system of punishment — bounded by appropriate constraints on who may be
punished and how severely — does not treat offenders as mere means to securing certain
social goods, it does not offer inappropriate reasons for compliance with the law, and it
does not implicitly exclude criminals from membership in the political community.
In section I, I examine and refute the objection that deterrent punishment uses
offenders as mere means to securing the social goal of crime reduction. In section II, I
take a closer look at Duff’s account and contend that he actually offers two
distinguishable versions of the respect-based objection. In sections III and IV, I examine
each of these objections in turn, and I conclude that neither succeeds. Ultimately,
deterrence is a permissible aim for a system of criminal punishment; that is, punishment
aimed at deterring crime can be consistent with respect for moral persons.
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I. Does deterrence use offenders as mere means?
One way to interpret the charge that deterrent punishment fails to respect
offenders as persons is that such punishment appears to use offenders as mere means to
deterring crime. Jeffrie Murphy, for instance, has written of deterrence that “a guilty man
is, on this theory, being punished because of the instrumental value the action of
punishment will have in the future. He is being used as a means to some future good —
e.g., the deterrence of others.”4 Such punishment thus appears inconsistent with
maintaining proper respect for offenders as autonomous moral agents.
Murphy’s characterization of the good being sought as “the deterrence of others”
points to a sense in which we might think one form of deterrence can be especially
problematic. That is, it might seem bad enough that punishment subjects offenders to
hard treatment with the aim of promoting the social good of crime reduction. A critic
might further point out, however, that one type of deterrence, general deterrence, seeks to
achieve this social good by treating offenders in certain ways in order to affect others’
behaviors, to persuade others to comply with the law. Special deterrence may also seem
troubling insofar as it subjects an offender to hard treatment to bring about the social
good of crime reduction, but at least it treats the offender in this manner with the aim of
affecting her own future behavior, of persuading her to comply with the law in the future,
rather than treating her in this way to affect others’ behavior. Thus insofar as this
objection is valid, it strikes particularly hard at general deterrence.
4
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We might respond to this line of critique by pointing out that political
communities often harm law abiders for the sake of promoting some greater good, as well.
Construction of a new highway may be beneficial to the community generally, but it may
harm those who live nearby (perhaps by generating noise pollution or diminishing their
property values). Similarly, those with a communicable disease may be forced to endure
certain restrictions of their liberties in the interest of protecting public health. If harming
some for the greater benefit of others is permissible in cases such as these, and numerous
others, then perhaps harming offenders to benefit the public by deterring crime is
similarly permissible.
David Boonin rejects this line of response, however, because he believes it
overlooks the distinction between intending harm and foreseeing harm. Boonin points out
that cases such as those described above — the highway construction, or quarantining
those with a communicable disease — “do not involve intentionally harming some people
in order to benefit others. Rather, they involve intentionally doing acts that foreseeably
cause some harm to some people and provide greater benefits to many others.”5 He
continues:
[T]he fact is that punishment stands alone as the one
instance in which the state not only does an act that
predictably harms some of its citizens, but in which it acts
with the explicit aim of causing harm. Punishment is utterly
anomalous in this respect. This is precisely what makes

5

Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, p. 62.

51

punishment distinctively difficult to justify in the first
place.6
Thus for Boonin, a deterrent system of punishment is objectionable because it
intentionally harms some to benefit others. The harm is the means by which the good is
achieved, not merely a foreseeable consequence.
Given that the ultimate aim of a system of deterrent punishment is to reduce crime,
however, I suggest that actual inflictions of punishment are not the means by which the
system seeks to achieve this aim. Rather, the threat of punishment is intended to do the
deterrent work.7 A deterrent system of punishment communicates a threat to everyone in
the community: If you do these acts, you will be subject to punishment. Consider that if
the threat of deterrent punishment were perfectly effective, no one would violate the
community’s laws, and thus no one would be punished. Actual instances of punishment,
then, are best seen as cases where the deterrent threat failed.8 The inflictions of harm that
constitute punishment are not the means by which the good of crime reduction is
achieved; rather, the means by which deterrent systems of punishment aim to reduce
crime is by issuance of a threat. Obviously, in the actual world deterrent systems of
punishment are not perfectly effective. Individuals continue to commit crimes despite the
existence of the deterrent threat. In these cases, such individuals are harmed in the ways

6

Ibid. See also Nathan Hanna, “Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism,” Law and Philosophy
27 (2008): 123-150, on pp. 124-28.
7

One might worry that the threat of punishment is itself a sort of coercive sanction, in that its aim is to
change incentives so that, in effect, it restricts citizens’ viable options. I consider this point more below.

8

S. I. Benn noted this point in his “An Approach to the Problems of Punishment,” Philosophy 33:127
(1958): 325-41, on p. 330.

52

characteristic of punishment. But such individuals are foreseeably rather than
intentionally harmed. Again, this is because the intention of a deterrent system of
punishment is that everyone should take the threat seriously and avoid criminal behavior
(and, in turn, punishment).
Boonin insists, however, that the intended-harm element is essential to our
conception not only of deterrent punishment, but of punishment in general. He writes:
When the state punishes someone, … it inflicts various
harmful treatments on him in order to harm him. It is not
merely that in sentencing a prisoner to hard labor, for
example, we foresee that he will suffer. Rather, a prisoner
who is sentenced to hard labor is sentenced to hard labor so
that he will suffer, and if a given form of labor turned out to
be too pleasant and enjoyable, he would be sentenced to
some other form of labor for precisely that reason.9
Boonin may be correct with respect to punishment whose central aim is
retribution, or perhaps even special deterrence (although even on these accounts there
would presumably be plausible considerations cautioning against lengthening or altering
sentences once they had been issued). But his point is mistaken with respect to general
deterrence. In a system of punishment aimed at general deterrence, sentences are not
imposed to inflict suffering on the offender, but rather to maintain a credible threat to the
public generally. Typically, of course, the more severe the sentence, the more the
offender will suffer and the more credible the threat will be. But the concern, from the
perspective of general deterrence, is not how much an offender suffers, but rather how
effectively the general public is deterred from committing the given offense. In fact, if the
9
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credible threat could be maintained without harming any offenders, then this would be
entirely acceptable based solely on considerations of general deterrence.10 Punishment
aimed at general deterrence, then, is best characterized not as intentionally harming some
to benefit others, but rather as intentionally threatening everyone, and then foreseeably
harming those who nevertheless commit crimes.
Suppose, however, that I am wrong about this. Suppose that punishment aimed at
deterrence is in fact best understood as intentionally harming some to benefit others. This
is still not enough to establish that such punishment would violate the Kantian principle
of respect for persons. It’s widely recognized that this principle does not forbid treating
others as means, but as mere means. We frequently treat others as means to our own or
other people’s ends, and we typically consider such treatment permissible. I ask a taxi
driver to take me to my destination, our country sends soldiers to fight in a war to protect
our interests, I ask a friend to lend me money. The taxi driver, the soldiers, and my friend
are all treated as means to others’ ends (mine, or in the case of the soldiers, the country’s),
but we do not find these cases objectionable as long as they are not treated merely as
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means. The relevant question for this version of the respect-based objection, then, is
whether deterrent punishment treats offenders merely as means to the social good of
crime reduction.
There are good reasons to doubt that punishing for deterrence uses offenders
merely as means to the end of crime reduction. First, note that insofar as the institution of
punishment does yield a deterrent effect, those who commit crimes typically will have
reaped benefits from the existence of this institution just as law abiders have done.
Perpetrators of crime are also, like other community members, potential victims of crime.
Thus insofar as the institution of punishment helps to deter crime, it protects the safety
and security of everyone.
One might respond that an offender may still be treated merely as a means when
she is harmed in the interest of securing this social good, even if the social good is also a
good for the offender herself. If our legal system sanctioned the occasional punishment of
innocent people for the purpose of achieving the beneficial deterrent effect, for instance,
then these individuals would be used as mere means even if they themselves had
benefited from the deterrent effects of the institution generally. Thus even if offenders as
well as law abiders enjoy the general benefits of deterrent punishment, this fact by itself
appears insufficient to assure that such punishment avoids using offenders as mere means.
Deterrent punishment with prohibitions on punishing the guilty is relevantly
different, however, from a system of deterrent punishment (even an overall beneficial one)
that allowed the punishment of the innocent. To punish law abiders would be to treat
them in ways that were not responsive to choices they had actually made, and thus it
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would fail to respect them as autonomous moral agents. Respectful treatment requires at
least that we treat others according to what they have actually done (or failed to do);
punishing those who have violated no criminal laws fails to meet this minimal standard of
respect. Notice, though, that a deterrent system of punishment does not only offer to each
community member the benefits that come from reduced crime. Deterrent punishment
constrained by the retributivist principle against punishing the innocent also allows each
individual to choose whether she will risk suffering the harms associated with
punishment. Such a system offers everyone a choice: Comply with the law, or be subject
to punishment. Thus unlike the innocent person who is punished to achieve the deterrent
effect, the offender’s punishment is a response to the choice she made to violate the law.
Given that her punishment is a response to her own free choice, the fact that the aim of
punishing her is to deter others from committing similar crimes (or her from committing
similar crimes in the future) does not imply that she is treated merely as a means to this
end. Hart expresses essentially this idea, as he describes the institution of punishment as
“offering individuals including the criminal the protection of the laws on terms which are
fair, because they not only consist of a framework of reciprocal rights and duties, but
because within this framework each individual is given a fair opportunity to choose
between keeping the law required for society’s protection or paying the penalty.”11
Still, even if an institution of deterrent punishment offers benefits to everyone,
and even if it offers each community member equally a choice about whether to endure
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the threatened sanction, one might still object that this choice itself is coercive, that it
employs the threat of harm to restrict citizens’ viable options. Richard Burgh objects to
Hart’s account by offering what he considers an analogous case, in which terrorists take a
group of people hostage and tell each that if he tries to escape, he will be beaten. The
terrorists treat all of the hostages equally, and they stay true to their pledge only to beat
those hostages who try to escape. “Simply because a hostage is given a fair opportunity to
avoid being beaten,” Burgh concludes, “it does not follow that his beating is just.”12 Even
if the terrorists “were to inform the hostages that if they do as they are told they will
receive positive benefits,” beating those who tried to escape would be unjust.13 Burgh
concludes that, analogously, deterrent punishment cannot be justified on grounds that it
provides a choice either to comply with the law and reap benefits from others’
compliance or to break the law and suffer punishment.
Contrary to Burgh’s charge, however, there is a fairly straightforward difference
between the choice offered by the institution of deterrent punishment and the choice
offered by the terrorists. Given that the terrorists violate each hostage’s liberty rights, the
hostages’ choice is either not to do that which they have a moral right to do (namely,
leave) or to be beaten. So the terrorists use the prospect of force to persuade the hostages
not to do what they have a right to do. A system of deterrent punishment, however,
employs the prospect of force to persuade community members not to do the sort of acts
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that they have a moral obligation not to do.14 Thus the relevant question is whether a
system of punishment that provided significant benefits to community members generally,
and that offered a choice either not to commit acts that one has moral obligations not to
commit or to be harmed, is coercive in a way that renders it inconsistent with respect for
moral persons. Given that such a system offers each community member benefits, treats
each according to her own choices, and seeks to persuade citizens not to do that which
they have a moral obligation not to do anyway, I suggest that such a system is consistent
with respecting individuals, even those punished, as autonomous moral agents.
Kant himself provides support for the view that punishment, properly constrained
by the retributivist principle, may aim at deterrence while nevertheless respecting the
offender. A criminal, he writes, “must previously have been found punishable before any
thought can be given to drawing from his punishment something of use for himself or his
fellow citizens.”15 Although Kant’s full view of punishment continues to be the subject of
substantial debate, in this passage he suggests that deterrence is a permissible aim, which
for him means that it does not use the individual as a mere means, as long as punishments
are limited to those who are guilty of crimes.
I conclude that punishment aimed at deterrence does not use offenders as mere
means, and thus that this version of the respect-based objection fails. Still, Kant’s respect
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principle instructs us not only not to use others as mere means, but also to respect them as
ends in themselves. Respecting people as ends may require more than merely not using
them as mere means. Perhaps, then, there is a sense in which punishment aimed at
deterrence nevertheless violates the respect principle. In the following three sections, I
consider what I take to be the most thorough and compelling development of this sort of
objection, by R. A. Duff.

II. Duff’s critique of deterrence
Duff conceives of the criminal law as fundamentally a communicative enterprise.
He argues that a system of punishment that aims to deter potential offenders is
inappropriate for a liberal political community, committed to respecting its members as
members of the community. Essentially, this is because deterrent punishment
communicates in prudential rather than moral terms:
The law of [a liberal political] community, as its common
law, must address its members in terms of the values it
embodies — values to which they should, as members of
the community, already be committed. It portrays criminal
conduct as wrongful in terms of those values; and the
reasons that citizens have to refrain from such conduct, the
reasons to which the law refers and on which it depends,
are precisely the moral reasons that make such conduct
wrong. A purely deterrent law, however, addresses those
whom it seeks to deter, not in terms of the communal
values that it aims to protect, but simply in the brute
language of self-interest. It thus addresses them, not as
members of the normative community of citizens, but as
threatening outsiders against whom the community must
protect itself. It implicitly excludes them from membership
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of the citizen community by no longer addressing them in
terms of that community’s values.16
Duff is concerned, commendably, that offenders should be treated as moral
persons, and in fact as continuing members of the community, rather than merely as the
“they” against whom “we,” the law-abiding community members, must protect ourselves.
His concern is well founded — it is all too easy, and too common, to assume that the
criminal act necessarily demonstrates a criminal, perhaps even irredeemably criminal,
character. Duff urges us, however, always to regard the person guilty of a criminal
offense as nevertheless one of us, a member of our community who may come to share
(or recommit to) the moral values that the community endorses. Despite the significant
virtues of Duff’s account, however, I contend that his objection to punishments aimed at
deterrence misses its mark. There is a real sense in which a system of punishment aimed
at deterring crime (with appropriate constraints) can nevertheless demonstrate appropriate
respect for criminal offenders, and thus avoid being objectionably exclusionary.
Note that Duff actually offers two critiques of systems of punishment aimed at
deterrence — two ways in which such systems of punishment fail to treat individuals
with appropriate respect as autonomous moral agents. First, deterrent punishment offers
individuals the wrong sort of reasons to comply with the law. It offers merely prudential
reasons to comply — i.e., to avoid incarceration, community service, etc. — rather than
the appropriate moral reasons — i.e., that the prohibited acts are morally condemned by
the community. Second, by offering merely prudential reasons, rather than making the
16
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sort of moral appeal that is appropriate to members of a liberal political community, a
deterrent system of punishment implicitly excludes those it addresses from membership
in the community. It fails to respect them as fellow community members who, as
members, share (or should share, and can come to share) the community’s moral values.
Punishing to deter is thus exclusionary, Duff believes, in that it reinforces the distinction
between “we,” the law-abiding citizens, and “they,” the criminals, rather than treating
offenders as continuing to be fellow members of our community.
Duff implies that the second critique follows from the first. That is, he indicates
that a system of punishment aimed at deterrence excludes certain individuals from the
political community because it offers them the wrong sort of reasons (i.e., prudential
reasons) to comply with the law. In fact, however, these are distinct critiques. The charge
that deterrent punishment is exclusionary rests on the notion that it treats offenders
differently from law abiders. It perpetuates the distinction between “us” (the law abiders)
and “them” (the criminals) and implicitly excludes “them” from the community in which
“we,” as law abiders, are still included as members. By contrast, the objection that
punishment aimed at deterrence provides the wrong sort of reasons to comply with the
law does not depend on its offering different reasons to offenders and to law abiders.
Rather, a system of punishment might offer the same, inappropriate reasons for
compliance to everyone. As such, it would not treat one group (offenders) as less of a part
of the political community than another group (law abiders). It would not perpetuate the
objectionable “we” and “they” distinction, because such a system would communicate

61

the same message, and offer the same reasons, to everyone.17 Thus whereas one objection
contends that deterrent punishment offers the wrong sort of reasons, the other contends
that it inappropriately offers different reasons to different members of the community.
I suggest, then, that these two critiques warrant distinct consideration. We should
ask, first, if punishment aimed at deterrence communicates a different message to (or
provides different reasons to, or in some other way excludes) criminals from the political
community generally; and second, if the reasons such a system of punishment offers for
complying with the law are themselves the wrong sort of reasons to offer fellow members
of the political community. I consider each of these critiques in turn and contend that,
ultimately, each fails. A system of punishment aimed at deterrence communicates the
same message to everyone in the political community, thus it does not implicitly exclude
anyone. Furthermore, a deterrent system of punishment is compatible with demonstrating
appropriate respect to all members of the community as members who share (or should
share, and can come to share) the community’s fundamental moral values.

III. Is deterrent punishment exclusionary?
The first objection evident in Duff’s account is that a system of punishment aimed
solely at deterrence implicitly excludes offenders from their community. It treats
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offenders as the “they” against whom “we,” the law-abiding members of the community,
must protect ourselves. Thus it fails to treat offenders with appropriate respect. Given
Duff’s conception of the criminal law as a fundamentally communicative enterprise, the
worry with deterrent punishment is that, insofar as it offers the offender only prudential
reasons why she should not have committed, say, theft or tax evasion, it fails to
communicate with her as (still) a member of the community. A more appropriate message
to a community member would appeal to the moral reasons that her act was wrong,
namely, that such acts violate important moral values that the community shares (and
thus that she, as a member of the community, should also share).
The thrust of the “exclusion” objection to deterrent punishment, then, is that once
a member of the community commits a crime, the criminal law stops talking to her as it
talks to law abiders, to whom it offers appropriate, moral reasons not to violate the law;
instead, it begins to talk with her in the language of mere prudence, as though this is the
only language she is capable of understanding. As such, it inappropriately excludes her
from membership in her community.
One might understandably be tempted to respond here that the offender, in
committing her crime, essentially excludes herself from membership in the community
— or at least, that she demonstrates that she does not share the community’s moral values.
If so, then it may seem appropriate for a system of punishment to communicate to her
solely in the language of prudence rather than in the language of the community’s moral
values. Duff rejects this argument, however, for several reasons, the most persuasive of
which is that it is empirically dubious. Often, criminal acts are not evidence that
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offenders have no regard for the community’s moral values, but rather “that their regard
is not wholehearted, or consistent, or always sufficient to overcome the temptations of
self-interest. They — or rather we, since these comments surely apply to many of us —
are not wholly deaf to the law’s moral appeal, though we do not attend to it carefully or
consistently enough”18 Duff is right to caution against assuming that an individual’s
criminal act is evidence of a complete rejection, or lack of regard, for the community’s
values.
There is a more fundamental problem, however, with the claim that deterrent
punishment somehow communicates to offenders differently from law abiders, and thus
excludes offenders from the political community. The message communicated by a
system of punishment aimed at deterrence essentially takes the form of a threat: If you
commit some criminal act, then you will be liable to have some form of suffering
inflicted on you. It is important to consider, however, to whom this message is
communicated. For deterrent punishment to be exclusionary, to create the sort of “wethey” dichotomy that concerns Duff, it would have to be the case that a system of
deterrent punishment communicates one (prudential) message only to criminal offenders,
and that law abiders, by contrast, receive another (moral) appeal that is appropriate to
members of the political community.
But this is doubly wrong. First, a system of deterrent punishment communicates
its prudential message, its threat, to everyone. For those who have not committed a crime,
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the prospect of punishment offers reasons not to do so (i.e., it acts as a general deterrent).
For those who do commit crimes, their punishments — or more specifically, the
unpleasant prospect of another term of punishment in the future — provide reasons not to
recidivate (i.e., they act as a special deterrent). From the perspective of deterrent
punishment, then, everyone is a potential offender (or reoffender), and such a system of
punishment communicates the same prudential message to everyone. Therefore, second,
if law abiders do receive the moral appeal that Duff believes is appropriate to members of
the political community, the source of this appeal is not the system of deterrent
punishment. Rather, the moral appeal must come from somewhere else, such as perhaps
the criminal laws themselves. But if it is the criminal laws that communicate the moral
message, that declare certain actions to be morally condemned by the community, the
intended audience of this communication is everyone, law abider and offender alike.
Thus it is not the case that, in receiving the prudential message of a deterrent system of
punishment, offenders are treated differently from others in the community, who are
exclusive recipients of the moral message. It appears that deterrent punishment is not
essentially exclusionary in the way Duff indicates.
There are other ways, of course, in which existing penal practices tend to exclude
offenders from the community. Imprisonment, by its nature, removes offenders
physically from the larger community. Beyond this, prisoners are typically excluded from
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participation in the political process, most obviously by being denied the vote.19 Also,
offenders are excluded from access to basic financial services (bank accounts, credit,
insurance), not only during their incarceration but often, in practice, even after their
release.20 These and other forms of exclusion should be troubling to members of a liberal
political community who are concerned to treat individuals, even offenders, with respect
as autonomous moral agents. But notice that such forms of exclusion are not distinctively
characteristic of systems of punishment aimed at deterrence (and constrained in the ways
suggested earlier). Because punishment involves the restriction of offenders’ liberties in
ways that law abiders’ liberties are not restricted, issues of exclusion will always arise.
But such issues are not distinctive of systems of punishment aimed at deterrence. Rather
than communicating differently to offenders and law abiders, and thus perpetuating the
“we-they” distinction that concerns Duff, systems of punishment aimed at deterrence
regard everyone equally as potential offenders, and thus they communicate the same
message, namely, if you commit a crime, then you will be liable to be harmed. I conclude,
then, that punishment aimed at deterrence is not exclusionary as Duff charges.
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IV. Does deterrent punishment offer the wrong sort of reasons for compliance?
Given that deterrent punishment communicates the same reasons to everyone, the
question then becomes whether these reasons are appropriate. Duff contends that they are
not. He writes, “The criminal law of a liberal polity, and the criminal process of trial and
conviction to which offenders are subjected, are communicative enterprises that address
the citizens, as rational moral agents, in the normative language of the community’s
values.”21 And the institution of punishment, a constitutive element of the institution of
criminal law generally, must similarly communicate in moral rather than prudential terms.
A system of punishment aimed at deterring criminals, however, aims to secure general
compliance with the law by means of a threat, rather than by moral appeal. Thus Hegel
famously objected: “To base a justification of punishment on threat is to liken it to the act
of a man who lifts his stick to a dog. It is to treat a man like a dog instead of with the
freedom and respect due to him as a man.”22 Like Hegel, Duff worries that the prudential
terms in which deterrent punishment communicates with community members, the
prudential reasons it gives them to comply with the community’s laws, are not the sort of
reasons that are appropriate to offer to autonomous members of a liberal political
community, who endorse (or could come to endorse) the community’s moral values.
I offer a couple of responses to this worry. First, punishment may communicate a
prudential message to community members without communicating a solely prudential
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message. In my view, the good of punishment, the reason we should want such an
institution, is that it plays a key role in ensuring the well-being of community members.
Thus the proper aim of punishment is to prevent or reduce crimes by offering potential
wrongdoers reasons not to offend. Punishment may serve this aim by supplying potential
offenders with prudential reasons not to offend (reasons such as the desire to avoid the
harms characteristic of incarceration, etc.), but it may also provide moral reasons. As is
commonly recognized, punishment involves not only what Joel Feinberg called a “hard
treatment” aspect but also an expressive aspect — punishment expresses the
community’s condemnation of the offender for her criminal act.23 Even before the
commission of a crime, however, the threat of punishment also expresses the
community’s condemnation not of a particular offender but rather of the offense itself. If
a potential offender receives and accepts this message of condemnation, it may play a
role in persuading her not to do what she otherwise would have done. If so, then even if
the fear of punitive suffering also played a role in dissuading her, I suggest that she is
treated with the respect due to her as a moral person. Thus even if a system of
punishment’s central aim is to provide prudential reasons for compliance, this does not
preclude its also providing moral reasons.
Second, even if a system of punishment did provide solely prudential reasons to
comply with the law, this doesn’t show that the criminal legal system more generally fails
to communicate with community members as moral persons. I agree with Duff that the
23

Joel Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment,” in Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory
of Responsibility (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 95-118.

68

criminal law should appeal to citizens as moral agents who share (or should share, and
can come to share) the community’s values. But punishment is only one aspect of the
criminal legal system. Suppose we grant, then, that a community through its criminal
statutes declares certain acts to be wrong and makes a moral appeal to community
members to comply, whereas trials and convictions communicate a message of deserved
moral censure to the wrongdoer, and they urge the wrongdoer “to understand and accept
the censure as justified … .”24 Why, then, must punishment also make a moral appeal?
Why is it inappropriate for the institution of punishment to communicate a solely
prudential message?
First, one might argue that the criminal legal system must be univocal in the
message it communicates to community members, and that this message must be a moral
rather than a prudential one. Thus the institution of punishment, as one element of the
criminal law generally, must communicate a moral message. It’s not clear why this
should be so, however. We can grant, with Duff, that the criminal legal institution should
communicate a moral message to community members while still (a) recognizing that
distinct elements of the institution can communicate different messages, (b) maintaining
that the criminal statutes themselves, and perhaps the process of trial and conviction,
sufficiently communicate the moral message, and thus (c) denying that punishment must
communicate this same message. Notice, too, that if the entire criminal legal system must
be univocal in its moral message, much more than deterrent punishment would be
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prohibited. The practice of plea bargaining, for one, would appear unjustifiable if
prudential appeals are inappropriate in criminal law. More reasonable, I suggest, is to
claim that the criminal law should address community members in moral terms, and in
fact that the moral message should be central, but that as long as this moral message is
present, prudential appeals also have an appropriate role.
A second possible response is that whereas the criminal law need not, in principle,
communicate only a moral message, the prudential message of deterrent punishment is
inappropriate in practice because it tends to drown out the moral message. That is,
perhaps the threat of punishment is so powerful that it tends to focus community
members’ attention on the prudential reasons not to commit crimes and cause them to
lose sight of the moral appeal. Andrew von Hirsch, who conceives of punishment as
offering prudential reasons to supplement the (sometimes insufficiently motivating)
moral reasons supplied by the criminal law, advocates a “decremental strategy” according
to which prescribed sentences would be reduced gradually to levels at which the
prudential reasons they offered would not drown out the moral reasons for compliance
with the laws.25 Duff is skeptical of such a strategy, however, as he believes that
sentences mild enough so as not to overwhelm the moral message with the prudential
threat would be too mild to achieve much deterrent effect at all, whereas by contrast,
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sentences sufficiently severe to provide any genuine deterrent effect would replace, rather
than merely supplement, the moral appeal.26
I suggest that this worry, that the prudential appeal of deterrent punishment may
drown out the moral message of the criminal law generally, inaccurately depicts the
relationship of the moral and prudential appeals. Rather than accepting that a stronger
prudential message will tend to weaken the moral message comparatively, why not
acknowledge that the prudential threat actually can reinforce the moral appeal? Granted,
an institution of punishment aimed at deterrence provides prudential reasons to comply
with the community’s laws. But the existence of such an institution also invites us to
consider, or remind ourselves, why our community believes that these laws, and the
interests they protect, are of sufficient moral weight that we are willing to invoke the
threat of hard treatment to help ensure that they are not violated. Rather than drowning
out the moral message of the criminal law, as Duff fears — the message that certain acts
are prohibited because society regards them as significant moral violations — deterrent
punishment can reinforce this message, as it underscores that protecting community
members from such violations is sufficiently important to warrant the infliction of harm
as a response.
The prudential message of deterrent punishment, therefore, is compatible with the
criminal law’s nevertheless communicating a moral appeal to community members, and
thus with respecting them as autonomous moral agents. On one hand, a system of
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punishment aimed at deterrence may nevertheless provide moral as well as prudential
reasons for compliance. On the other hand, even if punishment itself provides only
prudential reasons, the criminal legal system need not be univocal. As long as the moral
message is communicated prominently (by the laws themselves and the process of trial
and conviction), respect for persons does not require that the institution of punishment
communicate in moral terms. I conclude, then, that this third articulation of the respectbased objection fails.

V. Conclusion
In closing, it’s worth emphasizing again the scope of the defense of deterrence
that I have offered here. Specifically, I have not aimed to defend deterrence as sufficient
to ground a complete justification of punishment. Rather, my focus has been on
deterrence as the aim of punishment, constrained by certain considerations such as the
retributivist principles against punishing the innocent or excessively punishing the guilty.
Critics of deterrence, such as Murphy and Duff, claim that even as one element of this
sort of hybrid account of punishment, deterrence is objectionable because it fails to treat
individuals with appropriate respect as autonomous moral agents. I have contended,
however, that on what I take to be the three most plausible articulations of this critique, it
nonetheless fails. Constrained in certain ways, then, I conclude that deterrence is a
permissible aim of punishment.27
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CHAPTER 3
Retributivism as a constraint on punishment

I claimed in the chapter 2 that deterrence is a legitimate aim of punishment if we
accept certain constraints to ensure that particular impositions of punishment are
consistent with respect for moral persons. In this chapter and chapter 4, I focus on what
sort of constraints are warranted. An ostensible virtue of retributivism is that it entails
intuitively compelling limitations on punishments, namely, that only the guilty may be
punished and that punishments should be no more severe than is deserved as a response
to the crime (viz., punishment should fit the crime). Proponents of such a constraint
worry that punishment grounded purely in consequentialist considerations such as
deterrence may not have the resources to rule out punishment of the innocent or excessive
punishment of the guilty, insofar as there could be cases in which such punishment would
promote the best overall consequences. In Kantian terms, the retributivist constraints are
intended to ensure that those punished are treated with respect as moral persons. These
constraints are viewed by many legal theorists and practitioners not only as necessary to
ensure that those punished are appropriated respected, but also as sufficient.
My focus in what follows is on the second retributivist constraint, that punishment
should be no more severe than is deserved. Critics of retributivism point to its notorious
inability to make sense of the notion of desert, or of a punishment’s fitting a crime. Many
see it as a fatal flaw of retributivism that it doesn’t have the resources to provide guidance
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about what punishments are deserved for various crimes. Russ Shafer-Landau, for
instance, writes:
I do not believe that we can make sense of commensurating
punishment with moral desert. If we can’t, then the
commensurability thesis [that sentencing guidelines are
morally justified if and only if they assign punishments
commensurate with moral desert] is false. And if the
1
commensurability thesis if false, so too is retributivism.
In this chapter, I argue that the retributivist principle is indeed insufficient to
ensure adequate constraints on punishment — in particular, it is unable to provide
sufficient protection against overly harsh punishment. But this is not, at least not
primarily, for the reason that critics such as Shafer-Landau suggest. On the contrary,
considerations of moral desert may ground genuinely useful, albeit imperfect, guidance in
sentencing determinations. The more serious problem with retributivism is that, even if it
could provide definitive guidance regarding what punishment is morally deserved for a
given crime, in some cases this punishment will nevertheless strike many as too severe.
What treatment an offender morally deserves all things considered will often depend on
more factors than those on which retributivism focuses: the seriousness of a person’s
crime and her degree of responsibility for it. Retributivism itself provides no basis for
taking considerations other than these into account in determining how a political
authority should punish. Thus retributivism is insufficient as a constraint on punishment.

1

Russ Shafer-Landau, “Retributivism and Desert,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2000): 189-214, on
p. 190.
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Insofar as we are concerned to treat even offenders as ends in themselves, some
additional constraint(s) will be warranted.
In section I, I flesh out the retributivist constraint and examine the objection often
raised against retributivism that there is no adequate way to determine what punishment
is morally deserved for a given crime. I focus on Shafer-Landau’s particularly thorough
development of the objection, which, using an argument by elimination, concludes that
there is no fact of the matter about what punishment an offender deserves for a crime.
Thus his account includes not only the epistemological claim that we cannot know what
punishment a given crime morally deserves, but also the metaethical claim that there is
no fact of the matter to be known. In section II, after briefly taking issue with the
metaethical claim, I turn my focus to the epistemological worry: Given the inevitable,
apparently irresolvable disagreements about what punishments are morally deserved in
various cases, is the retributivist injunction on punishments that exceed what is deserved
essentially useless as a practical constraint on sentencing determinations? In response, I
contend that we may (at least if we reject nihilism about moral desert) believe this
retributivist constraint has some value insofar as (a) it may provide some guidance as a
general moral principle from which particular moral judgments may be, albeit
imperfectly, inferred, and (b) it ensures that desert, rather than various consequentialist
considerations, is the target in determining sentences. The deeper problem with the
retributivist constraint, however, lies in retributivism’s overly narrow criteria in
determining what response a wrongdoer morally deserves. In section III, I contend that to
treat offenders with respect as moral persons, it is not sufficient that we ensure that their
75

punishments fit their crimes. Respect requires some additional, nonretributivist
constraint(s) on punishment. Defending such a constraint is my project in chapter 4.

I. The retributivist constraint, and the standard objection
Theorists who endorse the retributivist constraint that punishments should be only
2

to the degree morally deserved (no excessive punishment) see it as a valuable check on a
political authority’s ability to impose overly harsh sentences to further some
consequentialist goal. Two features of this constraint are worth noting. First, as typically
endorsed — viz., punishments may be only as severe as is morally deserved — this
constraint is sometimes referred to as a negative retributivist principle, and it is contrasted
with the positive retributivist view that punishments should be no more or less than is
3

morally deserved. Negative retributivism (sometimes called minimalism) thus differs
from positive retributivism in that the former, but not the latter, could permit punishment
less severe than is believed to be deserved. For instance, J. Angelo Corlett endorses
negative retributivism and suggests as reasons for decreased punishment of the guilty,
“plea bargaining for the sake of securing stronger punishments for greater offenders who
deserve it, or simply not punishing minor offenses so that limited resources can be
2

See, e.g., W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), pp. 62-63; James
Sterba, “Retributive Justice,” Political Theory 3 (August 1977): 349-362; David Wood, “Reductivism,
Retributivism, and the Civil Detention of Dangerous Offenders,” Utilitas 9:1 (1997): 131-146, esp. p. 132;
and J. Angelo Corlett, “Making Sense of Retributivism,” Philosophy 76:295 (Jan. 2001): 77-110.

3

C.f., J. L. Mackie, “Morality and the Retributive Emotions,” Criminal Justice Ethics (1982): 3-10; R. A.
Duff and David Garland, A Reader on Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 7-8; R. A.
Duff, “Legal Punishment,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008), at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/ (accessed Sept. 8, 2008); and John Cottingham,
“Varieties of Retribution,” The Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1979): 238-46, at pp. 240-42.
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focused on more important wrongdoings.”4 Much of the popularity of the negative
retributivist constraint is that this constraint prohibits excessive punishment but also
allows for the intuitively attractive possibility that the mitigation of punishment may, in
some cases, be justified. The negative retributivist constraint is thus widely endorsed,
both by those (such as Corlett) who offer purely retributivist accounts of punishment and
also those (such as Ross and Hart) who endorse a consequentialist aim for punishment as
well as nonconsequentialist constraints.5
Second, the requirement that offenders should be punished only to the extent they
deserve is best understood as a claim about moral rather than legal desert. It’s true that, in
speaking of what punishment a criminal deserves, one might refer solely to the legally
deserved punishment, i.e., the punishment (or range of punishments) authorized by
sentencing guidelines. But this is no help if what we trying to determine is whether the
legally sanctioned sentences are themselves justified. The existence in some society of a
law according to which the offense of jaywalking is punishable by death would not
convince most of us that jaywalkers in such a society therefore deserve to die; rather,
most of us would feel that the law is unjust. What the retributivist needs, then, is an
account of moral desert, not merely legal desert. As Ted Honderich writes, “We get no
conceivable moral justification for punishment, no obligation or permission to punish,

4

J. Angelo Corlett, “Making Sense of Retributivism,” Philosophy 76:295 (Jan. 2001): 77-110, on p. 78, fn.
7.

5

Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 56-64; H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the
Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 1-13.
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from the fact that an act was against a law, no matter how wrong or useless or disastrous
the law, no matter the worth of the whole body of law of which it is part.”6
A common objection to the claim that punishment should be only as severe as is
morally deserved, and in fact to retributivism in general, is that there is no apparent way
to determine what punishment a given crime morally deserves. Those who would try to
link an offense directly to some punishment it deserves will face the problem of
explaining in what respect, in virtue of what, the punishment is deserved. Those who
would instead attempt first to rank crimes from least serious to most serious, and then to
map this ordinal ranking onto sentences that similarly run from least severe to most
severe, do not avoid the problem. Such accounts would need not only an explanation of
why one crime merits more severe punishment than another, but also of how to map the
ordinal ranking of crimes onto the penalty schedule. For a retributivist, these questions
will all need to be answered in terms of moral desert, but again, it’s unclear how desert
7

should be understood to link crimes and punishments. Shafer-Landau describes the
problem this way:

6

Ted Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications Revisited (London: Pluto Press, 2006), p. 23.

7

Among those who have cited concerns about retributivists’ inability to settle questions of moral desert,
either directly or as part of a proportional mapping of punishments onto crimes, are S.I. Benn, “An
Approach to the Problem of Punishment,” Philosophy 33:127 (Oct. 1958): 335-37; Edmund L. Pincoffs,
“Are Questions of Desert Decidable?” in J.B. Cederblom and William L. Blizek, eds., Justice and
Punishment (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 75-88, esp. pp. 84-86; Hugo Adam
Bedau, “Retribution and the Theory of Punishment,” The Journal of Philosophy 75:11 (Nov. 1978): 60120, on pp. 610-15; Andrew Ashworth, “Criminal Justice and Deserved Sentences,” Criminal Law Review
(1989): 340-55, on pp. 344-46; Michael Tonry, “Proportionality, Parsimony, and Interchangeability of
Punishments,” in R. A. Duff and David Garland, eds., A Reader on Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994), pp. 145-51; and Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications Revisited, pp. 36-41.
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If the commensurability thesis is true, and if legal
punishment can be morally justified, then there must be
some sanction or range of sanctions that a criminal morally
deserves for his conduct. But consider some standard cases
and see the difficulty for yourself: how much suffering is
morally deserved for one who impersonates an officer, or
counterfeits currency, or hijacks an airplane, or batters a
child? … [There] does not appear to be any way to know
whether the impersonator morally deserves eighty, eight
hundred or eight thousand days behind bars, or even
whether some amount of jail time is the appropriate kind of
punishment to impose in the first place. We can allow for
some indeterminacy in the sentencing correlations, but at
some point we must ask whether moral desert is giving us
8
any guidance at all.
. Although the critique of retributivism for its inability to settle questions of moral
desert is quite common, Shafer-Landau’s essay is distinctive, as far as I can tell, in that it
not only cites this difficulty, but thoroughly illustrates how the difficulty arises for the
various versions of retributivism. He sets about an argument by elimination, as he
considers and rejects a number of retributivist attempts to answer the question of what
punishment a crime morally deserves. Here I consider five of the more prominent of
these (which, I take it, are sufficient to demonstrate the general problem for retributivists
in determining moral desert): (1) punishment should be equal in kind to the crime; or (2)
it should inflict equal suffering; or (3) it should be a product of the seriousness of the
crime multiplied by the offender’s degree of responsibility; (4) it should correct the unfair
advantage gained by the perpetrator; or (5) it should communicate public condemnation
of the crime.

8

Ibid.
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First, there is the famous law of retribution, lex talionis, often expressed as “an
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,” which holds that a criminal should receive treatment
equal in kind to that which she inflicted on her victim. Kant famously endorses lex
talionis in his Doctrine of Right, where, discussing the appropriate amount and kind of
punishment for a given crime, he writes: “whatever undeserved evil you inflict upon
another within the people, that you inflict upon yourself. If you insult him, you insult
yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself; if you strike him, you strike
9

yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself.” As Shafer-Landau points out, problems with
10

this sort of strict interpretation of lex talionis quickly become apparent. For many
offenses, an in-kind response is impossible, either because there is no clear victim (e.g.,
many cases of reckless endangerment); the harm is spread over numerous victims, each
of whom is only negligibly harmed (e.g., tax fraud, or vandalism of public property); or
the perpetrator is in a relevantly different situation from her victim (e.g., kidnapping by a
childless person). Thus this strict interpretation of the law of retribution, according to
which crimes deserve punishment that is equal in kind, seems implausible in many cases.
Attempts to modify lex talionis to address these concerns do not fare much better.
For instance, some have argued that the principle is best interpreted not as endorsing an
in-kind response, but rather punishment that inflicts an equal amount of suffering on the

9

Kant, Metaphysics of Morals 6:332. In Mary J. Gregor, trans. and ed., The Cambridge Edition of the
Works of Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996). All
citations to the Metaphysics of Morals are to this edition.
10

Shafer-Landau, “Retributivism and Desert,” p. 193.
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11

criminal as her crime inflicted on the victim(s). But as Shafer-Landau indicates, this
version of the law of retribution encounters similar problems to the equal-in-kind
12

version. How much suffering is deserved, for instance, for reckless endangerment, or
for tax fraud? Further, how do we make interpersonal comparisons of suffering? Also, for
both the above interpretations of lex talionis, in which desert is wholly determined by the
harm done to the victim, there seems no room for consideration of mens rea (criminal
intent), although intent is typically held to be directly relevant to sentencing decisions.
A third sort of retributivist answer, offered by Robert Nozick, attempts to deal
with the mens rea concern by explicitly building considerations of responsibility into his
13

account of moral desert. Essentially, on Nozick’s account, we determine desert by
multiplying an offender’s degree of responsibility for an offense, r, by the wrongness of
the offense, H. On this formula, the value of r may range from 1 (full responsibility) to 0
(no responsibility), and the value of H “is a measure of the wrongness or harm, done or
intended, of the act.”14 Thus an offender deserves punishment proportionate to H when he
is fully responsible for his crime (1 x H = H), he deserves no punishment when he is not

11

See, e.g., Jeffrey Reiman, “Justice, Civilization and the Death Penalty: Answering van den Haag,”
Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 (1985): 115-48, esp. p. 125.
12 Shafer-Landau, “Retributivism and Desert, pp. 193-94.

13

Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp.
363-97.

14

Ibid., p. 363.
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at all responsible (0 x H = 0), and “otherwise punishment is discounted by (because
multiplied by) the person’s intermediate degree of responsibility.”15
Nozick’s account improves on the two previous accounts insofar as it
acknowledges the role of responsibility in determining moral desert. Still, this account
still doesn’t provide definitive guidance in sentencing. After all, it’s unclear how we are
to quantify the person’s responsibility, r, in any of the intermediate stages between full
and no responsibility. Similarly, Nozick provides no adequate account of how to
determine degrees of wrongness, H. He indicates only that the H-value for an offense
should be whichever is greater, “the amount of disutility the victim reasonably could have
been expected to undergo, [or] the amount of disutility the perpetrator would (reasonably
be expected to?) undergo from that same act.”16 Even if we find this claim compelling in
principle, it offers no guidance in how to measure disutility, or for that matter, what
would count as a reasonable expectation. So it is unclear on Nozick’s view how to
determine values for r or H, and because r and H are his determinants of moral desert,
this account cannot avoid the objection that it offers insufficient guidance in determining
moral desert.
A fourth retributivist account, which I discussed in chapter 1, is the fair play
17

view. According to the standard articulation of this view, the wrong to be redressed by

15

Ibid.

16

Ibid., p. 365.

17

Note that the nonstandard version of the fair play view that I defended in chapter 1 was not a retributivist
account. Among the most prominent articulations of this view as a retributivist justification of punishment
are Herbert Morris, “Persons and Punishment,” Monist 52 (1968): 475-501, and Jeffrie Murphy,
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punishment is a wrong against society generally. Essentially, the idea is that we all
benefit from our society’s laws, which protect against interferences with our liberties; but
along with this benefit comes the corresponding responsibility to refrain from breaking
these laws. A criminal, like other members of society, benefits from the general
obedience to laws, but she fails to reciprocate by obeying the laws herself. By failing to
restrain herself appropriately, she gains an additional degree of liberty, an unfair
advantage over the rest of society (in a sense, she becomes a free rider), and the
justification of punishment is that it corrects this unfair advantage by inflicting harm on
the offender proportionate to the benefit she gained by committing her crime.
This version of retributivism aims to avoid the problems of the earlier versions
with determining punishment deserved where there is no clear victim; on the reciprocity
view, punishment is a response not to a specific harm done to some specific victim(s), but
rather to an unfair advantage taken against society. Reciprocity theories still face two
significant problems, however: First, as has been commonly noted, it is counterintuitive
to think of the wrong perpetrated by, e.g., a rapist as a sort of free-riding wrong against
society in general, rather than an egregious wrong perpetrated against the victim. Second,
even if we grant that the relevant harm to be addressed by punishment is the additional
liberty unfairly enjoyed by the offender, how are we to determine the deserved
punishment, which on this account would be the punishment sufficient to offset, or
nullify, the criminal’s unfair advantage? What degree of unfair advantage over society,
Retribution, Justice, and Therapy (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1978), esp. pp. 82-115 and 223-49.
For a useful critical discussion of reciprocity theories, see M. Margaret Falls, “Retribution, Reciprocity, and
Respect for Persons,” Law and Philosophy 6:1 (1987): 25-51, on pp. 27-38.
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how much additional liberty, is gained by, e.g., a child molester? And what type and
18

degree of punishment would be sufficient to offset the unfair advantage? Ultimately,
it’s not clear that the fair play view gets us much closer to an answer to the moral desert
question than do the other retributivist efforts.
A fifth, increasingly popular retributivist answer to the question of how much
punishment is deserved is offered by the retributivist strain of communicative theories.
Communicative theorists contend that punishment is justified insofar as it is expresses a
message of public moral condemnation, or censure. Typically, modern communicative
theories incorporate a retributivist element: the condemnatory message is justified
19

because it is morally deserved. In particular, Shafer-Landau focuses on a retributivecommunicative view espoused by Jean Hampton, according to which the wrongness of
crimes is that they demean their victims, or communicate a message of their victims’
inferiority. Thus punishment is justified insofar as it sends a contrasting, nullifying

18

Perhaps the most sustained, if ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to answer these questions is offered by
Michael Davis. See, e.g., “How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime,” Ethics 93 (July 1983): 726-52; and
“Using the Market to Measure Deserved Punishment: A Final Defense,” in Davis, ed., To Make the
Punishment Fit the Crime: Essays in the Theory of Criminal Justice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992), pp.
234-53. For objections to Davis’ account, see Shafer-Landau, “Retributivism and Desert,” pp. 206-07; and
David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp.
129-35.
19

On other censure theories, the message communicated by punishment may be justified on nonretributivist
grounds. Emile Durkheim offers an account on which the message communicated by punishment is
justified insofar as it promotes social solidarity (Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. G.
Simpson (New York City: The Free Press, 1964)). An account by A.C. Ewing claims that punishment is
justified as a valuable communication that morally educates the public (Ewing, “Punishment as Moral
Agency: An Attempt to Reconcile the Retributive and the Utilitarian View,” Mind 36:143 (July 1927): 292305).
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20

message to victim and perpetrator, a message that affirms their equal status. Like the
views discussed above, however, Hampton’s retributivist-communicative theory faces
difficulties in determining what manner and degree of punishment is deserved in cases
with no clear victims. Also, even in cases with clear victims, it’s not clear that the
relevant feature of such crimes, the wrong that deserves to be punished, is that they
demean their victims, or express their inferiority. Shafer-Landau points out that, e.g.,
thieves or embezzlers need not feel superiority over their victims, and in any case this
doesn’t seem to be what is centrally wrong about such crimes.21
Other retributivist-communicative accounts may fare better on some of these
points. For example, a Kantian account offered by M. Margaret Falls contends that
punishment is justified in that it respects wrongdoers by holding them morally
accountable for their crimes, and that holding offenders accountable requires that
sentences should “appropriately communicate the state’s condemnation of the criminal’s
22

deed.” Falls’ account determines the proper communication of condemnation in terms
of what would hold the offender appropriately accountable, rather than what would
reaffirm the victim’s equal status, thus it seems less susceptible to Shafer-Landau’s worry
about determining desert in cases with no clear victims. Nevertheless, Falls’ account

20

Jean Hampton, “A New Theory of Retribution,” in C. Morris and R. Frey, eds., Liability and
Responsibility (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 377-414, esp. pp. 400-05.
Hampton believed her view captured what Hegel had in mind when he famously wrote that punishment
“annuls the crime.” She wrote, “Of course it can’t annul the act itself, but it can annul the false evidence
seemingly provided by the wrongdoing of the relative worth of the victim and the wrongdoer” (p. 403).
21

Shafer-Landau’s discussion of Hampton’s view is in “Retributivism and Desert,” pp. 195-97.

22

Falls, “Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons,” p. 45.
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ultimately fares no better than Hampton’s in terms of offering definitive sentencing
guidance. For Hampton, the unanswered question is what mode and degree of
punishment properly nullifies the demeaning message sent by, e.g., the rapist or the
armed robber. For Falls, the unanswered question is what mode and degree of
punishment properly holds the rapist, the armed robber, etc., morally accountable for his
act. Whichever the question, retributivist-communicative accounts appear unable to
provide a clear, specific answer.
Shafer-Landau considers several other retributivist accounts but finds them all
ultimately inadequate in providing concrete guidance regarding morally deserved
sentences. Given the inability of these various retributivist accounts to provide genuine
guidance regarding the question of sentencing, what mode and degree of punishment is
morally deserved, Shafer-Landau concludes that we have good reason to endorse nihilism
about moral desert, according to which “there is no fact of the matter about what
23

sanction(s) a wrongdoer morally deserves for his offense.” If nihilism about moral
desert is true, he contends, then the retributivist thesis that punishments should be
commensurate with moral desert is false. In the following section, I first briefly suggest
reasons to reject his nihilist thesis. Even if nihilism about moral desert is false, however,
so that there is some fact of the matter about what punishments are deserved for what
crimes, one might wonder how much this helps if we do not, perhaps cannot, know this
truth about moral desert. Thus my main task in the following section is to consider

23

Shafer-Landau, “Retributivism and Desert,” p. 191.
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whether this epistemological hurdle fatally undermines the practical use of retributivist
considerations for our sentencing determinations.

II. Two ways the retributivist constraint may still be useful
Shafer-Landau concludes, based on the inability of retributivist accounts to give a
satisfactory answer to the question of how much punishment is deserved for a given
crime, that there is no answer to this question, because there is no fact of the matter about
moral desert. It’s worth noting, however, that our persistent uncertainty about moral
desert is also consistent with the conclusion that there is a truth about moral desert (a
truth that either exists objectively, i.e., moral realism, or has its grounding in the views,
24

whether actual or somehow idealized, of human beings, i.e., moral constructivism). My
intent here is not to dive headlong into the interesting metaethical debate between those
who believe there are moral truths and those who do not. Indeed, I’m not sure how such a
debate could be ultimately settled, given that our current situation of moral uncertainty is
compatible with nihilism as well as with either realism or constructivism. But it is worth
pointing out that the claim that there are moral truths fits more neatly with our
pretheoretical intuitions. When we say that, e.g., the murderer got the punishment he
deserved, we certainly speak as if there is a fact of the matter about moral desert (notice
that even those who may disagree about what is deserved in such a case will each tend to
speak as if there is a fact of the matter about desert). Our intuitions tend to be particularly
24

Ironically, Shafer-Landau himself provides a particularly compelling, sustained defense of moral realism,
in his aptly titled Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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strong when we move to either side of the spectrum, to cases in which we believe the
punishment was not what was deserved, but rather was either clearly deficient (e.g., a
25

corporate polluter that received a proverbial slap on the wrist ) or clearly excessive (e.g.,
26

a group of students severely caned for littering ). Appeals to intuition obviously won’t
disprove nihilism about moral desert, but my aim here is just to point out that, based on
our current inability to settle the question of what punishment a given crime deserves, we
need not conclude that there is no answer to this question. There may be some
punishment or range of punishments that is deserved in each case, some truth about moral
desert.
Even if there actually is in each case a correct answer to the question of what
punishment is morally deserved for a crime, it nevertheless remains true that we have
been unable to pin down with any certainty what those deserved punishments are. As a
practical matter, then, a question persists as to whether the retributivist constraint on
excessive (i.e., undeserved) punishments has any useful role to play in sentencing
determinations. I suggest two ways in which this constraint can be seen as genuinely
useful, albeit insufficient.
First, note that the difficulty Shafer-Landau and others point out is essentially one
of deriving specific guidance, in particular instances, from some general moral
principle(s). The general moral principle at issue is that one should not be punished in
25

C.f., Fanny Carrier, “Top U.S. court slashes Exxon Valdez oil damages,” Agence France Presse, 25 June
2008.
26

C.f., Sulok Tawie, “Now, case of excessive caning by teacher,” New Straits Times (Malaysia), 23 July
2007.
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excess of what she deserves, but the difficulty comes in trying to determine what this
general principle implies in specific cases. Understood this way, it becomes clear that the
problem is not one unique to moral desert. (Consider, for instance, the difficulty in trying
to determine what constitutes a just distribution of societal resources.) In fact, the
problem will arise whenever we try to move from general moral ideals, principles, or
obligations to moral judgments in particular cases.
W. D. Ross discusses this problem in his well-known account of prima facie
27

duties. Ross endorses a pluralistic normative ethical theory; on his account, we
intuitively recognize a number of prima facie moral duties, some consequentialist but
also several nonconsequentialist. On Ross’ account, these are duties of fidelity,
28

reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement and nonmaleficence. These
various duties are prima facie in the sense that they may be overridden in certain cases,
but they will nevertheless continue to be recognized as duties. So we have, for example, a
prima facie duty to keep our promises (fidelity), but there may be certain circumstances
in which, for instance, our prima facie duty of beneficence overrides the duty of fidelity. I
promise to meet you for lunch, but as I drive along the lakeside drive to meet you, I
notice a child drowning and am in a position to help. My duty to help the child overrides
my duty to keep my promise to you, and so my all-things-considered obligation is to stop

27

Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 16-47.

28

Ibid., pp. 21-22.
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and try to save the child (even though I still recognize my broken promise to you as a
duty that I did not fulfill).
Ross’ account is irreducibly pluralistic; any of his seven basic, prima facie duties
may override any others in the right circumstances. The question arises, then, of how we
are to draw guidance from these general obligations in particular cases; how do we
weight them, and thus determine which one, or group of them, overrides which others?
Ross recognizes this problem, as he writes that the correct choice in a particular case is
neither self-evident nor a logical conclusion inferred from the more general prima facie
duties. But despite the fact that there is no clear, systematic way to infer particular
judgments from the general obligations, these general obligations can nevertheless
provide some guidance. As Ross writes: “we are more likely to do our duty if we reflect
to the best of our ability on the prima facie rightness or wrongness of various possible
acts in virtue of the characteristics we perceive them to have, than if we act without
29

reflection. With this greater likelihood we must be content.” Like Aristotle, Ross thus
indicates that there is no clear moral decision procedure; rather, arriving at the morally
correct decisions in particular cases is an exercise in practical reason.
My suggestion is that, similarly, although there may be no precise,
straightforward inferential path from the general moral principle that offenders should be
punished only to the extent of their moral desert to the correct, morally deserved
sentence, the ideal of moral desert may nevertheless offer some guidance as judges
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Ibid., p. 32.
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attempt, in exercises of practical reason, to arrive at appropriate sentencing
30

determinations in particular cases. If so, it may be that some of the various retributivist
accounts of desert may prove useful after all, not because any one of them specifically
implies a determinate deserved punishment in every given case, but rather because,
insofar as some of these accounts reflect our intuitions about an aspect of moral desert,
they may provide at least some guidance in determining desert in some cases. So, for
instance, Shafer-Landau rightly points out that retributivist accounts according to which
an offender deserves only as much suffering as she inflicted on her victim will be entirely
unhelpful in determining sentences for crimes with no clear victims. But in cases in
which there are clear victims (assault cases, for instance), the principle that an offender
deserves no greater degree of suffering than he inflicted on his victim seems a relevant
consideration in the exercise of practical reason to determine an appropriate sentence.
Similarly, fair play accounts appear ill-suited to prescribe appropriate sentences for
crimes that are centrally wrongs done to some particular victim(s), rather than cases of
free-riding on society as a whole. But in other cases (e.g., tax evasion), the principle that
an offender deserves no more punishment than is required to offset the unfair advantage
she gained over other members of the community may be an appropriate consideration in
determining a suitable sentence. Again, these considerations will not directly imply any
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Note that this proposal implies a presumption against practices such as mandatory sentencing guidelines,
in favor of more flexibility for judges: Because the sentence that reflects the general ideal of moral desert
will differ from circumstance to circumstance, our sentencing policies should allow for more fine-grained
exercises of practical reason. This is, however, a presumptive consideration, rather than an absolute one, in
favor of greater sentencing discretion for judges. It could thus be overridden by other considerations, such
as if there was believed to be a significant danger of abuse of this discretionary power.
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determinate conclusions regarding deserved sentencing. But they may provide some,
albeit imperfect, guidance in the deliberations of those making sentencing decisions.
Second, even given that we do not know precisely what sentence is morally
deserved in a particular case, the retributivist constraint on undeserved punishments can
protect against focusing solely on consequentialist considerations in sentencing. As
mentioned before, those who endorse retributivist constraints typically worry that,
without such constraints, offenders might be given sentences well in excess of what they
deserve to further some consequentialist aim. The retributivist requirement that
punishments be only in a manner and to a degree that is deserved is not, in itself, able to
ensure that political authorities never impose excessive punishments — at least, not
without an account of moral desert that can ground specific sentencing determinations —
but this retributivist constraint is sufficient to ensure that political authorities never
impose excessive punishments to further some consequentialist goal. Note that this does
not prohibit considerations of social benefits from playing any role in determining
punishments; in Kantian terms, respect for humanity does not prohibit treating offenders
as means to some consequentialist end, but rather it prohibits treating them merely as
means to such an end.
The retributivist constraint, then, can tell us that sentencing determinations should
be governed by considerations of moral desert, even if this constraint cannot itself ensure
that the morally deserved sentence is established. This is a significant constraint. Again,
the point here is not that it rules out certain sentences per se as inappropriate, but rather it
rules out certain considerations as inappropriate in governing sentencing decisions. Of
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course, this argument is unlikely to persuade a nihilist about moral desert. After all, if
there is no such thing as a morally deserved punishment (or range of punishments) in
particular cases, then it would make no sense to make moral desert one’s governing aim.
But if nihilism about moral desert is false (and I have suggested above that, at least, this
remains an open question, and in fact our intuitions tend to oppose the nihilist), then the
retributivist requirement that punishments be deserved can provide some useful guidance,
at least in terms of what is the appropriate aim of sentencing (and, importantly, what aims
are inappropriate).
So perhaps the retributivist consideration that punishments should not be more
than is deserved can be of some use as a constraint on sentencing determinations. It may
provide some guidance in deliberation about appropriate sentences in particular cases,
and it can help to protect against excessive punishments inflicted solely on
consequentialist grounds. But although this constraint can provide some useful guidance
in determining how we may punish, it is insufficient. This is not, at least not primarily,
for the reason suggested by critics such as Shafer-Landau, viz., that retributivism cannot
make adequate sense of the notion of moral desert to ground determinate constraints on
punishment. In fact, even if retributivism did provide the resources with which to
determine definitively what punishment appropriately reflects the severity of (and
offender’s responsibility for) a crime, the retributivist constraint would still be
insufficient. To begin to see why, I return to the lex talionis.
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III. Retributivism and respecting offenders as moral persons
Shafer-Landau’s critique of retributivism focuses on the difficulty of determining
moral desert. But in discussing the strict, eye-for-an-eye version of lex talionis, one of his
objections is worth noting. In addition to pointing out (as discussed earlier) that equal-inkind punishment will be impossible in many cases, he alludes to a distinct objection:
Finally, in many cases where lex does offer concrete
advice, many of the recommendations are morally unsavory
— raping a rapist, or torturing a torturer, for instance. Some
may be prepared to bite the bullet, and insist that such
treatment is what these criminals deserve. Even if it is, we
surely do not want such desert verdicts used as a basis for
structuring sentencing guidelines. Better to knowingly fail
to mete out such deserts than to authorize a line in the
budget for an official rapist or torturer.31
Here the worry is not that lex talionis will be unable to provide definitive sentencing
guidance; the worry is that it will be able to provide such guidance, and that we’ll find its
prescription morally unpalatable.
Recognizing this problem, Kant claims that certain exceptions to strict lex talionis
will sometimes be warranted. For instance, for the crime of rape, Kant prescribes not that
the perpetrator likewise be raped (he explains that this would itself be an unjustified
violation of humanity), but rather that he be castrated. This punishment respects the law
32

of retribution, Kant believes, “if not in terms of its letter at least in terms of its spirit.” It
is unclear why Kant believes castration is the appropriate, “like for like,” response to
rape. The physical damage of castration is not particularly similar to that of rape, nor is it
31

Shafer-Landau, “Retributivism and Desert,” p. 193.
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Kant, Metaphysics of Morals 6:363 (p. 498).
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clear that the two are similar in their emotional impact (also, this punishment is
inapplicable in cases of rape by a female). Instead, his discussion here feels ad hoc, as
though he is trying to avoid the unsavory implication that a rapist deserves to be raped.
But there seems to be nothing in the fairly straightforward, in-kind version of lex talionis
that would warrant such a deviation.
It is just these kinds of unsavory implications of the strict lex talionis that have led
many theorists to adopt alternative forms of retributivism, several of which I cited above.
But all versions of retributivism face the general worry that, in many cases, the
punishment determined on retributivist grounds to be morally deserved will be quite
severe. Consider what the equal-suffering retributivist will be obliged to advocate as a
deserved punishment for the torturer. Similarly, Nozick’s equation for determining the
appropriate retributive punishment (seriousness of crime multiplied by degree of
responsibility) doesn’t avoid the problem, at least not in cases where the rapist, or the
torturer, acted fully voluntarily. In fact, any retributivist account, because it links moral
desert to the seriousness of a crime, will face this problem. Some crimes are extremely
heinous, and these are sometimes committed completely voluntarily. It’s true that, in such
cases, some may be inclined to endorse the extremely harsh punishment that retributivism
will dictate. But to the extent that many of us are troubled by the idea of torturing the
torturer, raping the rapist, etc., we will need to find some justification for restricting such
practices.
One could, of course, simply insist that the punishment indicated by retributivism
as the proper response to, say, torture is some significant degree of suffering that is
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nevertheless not as severe as torture itself. Such an argument runs the risk, however, of
appearing arbitrary or ad hoc unless the retributivist can offer some principled
justification for the claim that the morally deserved response to the crime is less severe
than the crime itself. It just isn’t clear that retributivism has the resources to ground such
an account. Lex talionis obviously cannot, nor can the equal-suffering account. The fair
play account would need to explain why some less severe response is sufficient to
remove the unfair advantage the offender gained by the more severe crime. And a
communicative account such as Hampton’s would need to explain why some less severe
response can adequately nullify the message of the criminal’s superiority to her victim(s).
None of the standard retributivist accounts provides a clear explanation of why, as a
response to some serious criminal wrongdoing, retributivism would indicate the infliction
of some lesser degree of suffering on the perpetrator.
These concerns are, in part, why the retributivist constraint is typically cited in the
form in its negative, or minimalist, form — that is, that punishment must be only as
severe as is morally deserved. As indicated earlier, negative retributivism reflects the
widespread intuition that offenders should not be punished more severely than their
crimes deserve, but it also allows us to avoid the implication that we may be required to
impose troublingly harsh punishments in certain cases. Thus it may seem that the
appropriate remedy to the concerns about unpalatably harsh punishments raised by the lex
talionis and other versions of retributivism discussed above is simply to endorse negative
retributivist constraints.
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Despite the intuitive appeal of negative retributivism, however, it’s ultimately
unclear how we could justify endorsing only this negative version, but not the positive
version; at least it’s unclear how we could justify this on purely retributivist grounds.
Accounts of retributivism vary widely, but a general thread running through all accounts
33

is that there is some sort of value in wrongdoers getting what they deserve — either it is
intrinsically valuable, or it is good because it communicates the appropriate message, or
somehow nullifies the crime, etc.34 Given that the value of wrongdoers’ getting what they
deserve is fundamental to retributivism, there seems to be no purely retributivist
justification for distinguishing the view that offenders should get no more than they
morally deserve from the view that offenders should get no less than they morally
deserve, and for endorsing the former but not the latter. From a purely retributivist point
of view, moral desert should determine both the ceiling and the floor for appropriate
punishments. If there is no retributivist justification for accepting negative but not
positive retributivism, however, then proponents of only the negative constraint will need
to appeal to some nonretributivist considerations to justify endorsing one but not the
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As John Cottingham points out, “retribution” derives from the Latin re+tribio, “to pay back.”
Cottingham, “Varieties of Retribution,” p. 238.
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Boonin, in The Problem of Punishment, contends that retributivism that is concerned with moral desert is
only one form of retributivism. I disagree with Boonin’s taxonomy, which, for instance, considers what I
have called fair play theories not to be desert-based accounts. Developing a full objection to Boonin on this
point is beyond the scope of this paper, but I will point out that the proponents of the fair play view take
themselves to be addressing questions of moral desert — see, e.g., W. Sadurski, Giving Desert its Due
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985); George Sher, Desert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); and Michael
Davis, “Criminal Desert and Unfair Advantage: What’s the Connection?” Law and Philosophy 12 (1993):
133-56. Regardless of whether there could be a retributivism that is not concerned with moral desert,
however, my project in this paper is focused on the widely endorsed negative retributivist constraint that
punishment should be no more severe than is morally deserved.
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other. Retributivist considerations alone will thus be insufficient to ground constraints on
punishment.
One might instead attempt to defend retributivist constraints by endorsing the fullthroated retributivist claim that offenders should be punished to the full extent of their
moral desert, but then insisting that this is only a presumptive principle, one that could be
overridden by other concerns. This would allow for mitigation of punishments for various
reasons, and thus provide a way to avoid the unwanted conclusion that extremely,
unpalatably harsh punishments may in some cases be warranted. Whatever these
overriding considerations happened to be, however, they would be nonretributivist ones.
And so, again, on this strategy retributivist constraints would be insufficient.
Falls’ retributivist account, discussed earlier, employs essentially this sort of
strategy. On her Kantian theory, punishment is justified in that it holds wrongdoers
morally accountable for their acts, and the suitable severity of punishment is that which
appropriately communicates the state’s message of moral condemnation. A punishment
appropriately communicates this condemnatory message, on her view, when it is
35

proportionate to the offense. Thus her proportionality principle states that the “severity
of punishment that is one’s [earned moral desert] is the degree of severity proportionate
36

to that of the wrongdoing.” Falls explicitly acknowledges that the morally deserved
punishment will often be quite severe: “The proportionality principle is solely about
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earned moral desert, and according to it torture, death, whatever, can be the earned moral
37

desert of the most wicked.”

Falls’ proportionality principle turns out to be only presumptively binding,
however. In cases in which one’s earned moral desert would be torture or death, etc., the
proportionality principle will be overridden by what she calls a limiting principle. The
limiting principle states that “punishment is justified only if the one suffering it remains
capable of reflectively responding to the treatment being received and the condemnation
38

it communicates.” Whereas the proportionality principle is grounded in considerations
of earned moral desert, the limiting principle is grounded in considerations of unearned
moral desert: As Falls sees it, an implication of Kant’s principle of respect for humanity
is that “persons simply as persons deserve that the state hold them morally accountable
(at least for certain kinds of acts).”39 This desert is unearned — that is, each of us
deserves to be held accountable simply in virtue of our humanity. But to hold a person
accountable, or responsible, for wrongdoing requires that we allow the offender to
respond to her punishment (to the message it communicates) as a moral agent. Thus
punishments that preclude such response are prohibited.
I believe Falls is onto something here. But note that her limiting principle, as
attractive as it is, is not a retributivist constraint. Falls makes clear that retributivist claims
37
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Ibid. The proportionality principle is presumptively binding because even when it is overridden by the
limiting principle, it remains the case that offenders still morally deserve (in the sense of earned moral
desert) the particularly harsh response.
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40

such as her proportionality principle are earned-moral-desert claims. Her limiting
principle, by contrast, is justified by considerations of unearned moral desert. It is clear,
then, that the limiting principle is not a retributivist principle. So again, on this account
retributivism is insufficient to guide how a political authority may punish; an additional,
nonretributivist constraint is warranted.
I actually find Falls’ limiting principle quite plausible. It helps to clarify that the
treatment an offender morally deserves may be a matter of more than the severity of her
crime and her degree of responsibility for it. Retributivism, grounded in the notion of
payback, is insufficient in its inability to account for the fact that the treatment an
offender deserves is a matter not only of the crime she has committed, but of who she is.
As Falls puts it, part of what each of us deserves is unearned — that is, it attaches merely
in virtue of our status as moral persons.41 Retributivism, however, deals only in earned
desert, i.e., the treatment an offender comes to deserve through the commission of her
crime. Thus retributivism is unable to make sense of the intuition many will share that an
offender does not always deserve to be treated as harshly as might be indicated by
considerations solely of the seriousness of the crime and her degree of responsibility for
it.

40

Ibid., p. 40.
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Stephen Darwall makes a similar point in “Two Kinds of Respect,” Ethics 88:1 (1977): 36-49.
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IV. Conclusion
Retributivism is unable to account for the idea that the treatment an offender
deserves all things considered is not solely a matter of the treatment she has earned by
committing a crime. Part of what an offender deserves is grounded in her status as a
moral person. In the next chapter, I defend an additional constraint on punishment, one
grounded in the Kantian notion that a central feature of humanity is our capacity for
moral reform and redemption. Kant believed that redemption was always possible, even
for the most vicious individuals. Thus he wrote:
[T]he censure of vice … must never break out into
complete contempt and denial of any moral worth to a
vicious human being; for on this supposition he could never
be improved, and this not consistent with the idea of a
human being, who as such (as a moral being) can never
lose entirely his predisposition to the good.42

Building on Kant’s discussions of contempt and the prospect of redemption, I contend
that punishments should not, in their mode or degree, tend to undermine offenders’
prospects of moral reform, and that certain forms of punishment, notably capital
punishment and incarceration in certain types of maximum-security facilities, tend to do
just this. In doing so, they fail to respect offenders as persons, as ends in themselves.
My goal in this chapter, however, has been to lay the groundwork for this
upcoming account by demonstrating the insufficiency of the commonly cited retributivist
constraint. Contrary to those who object that retributivism is either useless or false
42
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because it is unable to provide definitive guidance regarding what punishments are
morally deserved, the retributivist constraint can provide some genuinely useful
guidance. Nevertheless, the guidance retributivism does offer will in some cases strike
many of us as excessively, inflexibly harsh. Retributivism itself provides no reason to
accept its negative prescription (punishments no more severe than is deserved) while
rejecting its positive one (punishments no less severe than is deserved). And by focusing
only on what an offender morally deserves for her crime, (which may in some cases be
quite severe), retributivism fails to account for what an offender morally deserves all
things considered.43
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CHAPTER 4
Punishment, contempt, and the prospect of moral reform

For the institution of criminal punishment to be morally permissible, it is widely
accepted that penal practices must treat criminals with some basic level of respect. The
most common account — endorsed (whether explicitly or implicitly) by most theorists of
punishment and widely reflected in legal practice — is that respect for offenders requires
that punishments not be more severe than the corresponding crimes morally deserve. In
chapter 3, I contended that this retributivist constraint, although a valuable check against
the imposition of excessive punishments on consequentialist grounds, is ultimately
insufficient for two reasons: First, as has been widely noted, it is often unclear precisely
what punishment (or range of punishments) is morally deserved in a given case. Second,
and more importantly, what guidance we do get from prominent retributivist accounts
indicates that the punishment that is morally deserved for a given crime may often be
quite severe — so severe, in fact, as to strike many as intuitively excessive. This is in part
because retributivism seeks to assess desert solely in terms of what the offender did,
rather than who she is, or who she can be. The concerns associated with retributivism
give us reason to examine more closely what treating offenders with respect requires, and
whether respect warrants some additional constraint(s) on punishment.
My aim in this chapter is to argue for one such constraint, albeit one that has often
been overlooked both in the literature on punishment and in legal practice. Specifically, I
contend that punishment, if it is to treat offenders with respect as autonomous moral
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persons, should never be of a mode or to a degree that tends to undermine the prospect of
offenders’ moral reform. As I discuss below, although this principle is centrally
concerned with the moral reform of the offender, my account differs from typical
offender-improvement theories of punishment, insofar as such accounts characteristically
set offender improvement as the aim of punishment, whereas on my account reform need
not be an aim of punishment but is rather a prospect that penal practices should take care
not to undermine.
In section I, I appeal to certain discussions in Kant, not (primarily) of respect but
rather of contempt, which Kant took to be the opposite of respect. By highlighting certain
relevant features of contempt that make it especially problematic, we can gain insight into
what is, conversely, required by respect for persons. After discussing what is implied by
contemptuous treatment generally, I consider in section II what would constitute
contempt, and thus would violate the requirement of respect, in the context of punishing
criminal offenders. Again, on my account, respect prohibits punishments that tend to
undermine offenders’ prospects for moral reform. In sections III and IV, I further flesh
out my own view, first by contrasting it with accounts that cite reform as a positive aim
of punishment, and then by considering some possible objections to my account.1

1

I should note at the outset that, although my account takes as its starting point certain Kantian themes, my
central project here is not one of Kant interpretation. My aim is to consider what conclusions we might
draw if we apply certain useful, compelling themes in Kant’s practical philosophy to an analysis of how a
political community may permissibly treat offenders. In fact, certain conclusions that I reach about which
punishments are and are not permissible (e.g., regarding capital punishment) contradict Kant’s own explicit
conclusions. But whether or not Kant’s explicit about punishment can be reconciled with certain other,
fundamental principles in his moral philosophy, my aim is to develop and expand on certain Kantian
themes that I take to be particularly plausible and to suggest how they are relevant to questions of
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I. What’s wrong with contempt?
Kant famously believed that all human beings, as rational beings, possess a
dignity, an absolute inner worth, that warrants respect (both self-respect and the respect
of others).2 Thus his second formulation of the categorical imperative instructs us, “Act
in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of
another, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means.”3 In various
passages Kant indicates that the converse of respect, as he conceives of it, is contempt. In
the Doctrine of Virtue, for instance, he writes, “To be contemptuous of others
(contemnere), that is, to deny them the respect owed to human beings in general, is in
every case contrary to duty; for they are human beings.”4 One strategy, then, for better
understanding what respect for persons requires is to examine, conversely, what it
prohibits, by looking more closely at what it means to treat others with contempt.

punishment. Thus, my concern is less with whether Kant’s theory does, or should, commit him to the
conclusions I draw than with whether mine is a plausible account in its own right.
2

See, e.g., Kant, Metaphysics of Morals 6:435 and 6:462. In the Cambridge Edition of the Works of
Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), pp. 557 and 579, respectively. All citations to the Metaphysics of Morals are to
this edition.
3

Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 4:429. In Immanuel Kant, Ethical Philosophy, 2d ed.,
trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing, Inc., 1994), p. 36. All citations to the
Groundwork are to this edition.

4

Kant, Metaphysics of Morals 6:463 (p. 579). Similarly, in Georg Ludwig Collins’ notes from Kant’s
ethics lectures, Kant explicitly describes contempt as the opposite of respect. In the Cambridge Edition of
the Works of Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter Heath and ed. Peter Heath and J.B.
Schneewind (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 173.
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To treat someone with contempt, on Kant’s view, is to treat her as morally
worthless.5 This conception may strike some as too strong. Michelle Mason, for instance,
describes contempt somewhat more modestly, “as presenting its object as low in the
sense of ranking low in worth as a person in virtue of falling short of some legitimate
interpersonal ideal of the person.”6 Thus for Mason, contempt takes its object to be
fundamentally deficient, or comparatively low in worth, along some dimension(s) of
moral personhood, but perhaps not altogether morally worthless. Whether contempt picks
out a (perceived) complete lack of moral worth in someone, however, or just a
fundamental deficiency, we can say that a person regards the object of her contempt as
inferior as a person.
It’s worth noting here the distinction between treating someone with contempt
and regarding her with contempt. Kant recognized this distinction, and he seemed to
view contemptuous regard as, at least to a degree, outside our control. He writes, “At
times one cannot, it is true, help inwardly looking down on some in comparison with
others; but the outward manifestation of this is, nevertheless, an offense.”7 Here Kant
indicates that contempt as regard is, or significantly involves, a feeling that cannot be
rationally controlled at the time at which it emerges.
Still, it’s plausible that one could, over time, cultivate a disposition not to regard
others with contempt. To the extent that this is possible, there are at least two good

5

See, e.g., Metaphysics of Morals 6:462 and 6:463-4 (pp. 579-80).

6

Michelle Mason, “Contempt as a Moral Attitude,” Ethics 113 (January 2003): 234-272, pp. 240-41.
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Metaphysics of Morals 6:463 (pp. 579-80).
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reasons to do so: First, it may be exceedingly difficult to harbor contemptuous feelings
for another without these feelings manifesting themselves in contemptuous treatment.
Thus if contemptuous treatment is morally prohibited, then as a practical matter, meeting
this moral proscription may require cultivation of a noncontemptuous disposition. Second,
even if one could conceal one’s contemptuous regard, such regard veiled with apparently
respectful treatment seems disingenuous, and thus it may not actually be respectful at all.
Imagine discovering that a colleague who has always treated you respectfully has actually
at the same time regarded you with contempt. On finding this out, it might cross your
mind, in retrospect, that the years of seemingly respectful treatment actually reflected the
depth of the colleague’s contempt: She didn’t even regard you as worthy of her honesty
with respect to her assessment of you as a person. Contemptuous regard may thus be
troubling even when it does not manifest itself in obviously contemptuous treatment. For
both of these reasons, then, even if contemptuous regard does not admit of rational
control at the time it surfaces, there are reasons to work to cultivate a disposition against
contemptuous regard. And although the focus in what follows is on contemptuous
treatment, contemptuous regard will at times be relevant to the discussion as well.
A relevant feature of contempt, evident in the previous description of it as
regarding its object as inferior as a person, is that it is person-focused rather than actfocused. Mason rightly distinguishes contempt from resentment in that, whereas
resentment is typically focused on what someone has done or brought about (“I resent
that she unfairly embarrassed me in front of our colleagues”), contempt focuses on the
person — not for what she has done, but for who she is. Thus Mason writes:
107

Contempt, to adopt a phrase of Augustine’s, thus will have
none of “Despise the sin but not the sinner.” The “sin” in
such a case is simply an outer manifestation of something
taken to go to the core of the “sinner,” something taken to
be contemptible.8
Furthermore, not only is contempt person-focused, but it is pervasively person-focused.
In other words, contempt permeates all of our interactions with those we hold in
contempt. As Mason puts it, my contempt for another becomes that person’s “most
salient description for purposes of my … assessment of her.”9 So whereas my resentment
for something a person has done may not necessarily color my entire evaluation of (and
all my interactions with) the person, contempt tends to present a person as morally
inferior generally, or at least in her most fundamental aspects (viz., in the ways we take to
matter most).
Just as distinguishing contempt from resentment highlights certain relevant
features of contempt (namely, its person-focus and its pervasiveness), it is also instructive
to consider how contempt contrasts with anger. Whereas anger is heated, contempt is
cold. An angry response engages the other for a perceived offense; a contemptuous
response, on the other hand, treats the other as not worth the trouble. Thus Kant states:
[W]e cannot be angry and at the same time hold the other in
contempt; for just as anger involves an emotion that
presupposes a great exertion of effort to resist the
impression of a felt offence, so contempt incorporates a
conviction of the object’s unworthiness for employment of

8

Mason, “Contempt as a Moral Attitude,” 247.
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Ibid., 249.
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such a resistance on its behalf, and is therefore coupled
with calmness.10
Contempt is distinctive, then, in that whereas other negative responses to someone
— such as anger, censure, or heated argument — treat their object, at least implicitly, as
worthy of concern and engagement as a moral person, contempt does not. Of course, we
might still treat such a person as worthy of our prudential concern, perhaps as a threat.
But assessing someone as worthy of prudential concern is consistent with maintaining a
moral attitude of contempt toward her, with regarding and treating her as beneath our
moral concern. To treat someone as solely of prudential concern would be to treat her
merely as a thing, rather than as a moral person — in Kantian terms, it would be to treat
her merely as a means rather than as an end.
Contempt, then, presents a person as fundamentally deficient (if not altogether
worthless), is focused on the person rather than what she has done or brought about,
pervades our entire assessment and interaction with her, and is cool and dismissive in
virtue of not regarding her as worthy of engagement as a moral person.11 Another feature
of contempt, which follows from these, is that it is especially unconducive to the
prospects of moral reform, forgiveness, and reconciliation; in fact, it is arguably less

10

From Johann Vigilantius’ notes from Kant’s ethics lectures. In the Cambridge Edition of the Works of
Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter Heath and ed. Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 417. See also p. 434 and p. 173 (the latter is from
Collins’ lecture notes).
11

Note that, although in this chapter I write of contempt as directed at others, the points I mention here also
apply to self-contempt.
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compatible with these ideals than are the hotter, more engaged emotions such as anger or
even hatred.12 As Thomas Hill writes:
[C]ontempt is a deep dismissal, a denial of the prospect of
reconciliation, a signal that conversation is over. Furious
argument and accusation, and even sharp-tongued deflation
of hypocrisy and self-deception, leave some space to
resume communication; but cold, silent contempt does not.
The one demands to be heard, while the other walks away
in disgust.13
As Hill indicates, we can see reflected in contempt a sort of disengagement, a giving up
on a person. Or similarly, contempt may reflect one’s never regarding the person as
worthy of genuine engagement in the first place.
Because contempt essentially reflects a giving up on its object, it will typically be
unresponsive to evidence of moral reform — that is, evidence that might count in favor of
forgiveness. After all, the relative calmness characteristic of contempt reflects not only a
belief that the person is not worth our engagement, but also a sort of confidence that the
person’s status as fundamentally subpar is settled, and not liable to change.14 And
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Perhaps not surprisingly, psychologist John Gottman has found that contempt between spouses is the
most significant predictor of divorce. See John M. Gottman, James D. Murray, Catherine C. Swanson,
Rebecca Tyson, and Kristin R. Swanson, The Dynamics of Marriage: Dynamic Linear Models (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2002). For a discussion of Gottman et al.’s findings, see Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The
Power of Thinking Without Thinking (New York City: Little, Brown and Company, 2005), pp. 18-33.
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Thomas E. Hill, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University
Press, 2000), p. 60.
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One might think that insofar as contempt is cool and calm relative to anger, hatred, etc., it would thus be
more conducive to our recognizing evidence of reform. But as I indicate above, the calmness characteristic
of contempt is a product of our being settled in our assessment of the other person’s moral character. Thus
although contempt is calm, it isn’t necessarily conducive to the sort of calm, cool deliberation that (for
instance) Hume endorsed, because the calmness of contempt comes essentially from one’s having finished
deliberating, from having written the other person off, so to speak.
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because contempt is characteristically unresponsive to evidence that might favor
forgiveness, it will also typically be incompatible with the prospect of reconciliation.
Mason, who in her essay aims to defend the place of contempt as a morally
justified attitude, claims that contempt can remain responsive to evidence that would
count in favor of forgiveness. Her argument, however, is ultimately unconvincing.
Contempt, on Mason’s conception, assesses its object as low according to some
interpersonal ideal. But as Mark Kalderon writes, “Even if someone were lacking in this
way, to treat him as an end is to treat him as capable, at least in principle, of acquiring the
requisite sensitivity and perception. … The difficulty of course is that contemptuousness
is inconsistent” with such treatment.15 In response to this sort of worry, Mason contends
that it is both empirically and conceptually plausible that contempt may be sensitive to
evidence in favor of forgiveness.16 She writes:
In response to the empirical claim, I have only my own
experience as counterexample and ask others to consult
experiences of their own. As for the conceptual claim, I do
not see the basis for it; common usage, for example, does
not suggest that it is part of the very meaning of contempt
that once one is a contemner, one if forever a contemner.17
In my view, Mason’s reply here is unpersuasive. Undoubtedly, many of us can
recall instances of having held someone in contempt only to have that assessment change
when evidence favoring forgiveness emerged. But presumably there also are likely to
have been many counterexamples, in which our contempt rendered us slow to recognize
15

Mark Kalderon, Moral Fictionalism (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2005), 176.

16

Mason, “Contempt as a Moral Attitude,” 256.
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mitigating evidence, or even prevented our recognizing it altogether. Thus even if we can
recall cases in which contempt did not so color our view of a person as to leave us unable
to recognize evidence of repentance or reform, this does not dispel the empirical worry
that contempt tends to have this practical effect.18
Furthermore, the claim that contempt renders us less sensitive to evidence
favoring forgiveness is supported by certain other features of contempt discussed above. I
followed Mason in describing contempt as person-focused and pervasive. That is, I
regard someone with contempt not because of particular actions by which she may have
wronged me, but rather for who she is as a person. Also, my contempt colors my entire
assessment of and interaction with her.19 Given this conception, what sort of changes
might I regard as evidence in favor of forgiveness? Presumably the most viable recourse
for the person held in contempt, if she is genuinely repentant and desires forgiveness, is
to apologize and change her behavior. But given that my contempt transcends any
particular harms or transgressions toward me, why expect that particular acts of kindness
or contrition would elicit the withdrawal of that contempt? Since my contempt permeates
my assessment of the person, I would more likely view any sincere acts of contrition as
disingenuous, or perhaps as somehow manipulative. Again, this is not to say that
18

Note that it does not help to stipulate that contempt is morally justified only in the cases in which it does
not leave one unable to recognize mitigating evidence. For contempt is contempt in either case; insofar as it
tends to render people unable to see mitigating evidence, it is implausible to condemn contempt only in
those cases in which this ever-present tendency happens to be realized.
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Perhaps a useful, albeit imperfect, analogy could be drawn here between contempt and love. Love, we
often say, can tend to blind us to (or at least leave us less sensitive to) the flaws in those whom we love. My
argument is that contempt tends to have a similar affect, although in the opposite direction: Contempt tends
to blind us (or at least leave us less sensitive to) the redeeming qualities in those whom we regard with
contempt.
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contempt always prevents us from recognizing evidence of reform, or that the concept of
contempt itself rules out this possibility. But certain central features of contempt make it
unlikely that contempt will typically leave us capable of recognizing evidence in favor of
forgiveness. Contempt, after all, does not look for signs of repentance; contempt gives up
the search.
There is another sense in which contempt is in tension with reform. Not only does
contemptuous regard tend to leave us unresponsive to evidence of reform, but also
contemptuous treatment may tend to undermine the prospect of reform. This may occur
in at least two, related ways: First, an implication of our treating a person as though she is
fundamentally morally inferior, of dismissing her as not being worth our continued
engagement, is that we will not be motivated to provide her with the resources and
opportunities that might facilitate her reform. I say more about this below, in the context
of whether penal institutions make available sufficient opportunities for offenders, should
they so choose, to help themselves. Also, when we treat a person as though she is
fundamentally inferior, when our treatment of her expresses that we have given up on
her, that she is not worth our continued engagement and effort, she may in time come to
agree with this assessment and, as a consequence, give up on herself. Thus again, our
contempt may not only blind us to evidence of reform, but it may also actually undermine
the prospect of reform.
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Given this conception of contempt, we can perhaps see why Kant regarded
contempt as “in every case contrary to duty.”20 In particular, Kant was concerned about
the tension between contempt and reform. He writes,
[the] censure of vice … must never break out into complete
contempt and denial of any moral worth to a vicious human
being; for on this supposition he could never be improved,
and this [is] not consistent with the idea of a human being,
who as such (as a moral being) can never lose entirely his
predisposition to the good.21
As this passage indicates, Kant saw contempt as inconsistent with the recognition of
humanity’s predisposition to morality, and thus with a recognition of the possibility of
redemption.
Much more could be written about contempt, but for my purposes the salient
features are these: Contempt is person-focused and pervasive; it presents its object as
inferior, if not altogether worthless, as a moral person; and it is cold and dismissive, i.e.,
it essentially reflects our giving up on the person as a moral person. In virtue of these
features, contempt tends to be unresponsive to evidence of repentance and reform, and it
actually tends to undermine the prospect of reform as well.22
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Metaphysics of Morals 6:463 (p. 579).
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I acknowledge that some may use the term “contempt” in ways that diverge from the conception I have
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(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 32.) For my purposes, however, it is enough if
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By contrast, then, what does respect for persons require? It may require quite a bit,
and my aim here is not to give a full account of what respect demands.23 Given the
features of contempt that I have discussed above, however, certain requirements of
respect become apparent. Respect requires not adopting a dismissive attitude toward
others, not giving up on them as irredeemably deficient as moral persons. It follows, then,
that respect requires us to be open to evidence of repentance and reform, and never to
treat others in ways that will tend to undermine the prospect for their reform. In the next
section, I consider what implications these conclusions will have for how the practice of
criminal punishment should be constrained.

II. Treating offenders with respect
Given the conception of contempt that I have endorsed above, and thus,
conversely, what I have argued is required by respect for persons, my central argument
with regard to punishment follows fairly straightforwardly: On my view, for punishment
properly to respect offenders as persons, it should not express contempt for them; it
shouldn’t give up on them, so to speak. In this section, I argue that this prohibition on
contempt in our treatment of offenders grounds the following constraint on punishment:

there is form of regard and treatment that exemplifies the features I have discussed in this section. I claim
that this is most naturally described as contempt. But what it is called is less important than that we can
recognize a form of regard and treatment that exhibits the features I have suggested — and, as I argue
below, that our existing penal practices often do (but should not) express this attitude in their treatment of
offenders.
23

For an excellent discussion of respect in the context of moral censure, see Hill, Respect, Pluralism, and
Justice: Kantian Perspectives, pp. 114-18.
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Punishments should not, in their mode or degree, tend to undermine the prospect of
offenders’ reform.
Essentially, punishment undermines the prospect of reform when it imposes
conditions on offenders such that the punishment itself makes it less likely (than had the
punishment not been imposed) that they will engage in moral reflection about the
wrongdoing for which they are being punished, come to see their actions as morally
wrong, regret having done them and, consequently, make a genuine commitment to
change their behavior in the future. The imposition of such conditions, on my account,
reflects a lack of respect for offenders as persons. Punishments may impose such
conditions in various ways.
First, punishment may undermine the prospect of reform when a sentence is so
severe that it inhibits the criminal’s capacity to engage in the moral reflection necessary
to come to see her criminal behavior as wrong.24 Capital punishment is an obvious
example of such a sentence, in that execution clearly inhibits (in fact, extinguishes) the
individual’s capacity for moral reflection. One might object here that a criminal
sentenced to death may have substantial time to engage in moral reflection, should he so
choose, while he waits on death row during his appeals process. The appeals process,
however, should not be conflated with the sentence; the death penalty itself, when carried
out, undeniably extinguishes a person’s capacity for moral reflection.25 In doing so, it

24

C.f., M. Margaret Falls, “Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons,” Law and Philosophy 6:1
(April 1987): 25-51, esp.pp. 46-48.
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This is true unless, of course, one believes in an afterlife in which moral reflection is still possible. If so,
one will presumably deny that execution extinguishes this capacity. For a number of reasons, however,
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fails to afford the offender the respect appropriate to him as a person. Similarly,
punishments imposing extreme physical suffering would be prohibited insofar as the
severe pain associated with such treatment would significantly inhibit the individual’s
capacity for moral reflection.
Punishment may inhibit the capacity for moral reflection not only because of the
severity of the sentence itself, but also because of the conditions that prevail in the
carrying out of that sentence. Two criminals receiving identical prison sentences may
nevertheless be said to receive different punishment if one is subject to significantly
harsher conditions during his incarceration than the other (e.g., physical beatings, rape,
etc.). Much of the philosophical literature on punishment, to the extent that it addresses
the question of how (as opposed to why) we should punish offenders, centers on morally
justifiable sentencing practices. Focusing only on imposing justified sentences, however,
without also considering the conditions in which the sentences are administered,
overlooks how much of the work of determining the overall character of a particular
instance of punishment is done after the sentence is handed down.26 Respect for offenders
must therefore be expressed not only in the formal sentences themselves, but also in the
manner in which these sentences are carried out.27 Thus, the constraint I endorse here

religious claims of this sort are not promising bases for the establishment of penal practices in a liberal
polity.
26

C.f., “Gently Does It; Prison Conditions,” The Economist, U.S. edition, July 28, 2007.
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Kant alludes to this point in the context of capital punishment, when, after endorsing capital punishment
as the required sentence for murder, he nevertheless insists that the execution “must still be freed from any
mistreatment that could make the humanity in the person suffering it into something abominable.”
Metaphysics of Morals 6:333 (p. 474). Unlike Kant’s explicit claim in this passage, of course, my account
entails that capital punishment is not morally permissible.
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prohibits not only sentences that tend to undermine the prospect of offenders’ reform, but
also the toleration by penal institutions of conditions in the carrying out of sentences that
tend to undermine the prospect of reform.
Another way punishments may undermine the prospect of reform is by weakening
offenders’ motivation, rather than their capacity, to undertake a process of moral
reflection and reform. (As before, the weakening can be a feature either of the sentence
itself or of the conditions involved in the administration of the sentence.) First, when a
sentence expresses to an offender that society has given up on him, that it regards him as
irredeemable, he may come to accept society’s judgment about him, to see himself the
same way. Thus his motivation to engage in the process of moral reflection and reform
may be weakened. Second, if the punishment is so harsh, demeaning, etc., as to foster
hatred (or perhaps cold, dismissive contempt28) in the offender for the penal institution
and the political community on whose behalf it punishes, then punishment may in this
way weaken an offender’s motivation to contemplate whether his criminal actions were,
in fact, wrong. The laws of a political community, after all, can be seen as reflecting, and
even expressing, that community’s values.29 Thus if an offender, because of the harsh or
humiliating treatment he receives from the community’s penal institutions, comes to
regard the community itself with hatred or contempt, then he may likewise be less
28

The notion of contempt directed upwardly — that is, from those out of power toward those in power —
is discussed at length by William Ian Miller in “Mutual Contempt and Democracy,” in his The Anatomy of
Disgust, supra. n. 21, at pp. 206-34.
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For a useful discussion of the law as an expression of the values of a political community, see R. A. Duff,
“Liberal Legal Community,” in his Punishment, Communication, and Community (New York City: Oxford
University Press, 2001), pp. 35-73. See also Igor Primoratz, “Punishment as Language,” Philosophy 64
(1989): 187-205, esp. pp. 196-98.
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motivated genuinely to reflect on which of the community’s values were expressed in the
law(s) that he violated, and whether these values might in fact have merit. Such
punishment would therefore make reform less likely for the offender.
In addition, when a punishment does not at least make available the opportunities
by which an offender may improve his situation, both during his punishment and
afterward, this may weaken his motivation to engage in a process of reflection that may
lead to repentance and reform. Here it is useful, following R. A. Duff, to distinguish
“reform” from “rehabilitation,” where “reform” refers to a change in individuals’ motives
and dispositions and “rehabilitation” refers to the improvement of their skills, capacities
and opportunities.30 Thus, on this construal, providing an offender with the education,
training or information he needs to improve his chances of (re)integrating himself as a
productive member of society would constitute an example of rehabilitation. Reform,
however, would require something different, namely, that the offender come to appreciate
that what he did was wrong and make a commitment to change his behavior accordingly.
Although the two concepts are distinct, they are nevertheless related. When penal
institutions fail to make available to offenders the resources that could facilitate their
reintegration into society, they send a message that society sees these offenders either as
incapable of improvement, as not worth the trouble, or both. Also, apart from this
expressive function (that is, even if the offender doesn’t recognize the contemptuous
message being implicitly expressed), failures to make such resources available may still
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Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, p. 5.
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facilitate self-contempt in offenders. Offenders with few or no job skills, little or no
education, and, importantly, no real tools with which they stand a serious chance of
addressing these deficiencies and improving their lives may come to regard themselves as
hopelessly incapable of improving their situations. That is, they may be more likely to
regard themselves with contempt.31 Thus an offender’s motivation to reform may be
weakened by the message sent by a punishment’s failure to make available sufficient
opportunities for improvement, or by the lack of opportunities itself, or both. In any case,
the result will be effectively to undermine the prospect of reform, and thus to fail to
respect the offender as a person.
As an example of a form of punishment that exhibits a number of the tendencies
discussed here, consider control units, or maximum security units. These are facilities in
which prisoners typically spend twenty-three or more hours each day in isolation in their
cells, exiting only to shower or for solitary exercise in a small yard. In one sense, such
units might seem especially conducive to the sort of moral reflection that might lead to
reform. The extreme isolation of such units, after all, offers prisoners plenty of time (in
fact, little else) during which they may choose to contemplate the wrongness of their acts.
In practice, however, evidence indicates that prolonged terms of isolation may undermine
31

Because the contrast class on this account is the likelihood of reform had the offender not been punished,
one might raise this objection: Many offenders face considerable hardships, in particular a lack of
opportunities to improve their condition, in their normal lives, outside of punishment. Given such
conditions, the practices I have targeted here (i.e., lack of available resources, and a message of society
having given up on the individual) might not really make reform less likely, given the likelihood that these
resources would be lacking, and the expression of societal contempt would be present, in the offender’s life
even if she were not punished. As I see it, however, this is a problem not for my constraint on punishment,
but for societal conditions generally. Perhaps my proposal could better be read to say that punishments
should not undermine the prospect of reform in the sense of making reform less likely than it should have
been had the offender not been punished.
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both the capacity and motivation for moral reflection, and may instead push many
prisoners toward paranoia, hopelessness, or desperation. Lorna Rhodes, an anthropologist
who visited and studied control units in the state of Washington, writes that in “isolation
or semi-isolation, there is nothing to nudge the mind outside of its self-preoccupation and
discomfort.”32 Among the numerous prisoners she quotes, one says: “There is no hope for
my future, no matter how hard I try to just be patient, be humble … There is nobody to
talk to … and vent my frustration and as a result, sometimes I am violent. Pound on the
walls. Yell and scream.”33
In addition, Rhodes describes how prison officials are trained to regard prisoners
skeptically, to view positive responses by prisoners not as good behavior but as waiting
and manipulation. As one administrator put it:
The inmates know the game. They know what to say …
you have to be really guarded on that. You’d like to think
that they’re not animals, that these are human beings: ‘Oh,
my gosh, [he] won’t do that. And he even promised me.’
But that is not the reality … there’s always the risk that the
person is just playing the game.34
Undoubtedly, many of the individuals detained in maximum security units are adept at
“playing the game.” But notice how the administrator’s description reflects the feature of
contempt I discussed earlier, namely, its tendency to be unresponsive to evidence of
moral reform. Officers in the control units are trained to regard prisoners as incapable of
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changing, and to discount apparent evidence of change as in fact evidence only of
manipulation. As an officer told Rhodes: “A person is not a liar because he lies, but he
lies because he’s a liar. The point is, how do we remove the liar out of a person? We can
postpone lying … but that does not change the individual.”35 Certainly, many prisoners
can be dangerous and manipulative, and the officers who deal with them on a regular
basis should be wary. But to presume that each prisoner’s moral character is settled, and
that any apparent signs of improvement must instead be evidence of manipulation, is
essentially to give up on these prisoners. In my view, this essentially amounts to a form
of institutionalized contempt.
Ultimately, Rhodes is pessimistic about the effects of prolonged isolation on
prisoners’ moral (and mental) well-being. This is not to deny that in some cases isolation
might facilitate moral reflection and reform. But the effects of prolonged isolation merit
further study. If empirical evidence indicated that such punishments, on balance, did tend
to hamper offenders’ ability to engage in moral reflection, and thus tended to undermine
the prospect of their moral reform, then these punishments would be prohibited according
to the constraint I am endorsing.

III. Reform to be promoted or not undermined?
On the conception of contempt I have endorsed, a central characteristic is that it
expresses a giving up on its object. Respect, conversely, requires that we not treat others
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as hopelessly, irredeemably inferior as moral persons; that is, respect requires not giving
up on others. One might expect, given this account, that I would defend a different
constraint on punishment, namely, that to be permissible, punishments must tend to
promote the moral reform of offenders. One might think, after all, that the best way to
express that we have not given up on an individual is to make her reform our positive aim,
or goal. Thus perhaps our institution of punishment should reflect this positive goal,
tailoring penal practices so that they tend to promote the moral reform of offenders
(rather than merely the negative goal, on my account, of not tending to make offenders’
reform less likely).36
Typically, accounts of punishment that focus on considerations of reform of the
offender do incorporate these as positive goals to be promoted. Prior to the 1970s, for
instance, offender improvement was a prominent justification of punishment. R. A. Duff
and David Garland write:
The same programmes and attitudes which fostered ‘the
Welfare State’ sought to make the penal system an
instrument of social engineering through which crime could
be prevented. Punishment could prevent crime by deterring
potential offenders or by incapacitating actual offenders:
but it could achieve even greater goods, it was hoped, by
reforming and rehabilitating offenders.37
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As Duff and Garland explain, enthusiasm for offender improvement as a goal of
punishment decreased significantly beginning in the 1970s, for two general reasons. Both
lines of objection are compelling against offender improvement as a positive goal, but
neither is damaging to my account of reform as a prospect not to be undermined. The first
general objection centers on efficacy. Emerging evidence seemed to indicate that the
penal programs of the mid-20th century aimed at reform simply didn’t work. Insofar as an
account grounds punishment’s permissibility in its potential as a mechanism for
reforming offenders, evidence casting doubt on this potential is obviously fundamentally
damaging to such an account.
The account I endorse, however, requires only that punishments not tend to make
reform less likely. Thus it does not link the permissibility of punishments to their ability
to bring about positive changes in the offender — it only requires that punishments not
get in the way, so to speak, of this prospective outcome. My account is unaffected,
therefore, by evidence indicating that impositions of punishment are not effective means
of bringing about reform.
The second objection raised against punishments geared toward reform centers
not on whether such practices are effective in attaining their stated goals, but rather on
whether setting reform as a positive goal of punishment is consistent with the liberal ideal
of individual autonomy. Or as it is often expressed in Kantian terms, the objection is that
punishments aiming at reform fail to demonstrate proper respect for offenders as persons.
Kant’s views on punishment remain the subject of substantial debate, but for present
purposes the relevant legacy of Kant’s account for liberal theories of punishment is that
124

by punishing in an effort to bring about reform, a political community takes as its goal
that which is not rightfully its goal to pursue. Moral reform involves the changing of
motives, but moral motives, on the Kantian account, are not the sorts of things
appropriately subject to external modification. As Duff characterizes the objection, if a
system of punishment aims to reform offenders “by so modifying their dispositions and
motives that they will in future willingly refrain from crime, it treats them not as
responsible agents who should be left free to determine their own values and attitudes but
as objects to be remolded or manipulated into conformity.”38 Instead, if the process of
moral reform is to be meaningful, genuine reform, it must be freely chosen by the
individual herself. Simply put, reform is not the sort of thing that should be imposed from
the outside.
As before, this objection is not damaging to my account. This is, again, because
my view does not require that reform be a positive goal of punishment. All that my
proposal requires is that punishment not tend to make reform less likely. This
requirement is entirely compatible with the view that moral reform must be freely
undertaken by the individual herself, as it is also with the recognition that she may never
choose to do so.
There is a particular strand of reform-oriented justifications of punishment that
attempts to address the previous two objections while still maintaining offender reform as
a positive aim. These accounts fall under the broad heading of expressive, or

38

Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, pp. 13-14.

125

communicative, theories, according to which punishment is a kind of language; it
communicates an important message, namely, that a particular act is condemned by
society as being morally wrong. The primary value of this communication may be of
various kinds: It may be intrinsically valuable as a vindication of the law or a
reaffirmation of the right that was violated39; it may be instrumentally valuable in
promoting some societal goal, such as social solidarity40 or a morally educated public41;
or, relevant for present purposes, it may be instrumentally valuable in promoting the
moral improvement of the wrongdoer herself.
Two prominent varieties of this offender-improvement strand of the
communicative account are the moral education theory, according to which the
communicative aim of punishment is to teach a wrongdoer that what she did was morally
wrong and thus prohibited by society, and Duff’s theory of punishment as secular
penance, according to which punishment “aims not just to communicate [deserved]
censure but thereby to persuade offenders to repentance, self-reform, and
reconciliation.”42 Both of these theories explicitly take offender reform to be a positive
aim of punishment; nevertheless, both share two important features with my account.
First, both theories accept, as I do, the notion that no one should be treated as morally
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irredeemable.43 Second, and more important for present purposes, communicative
theorists emphasize the Kantian ideal of respecting individual autonomy. Thus Jean
Hampton, in her seminal development of the moral education theory, writes:
[T]he moral education theorist will admit that the state can
predict that many of the criminals it punishes will refuse to
accept the moral message it delivers. As I have stressed, the
moral education theory rests on the assumption of
individual autonomy, and thus an advocate of this theory
must not only admit but insist that the choice of whether to
listen to the moral message contained in the punishment
belongs in the criminal.44
On these communicative accounts, then, punishment communicates a message to
the offender urging reform, but the offender, being autonomous, may accept or reject the
message. By respecting — in fact insisting on, as Hampton writes — the offender’s
freedom to reject the message of reform, these communicative theories can answer the
two objections leveled against traditional offender-improvement accounts. For the
communicative theories, after all, punishment’s aim is not to impose reform on the
offender, an aim not only likely to fail but also inappropriate for the penal institutions of
a liberal state. Rather, the aim of punishment on these theories is to send a message
asking, even urging the offender to choose freely to repent and reform. Given the
43
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emphasis such theories place on respecting individual autonomy, as well as their
insistence that everyone be treated as having the capacity for redemption, it might seem
that I should just endorse one of these accounts, accepting this sort of freely chosen
reform as a positive aim of punishment rather than as a prospect not to be undermined.
I actually don’t have strong objections to punishments that aim at offender reform,
although as I discussed in chapters 1 and 2, I believe the central aim of punishment —
the reason we should want such an institution — is that it helps to deter criminals and
thus to protect the security and well-being of community members. Deterrence, in my
view, constitutes both a sufficient and a necessary positive aim of punishment. That is,
the role played by the prospect of punishment in reducing crimes constitutes enough of a
reason to want such an institution; conversely, if empirical evidence determined that the
prospect of punishment had no impact in reducing crime,45 and thus that it didn’t serve to
protect community members security or well-being, then communicating a message of
moral censure would not itself constitute a sufficient reason to justify the enormous
financial investment that the institution of punishment requires. But if we grant that
deterrence is properly the central aim of punishment, I don’t object to the sort of moral
suasion that Hampton and Duff endorse as a supplementary aim of the practice.
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a deterrent effect. See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, “Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the TwentyFirst Century,” Crime and Justice 23 (1998): 1-42. Nagin writes that “the evidence for a substantial
deterrent is much firmer than it was fifteen years ago. I now concur … that the collective actions of the
criminal justice system exert a very substantial deterrent effect” (p. 3). See also Andrew von Hirsch,
Anthony E. Bottoms, Elizabeth Burney, and P-O. Wikstrom, Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity:
An Analysis of Recent Research (Oxford, U.K.: Hart Publishing, 1999).
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In practice, of course, punishments may tend to have both effects. Also, the
distinction between special deterrence (deterring the offender from committing future
crimes) and offender reform may in practice become blurrier than is sometimes
recognized in theoretical discussions of these aims. Still, if we consider the
communicative aspect of punishment and ask who should constitute the primary audience
of the institution, in my view the answer is all of us (as potential offenders), not solely
those who have already committed crimes (as wrongdoers in need of moral reform).
Consider also that if we took the central aim of punishment to be offender reform rather
than deterrence, then we would have at least a relatively harder time justifying the
punishment of already-repentant offenders, or offenders who may be persuaded to repent
by nonpunitive means (nonpunitive censure, perhaps). A drunk driver who kills a person,
for instance, may upon sobering up be racked with guilt about what she has done;
furthermore, she may genuinely commit to change her behavior, to fight her addiction,
and not to make the same mistakes again. Under a system of punishment aimed centrally
at reform, it’s unclear how we might justify punishing her.46 Given deterrence as the
institution’s central aim, however, it becomes clearer that we would have good reason to
punish her in spite of her repentance. The point of punishment is to provide a compelling
reason for potential offenders not to commit acts that violate community members’
security and well-being. Punishing the already repentant drunk driver would serve to
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C.f., David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008),
p. 186; and C. L. Ten, “Positive Retributivism,” Social Philosophy and Policy 7:2 (1990): 194-208, p. 204.
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reinforce the credibility of the threat to other potential drunk drivers (many of whom
would also undoubtedly be remorseful and repentant if they committed similar acts).
In summary, then, I have no strong objections to the sort of reform endorsed by
Hampton and Duff as an aim of punishment, as long as it is not taken to constitute the
sole or central aim of the institution. Deterrence constitutes the reason we should want an
institution of punishment, and although reform might represent a supplemental aim, the
institution’s justification does not require that reform be among its aims. On my account,
however, the permissibility of punishment does require that penal practices not tend to
undermine the prospect of offender reform. In the next section, I consider various
objections to this thesis.

IV. Objections
First, one might argue that any punishment might undermine the prospect of
reform. That is, perhaps any punishment might at least to some degree increase an
offender’s negative regard for the society on whose behalf she is punished, and thus
weaken her motivation to reflect on, and care about, how her criminal actions violated
certain of the society’s values. If this is the case, then one might think that all
punishments, insofar as there exists the possibility that they might undermine reform,
would be impermissible. Notice, however, that I have consistently phrased my constraint
as a prohibition on punishments that tend to undermine the prospect of reform. So for my
account to imply a prohibition on all punishments as the objection challenges, it would
have to be the case that all modes and degrees of punishment tend to undermine the
130

prospect of reform. This seems unlikely, unless one believes that impunity always tends
to be more conducive to moral reflection and reform than any punishment at all.
This leads to a related point: Undermining the prospect of reform, as I conceive it,
is to be distinguished from undermining the mere possibility of reform. The latter
formulation could permit a great deal more in terms of punishment, insofar as reform
may remain at least a bare possibility even for offenders subject to exceedingly harsh or
demeaning treatment. Such treatment would undermine the prospect of reform, however,
in terms of tending to make the requisite moral reflection less likely than it would have
been had punishment not been administered. Thus it would be prohibited on my account.
As the previous two points indicate, which punishments would actually be ruled
out by my account will depend significantly on empirical evidence about what tends to
undermine the prospect of reform. I do not attempt here to address these empirical
questions. Rather, my aim has been to flesh out and argue for the constraining principle
itself. But the question of how the principle would constrain in practice — that is, the
question of what sorts of punishments actually tend to undermine the prospect of offender
reform — is one that I suggest bears further scrutiny. If research found, for instance, that
certain forms of punishment significantly correlated with higher frequencies of
reoffending (or with offenders’ graduating up to more serious crimes) upon release, this
would provide at least some tentative evidence that such punishments were undermining
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offenders’ moral reform.47 Again, however, my point in this chapter is not to settle the
empirical issue, but rather to defend the principle underlying it.
Finally, one might object that some offenders are simply irredeemable, and if so,
we need not concern ourselves with whether punishments might undermine their
redemption.48 If some criminals are essentially moral monsters, with no potential for
reform, then seemingly no punishments would be ruled out by the considerations of
reform that I have proposed here. There is no punishment, after all, that will undermine
the reform of one who cannot be reformed anyway. We should be careful, however,
about ascribing to individuals, even apparently vicious individuals, the labels “moral
monster” or “irredeemable.” First, it’s not clear what would count as adequate evidence
that one is truly irredeemable, rather than merely (so far) unredeemed or unrepentant.
Even consistently evil behavior is only evidence, in Kantian terms, that one is not
currently exhibiting a good will, not that one has no capacity to develop a good will. Kant,
in fact, believed that everyone possessed a predisposition to act from respect for the
moral law.49 This feature of humanity, as Thomas Hill puts it, “implies that anyone who
47

A 2007 study by M. Keith Chen and Jesse M. Shapiro, for example, found some evidence that harsher
prison conditions led to higher rates of offending after release. See M. Keith Chen and Jesse M. Shapiro,
“Do Harsher Prison Conditions Reduce Recidivism? A Discontinuity-based Approach,” American Law and
Economics Review 9:1 (2007): 1-29. Chen and Shapiro’s study was limited, however, by a small sample
size. Also, a 2004 study by the Arizona Republic found that the state’s tougher punishment policies for
teenage offenders were contributing to nonviolent juvenile offenders’ more frequently committing violent
crimes upon release. See Judi Villa, “Adult Prisons Harden Teens: Young offenders groomed for life of
crime,” The Arizona Republic, 14 Nov. 2004.
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Rhodes discusses the tendency among officials in maximum security prisons to view prisoners essentially
as moral monsters. See Rhodes, Total Confinement, esp. pp. 182-90.
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See, e.g., Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 6:28, translated and edited by Allen
Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals 4:440 (p. 44).
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has humanity has a capacity and disposition to follow such principles; but since his
rationality may be imperfect or counteracted by other features, he may not always follow
these principles.”50 Thus Kant believed everyone had the capacity for repentance and
reform, that a human being “can never lose entirely his predisposition to the good.”51
Suppose, however, we are less optimistic than Kant. Suppose we believe that
some individuals truly are moral monsters, that some truly have no capacity for reform.
Still, there is a significant epistemic challenge in trying to determine which individuals
are truly incapable of reform and which are merely as yet unreformed. It’s not clear even
how we might go about distinguishing, with any confidence, the former class of
individuals from the latter.52 Given this practical epistemic challenge, any distinctions we
attempt to make between those who can and cannot be redeemed will be suspect. In
trying to make such assessments, then, we inevitably risk treating as irredeemable those
who are in fact capable of reform. That is, we risk treating some individuals with
contempt. Instead, I suggest that even if genuine moral monsters exist, we would do
better to err on the side of treating everyone as though she is capable of reform.
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Thomas Hill, Jr., Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1992), p. 41.
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Metaphysics of Morals 6:463-4 (p. 580).
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Kant cautioned us even about being too confident in distinguishing those who exhibit good wills from
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4:407, p. 19). See also Richard Dean, The Value of Humanity in Kant’s Moral Theory (Oxford, U.K.:
Clarendon Press, 2006). Despite the difficulties of assessing whether a person acts with a good will,
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V. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have contended that punishments should not express contempt
for offenders, should not give up on them as moral persons. Because of this, punishments
should be constrained so that they do not tend to undermine the prospect of offenders’
reform. In the previous chapter, I also offered a partial defense of the retributivist
principle that punishments should be no more severe than their crimes morally deserve.
Both of these constraints essentially set ceilings on how severely we may punish.53 A
worry arises, however, with respect to how these constraints fit with what I have claimed
is the central aim of punishment, the deterrence of potential criminals. The worry is that
for punishments to achieve the goal of deterring potential offenders, these punishments
would need to exceed what is allowed by the retributivist and reform-based constraints.54
I offer two responses: First, if it did prove to be the case that the floor set by the
goal of deterrence were higher than the ceilings set by the retributivist and reform-based
constraints, the constraints would take precedence. In other words, the social benefits of
punishment are insufficient to justify the institution if its practices fail to respect those
punished as moral persons. Second, however, I doubt that the aim of deterrence really
does require sentences more severe than the retributivist and reform-based constraints
allow. Research into punishment’s deterrent effects tends to support the notion that
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Often the ceiling set by the reform-based constraint will be lower than that set by the retributivist
constraint; thus what might be permitted on purely retributivist grounds will often be ruled out insofar as it
tends to undermine the prospect of an offenders’ reform. In principle, there might also be cases in which
the retributivist principle would set the ceiling on punishment lower than the reform-based principle,
although such cases seem less likely in practice.
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certainty of punishment plays a much larger role than severity of punishment. This
conclusion undermines the idea that sentences must be especially severe for the
institution of punishment to have a significant deterrent impact; effective enforcement
appears more relevant to the deterrent impact. Thus it’s reasonable, I suggest, to think
that the institution of punishment might provide significant deterrent benefits even as it is
constrained by the considerations of retribution and reform that I have discussed in these
two chapters.55
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I appreciate the helpful feedback I received on previous versions of this chapter from Anne Margaret
Baxley, Marilyn Friedman, Larry May, Christopher Heath Wellman, and the audience at the 2009
International Social Philosophy Conference.
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CHAPTER 5
Collective punishment and distribution of harms

The institutions of international criminal law that have developed in the decades
since the Nuremberg trials have consistently focused on prosecuting and punishing
individual human agents for their roles in mass crimes. The International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg expressed what has since become the governing view: “Crimes
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be
enforced.”1 In the wake of atrocities such as the Rwandan and Srebrenica genocides,
however, the tribunal’s pronouncement may seem, at least, too simplistic. Genocide and
crimes against humanity, after all, are by their nature group endeavors. Individuals may
murder, torture, or rape, but no individual alone is responsible for perpetrating mass
crimes such as genocide. Rather, such crimes typically result from the actions of groups
of individuals, who may be organized in some strong sense or may, at least, influence
each other in ways that make possible what would not have been possible from human
beings acting individually.
The question of how best to assign responsibility for group wrongdoing has
spawned a sizeable philosophical literature.2 Scholars have debated whether

1

International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the Major War Criminals, judgment of Oct. 1, 1946;
reprinted in American Journal of International Law 41 (1947), p. 221.
2

C.f., Larry May, Sharing Responsibility (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), esp. pp. 37-40; see
also Larry May and Stacey Hoffman, eds., Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in
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responsibility for group-perpetrated crimes is shared, in the sense that responsibility
distributes among individual group members, or collective, so that the group itself, as a
group, is responsible for the crimes in a nondistributive sense (or whether the best
conception of responsibility lies somewhere between these extremes). Because
international criminal law views individual human beings as the responsible agents, its
challenge has been to prosecute and punish individuals for what they, as individuals,
actually did (or failed to do), while nevertheless accounting for the fact that their acts (or
omissions) were part of a larger criminal enterprise. Establishing both the criminal act
and intent elements for individuals who contributed somehow to the mass crime can be a
thorny matter.3
As an alternative, a number of scholars have begun to endorse what I will refer to
as “collective punishment,” according to which states themselves, either in addition to or
instead of their individual members, are the appropriate subjects of punishment for
international crimes. Thus Anthony Lang writes: “[W]hile individuals have been
rightfully accused of and punished for these crimes, it seems appropriate that states be
held responsible as well, for only an organized community has the means to inflict

Theoretical and Applied Ethics (Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1991); Peter A.
French and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility, spec. issue of
Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXX (2006); Larry May and Raimo Tuomela, eds., Collective
Responsibility, spec. issue of Journal of Social Philosophy XXXVIII:3 (fall 2007); and Renee Jeffery, ed.,
Confronting Evil in International Relations: Ethical Responses to Problems of Moral Agency (New York
City: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), chapters 1-3.
3

C.f., Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), esp. chapters 7-9; and Aggression and Crimes Against Peace (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), esp. chapter 12; and Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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violence on such a large scale.”4 On this view, punishing states is often appropriate
because states themselves are in many cases the responsible agents of genocide and other
mass crimes.5 Collective punishment is thus an attractive option insofar as it better
ensures that no responsibility for the crime goes unassigned, whereas it has proven
difficult to account fully for responsibility for mass crimes by prosecuting and punishing
individual contributors.
This paper examines various conceptual and normative questions about how
international institutions might implement a practice of collective punishment. Of central
concern is whether collective punishment is consistent with treating individual group
members with respect as moral agents. Punishment involves inflicting harms on offenders,
and the worry with collective punishment is that the harms produced by punishing groups
will distribute among group members, some of whom may not have participated in (or
may even have worked against) the criminal endeavor. Requiring some group members
to bear these distributed burdens even though they did not contribute to the group’s
crimes appears inconsistent with respecting them as autonomous moral agents.
In what follows, I consider various strategies of defending collective punishment
against the objection that its harms will distribute in unjustifiable ways: First, one might

4

Anthony F. Lang Jr., “Crime and Punishment: Holding States Accountable,” Ethics & International
Affairs 21:2 (Summer 2007): 239-57. See also, e.g., David Luban, “State Criminality and the Ambition of
International Criminal Law,” in Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing, eds. Tracy Isaacs and Richard
Vernon (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 61-91.
5

States are not, of course, the only sort of group that may commit international crimes. Nonstate entities,
such as terrorist groups, may also commit crimes against humanity or genocide. Although I focus here on
collective punishment of states, I note on occasion how the implications might differ for collectively
punishing other sorts of group perpetrators.
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offer some argument as to why a given distribution of harms is in fact justified. Second,
one might accept that collective punishment’s harms will distribute unfairly, so that some
members of the state will be wronged, but then contend that this presumptive injustice is
overridden by the good accomplished (or harm averted) by the practice. Third, one might
endorse collective punishment with nondistributive harms. I contend that the first two
lines of defense fail. Distributive collective punishment is indeed presumptively
unjustified, and the ostensible benefits of such a practice are insufficient to override this
presumption. And although collective punishment with nondistributive harms may be
morally justifiable, it presents serious difficulties with respect to implementation.
Ultimately, international criminal law would do better to maintain its focus on individual
human agents, and to continue seeking better ways to fully assign responsibility for mass
crimes without imposing punitive burdens on group members who did not contribute.

I. The case for collective punishment
Proponents of collective punishment contend that we should regard the state as
the agent of international crimes. Since Hannah Arendt famously wrote of the “banality
of evil,”6 a number of scholars have pointed out that those who participate in perpetrating
mass crimes often aren’t properly characterized as criminal deviants, in the sense of
deviating from their community’s norms; instead, they may be said to act in accordance

6

See Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin Books, 1994).
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with the norms of a community that is itself criminal.7 In circumstances such as these, in
which the pathological instead becomes normal, or even expected, it may seem
appropriate to hold the group itself, as a group, responsible via collective punishment.
Thus David Luban writes: “the Nazi state, like the Hutu Power state half a century later,
was in a literal sense criminal to the core. ... A state that turns the world upside down and
makes the monstrous the centerpiece of civic obligation is a criminal state.”8 If
criminality really is pervasive within a group, then collective punishment may more
effectively ensure that all of the criminal wrongdoing is accounted for — that no aspect
of it goes unpunished.
By ensuring a full assignment of responsibility for mass crimes, collective
punishment may be valuable in the message that it sends to citizens of the punished state.
Again, given that the factors that allow, or even promote, mass crimes are often pervasive,
and sometimes subtle, throughout a group, collective punishment may make it more
difficult for some members of the group to avoid accepting responsibility themselves for
the roles they played in the crimes. If only the group leaders are punished, then members
of the group who escape punishment may find it too easy to rationalize to themselves that
they played no role, that they bear no responsibility, for the wrongdoing.
Underlying the idea that collective punishment is a more effective assignment of
responsibility for mass crimes is the practical consideration that determining criminal
7

C.f., Deirdre Golash, “The Justification of Punishment in the International Context,” in International
Criminal Law and Philosophy, eds. Larry May and Zachary Hoskins (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), p. 212. See also Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, pp. 25-26, 32, 173.
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responsibility and punishing mass crimes piecemeal can be extremely difficult. Even if
courts could determine each person’s individual contributions to the crime and
sufficiently establish each person’s intent, the process would be exceedingly expensive
and time consuming.9 Punishing a state as a whole, however, through monetary or other
sanctions, appears simpler to accomplish from a practical standpoint.
Finally, even for members of the state who did not contribute to the crimes,
collective punishment may provide an incentive to work to oust the criminal leaders, or to
change the institutions or culture that allowed the crimes to occur. Philip Pettit writes:
By finding the grouping responsible, we make clear to
members as a whole that unless they develop routines for
keeping their government … in check, then they will share
in the corporate responsibility of the group; even if they
have little or no enactor responsibility, they will have
member responsibility for what was done. By finding the
grouping responsible in such a case, indeed, we will make
clear to the members of other groupings in the same
category that they too are liable to be found guilty in
parallel cases, should the body to which they belong bring
about one or another ill.10
Thus there appear to be good reasons to give collective punishment serious
consideration as an alternative or a supplement to the current system of individually
focused prosecutions and punishments. Despite the apparent virtues of collective
punishment, however, serious concerns arise regarding how exactly such punishment
should be imposed. As suggested before, the central worry is that punishing an entire
9

C.f., Avia Pasternak, “Sharing the Costs of Political Injustices,” Politics, Philosophy, and Economics,
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group as a group will nevertheless result in harms to individual members of the group,
many of whom may not have participated in the wrongdoing (or may even have actively
denounced it or otherwise worked against it). Thus the specter of guilt by association
looms. That we may impose harms on an individual in response to a crime in which she
played no role, one which she did not even endorse, merely because she is in some sense
associated with others who did perpetrate the crime — this notion will strike many as
deeply unfair.11 In particular, such treatment appears inconsistent with the principle of
respect for persons, which requires at a minimum that our treatment of others be
responsive to them, to what they have freely done or intended to do.
If collective punishment is defensible in the face of this objection, it appears that
the defense will need to proceed along one of the following lines: (a) the harms of
collective punishment will distribute, but the distributions are justifiable in themselves; (b)
the harms of collective punishment will distribute in presumptively unjustifiable ways,
but this presumptive wrong is overridden by some greater good attained through
collective punishment; or (c) states can be punished without the harms distributing. I
consider each option in turn.

II. Distributing collective punishment’s harms
One alternative for an advocate of collective punishment is to concede that its
harms will distribute among group members, and then to defend some distribution of the
11

C.f., Toni Erskine, “Kicking Bodies and Damning Souls: The Danger of Harming ‘Innocent’ Individuals
While Punishing ‘Delinquent’ States,” Ethics & International Affairs 24:3 (2010): 261-285, on pp. 272-73.
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harms as justified. An obvious candidate is an equal distribution of harms.12 But is equal
distribution defensible, given the fact that some members of the group will inevitably
play a smaller role in the group’s crimes than others (or no role, or even work against the
crime)?
A number of theorists have argued, on various grounds, that group members, even
dissenters, may be liable to bear equally the costs of compensating victims for the harms
their group inflicted. David Miller, for instance, argues that in cooperative groups such as
democratic political communities, when members reap the benefits of citizenship and
have “a fair chance to influence” the community’s decisions, then they may be “outcome
responsible” for what their group does.13 On Miller’s view, the equal liability of members
of a democratic community stems, in part, from the fact that they participated (or at least
had the chance to participate) in the decision-making process. Avia Pasternak, by contrast,
rejects appeals to democratic authorization such as Miller’s, because she believes
community members who actively objected to a harmful policy cannot be said to have
authorized it.14 Instead, Pasternak defends equal distribution of the costs of political
injustices by appeal to associative obligations among members of a democratic
community.15
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C.f., Avia Pasternak, “The Distributive Effect of Collective Punishment,” in Accountability for Collective
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Rather than engage here with Miller’s and Pasternak’s contrasting defenses of
equally shared consequential responsibility for group wrongs, I want to focus on a point
on which their accounts, and a number of other discussions of collective responsibility,
agree: the distinction between blameworthiness and consequential responsibility.
Theorists who endorse holding group members, even noncontributors, responsible for
their group’s wrongdoing are typically quick to clarify that such group members may not
be morally blameworthy, or deserving of punishment.16 Even if it is not permissible,
however, to punish individuals for crimes in which they played no role, scholars such as
Miller and Pasternak offer various strategies for establishing that group members, even
noncontributors or dissenters, may share equally the consequential responsibility for
compensating those harmed by the crime. For instance, Miller writes of a polluting,
employee-controlled firm whose members decide in a majority vote not to implement
more environmentally friendly practices:
It would not in general be right to blame (or punish)
members of the minority for what their firm has done to the
river — they could quite properly defend themselves by
saying that they spoke out against the manufacturing
process that caused the pollution. But it is right to hold
them, along with others, liable for the damage they have
caused.17
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See also, e.g., Anna Stilz, “Collective Responsibility and the State,” The Journal of Political Philosophy,
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Miller’s discussion here reflects a common intuition: We typically believe that
liability to punishment is an especially serious matter, and so we set a higher standard to
hold a person liable to punishment than to hold her liable to pay compensation.18 There
are at least two significant reasons to be especially cautious when punishment is at stake.
First, a characteristic feature of punishment is that it expresses blame, or condemnation,
of the offender.19 This feature is not essential to compensation. Thus if a defendant in a
civil suit is required to pay compensatory damages, the aim of the decision is not to
assess blame but rather to make restitution to those harmed by the defendant’s actions.
Second, another essential feature of punishments is that they are intended to be of a
severity that will harm those punished — whether because offenders deserve the harm, or
because the prospect of harm will help deter wrongdoers, etc. It isn’t an essential feature,
however, of compensation that it be harmful to the agent making compensation. Because
of this, impositions of punishment may often be significantly more severe than would be
required solely to compensate those harmed. More is typically at stake, then, with
punishment than with compensatory liability, both because of punishment’s
condemnatory message and because particular burdens imposed may often be more
severe than compensating victims for their losses would require. These factors may help
explain why scholars such as Miller and Pasternak are willing to ascribe consequential
responsibility to individual group members where they would not endorse punishment.
18
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For present purposes, then, the relevant question is whether collective punishment
of a state in which the harms distribute equally among the state’s members looks more
like a case of assigning consequential responsibility to these members or of punishing
them. Pasternak believes it is the former. That is, she contends that equal distribution of
the harms of collective punishment does not entail that the punishment itself has
distributed; it is still the state itself that is punished, even if its members actually bear the
burdens. She justifies her claim by focusing on the expressive or condemnatory aspect of
punishment. Because the burdens borne by the group members have no condemning
function, she contends, they aren’t properly punishment.20 Thus the punishment itself
remains at the level of the state; the burdens borne equally by the state’s citizens stem
from their consequential responsibility to share the burden of compensating those harmed.
There are good reasons, I contend, to believe that the burden distributed among a
state’s citizens in cases of collective punishment is indeed a punitive burden, rather than
merely a compensatory (i.e., consequential) one. First, as indicated above, because
punishment and compensation have different aims, the sanction imposed on a perpetrator
state as punishment could be significantly more severe than would be required to
compensate those harmed by the state’s actions. In such cases, the distributed burden
shared equally by the state’s citizens would similarly be considerably greater than what
would be required for compensation. Second, the mode of punishment may differ from
what would be required for compensation. Monetary sanctions may be an obvious
20
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method of punishing a collectivity such as a state, but advocates of collective punishment
have suggested other options. David Luban, for instance, mentions “capital punishment”
for the state, that is, “conquest and reconstruction.”21 Anthony Lang suggests that
punishment could include “coercive military actions, such as the use of aerial bombing
against targets as identified as central to the state … .”22 The harms associated with these
punishments, like the burdens of monetary sanctions, would be distributive — they would
be borne by the group members. It’s at least unclear, though, how such harms would
serve to compensate the victims of mass crimes.23 Thus in their severity and their mode,
the burdens shared equally by group members will often be more punitive than
compensatory.
Similarly, these considerations cast doubt on whether the condemnatory
expression of collective punishment really remains at the level of the state, even as the
burdens distribute. If (a) the international community imposes punitive measures on a
state, with explicit or implicit recognition that it is asking the state’s citizens to bear the
associated burdens, and (b) these burdens are in many cases either more severe or of a
different mode than would be appropriate for compensating victims, then (c) it seems
reasonable to interpret the message conveyed to the burdened citizens as the message that
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Lang, “Crime and Punishment,” p. 250. I discuss Lang’s own strategy for defending collective
punishment in section III.
23

However, for an account of how considerations of compensation, or restitution, might be seen to ground
a number of sanctions that we typically associate with punishment, see David Boonin, The Problem of
Punishment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 231-35. I am skeptical of Boonin’s
account, but elaborating on this point is beyond the scope of this paper.
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they are being punished for their state’s wrongs, not that they are being asked to bear
consequential responsibility for their state’s harms. This is not to deny that the
international community might intend the expression of censure to attach only at the level
of the state itself, not to distribute. But it’s entirely possible (fairly common, even) to
intend to communicate one message but actually to communicate something else. Even if
the international community does not intend to communicate censure of the state’s
citizens themselves, the punitive severity and mode of the harms imposed will tend to do
just that. Thus the condemnatory aspect of collective punishment will distribute along
with the harms.
For all of these reasons, we would do best to characterize collective punishment in
which the harms distribute equally among group members as punishing the group
members equally. Given that some group members may have contributed less than others,
or not at all, or even worked against the group’s crimes, we have good reason to resist
this sort of punitive scheme as essentially a form of guilt by association, and thus as
inconsistent with basic respect for group members as autonomous moral persons. One
can certainly challenge this point, and endorse punishing group members, even those who
did not contribute, for their group’s crimes (although, again, this tack is explicitly
rejected by those such as Miller and Pasternak who want to endorse consequential
responsibility). One strategy would be to point to the overriding net benefits to which
such a practice would contribute. I discuss this sort of argument in section III.
There are other options for how the harms of collective punishment might be
distributed to group members. Pasternak, for instance, also discusses random, or
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unpatterned, distribution as well as proportionate distribution.24 First, the harms of
collective punishment could distribute among group members according to no real
pattern, or at least no pattern imposed by the punishing authority. Consider Luban’s
“capital punishment” of the state. Such punishment does not lend itself to any clear
pattern of harm distribution — equal, proportionate, or otherwise. Even monetary
sanctions may not distribute harm in any readily identifiable pattern, if the punished state
chooses (and is allowed by the punishing authority) to secure the funds by reducing the
services it provides to its citizens. These sorts of unpatterned distributions appear
especially unfair, in that they allow for the prospect that those who had nothing to do
with, or even worked against, the group’s crime may have to bear a greater burden than
those who more actively contributed. Furthermore, for the same reasons discussed with
respect to equal distribution, we should regard the unpatterned harms borne by group
members as genuinely punitive, rather than as consequential (compensatory) burdens.
Like equal distribution, then, unpatterned distribution appears unjustified in its own right,
although it may be defensible because of its overriding benefits.
Second, collective punishment’s harms could be distributed to group members
according to their proportionate responsibility. Pasternak notes that such a distribution
will be difficult as a practical matter.25 More importantly, though, it’s especially unclear
that a proportionate distribution scheme could still be said to count as punishment of the
group as a group. As I noted above, endorsements of equal distribution schemes rely on
24

Pasternak, “The Distributive Effect of Collective Punishment,” pp. 220-28.
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the claim that the harms borne by group members don’t amount to punishment, because
the condemnatory expression remains at the level of the group itself. I have suggested
reasons to be skeptical of this claim, but notice that it is even less plausible in a scheme
of collective punishment in which the harms are distributed proportionately. In a
proportionate distribution scheme, determinations would need to be made of each group
member’s relative responsibility, so that the harms could be distributed accordingly.
Surely, however, making such determinations is sufficient to change the expressive
nature of the punishment. By making determinations of which group member is
responsible for what, we in effect shift from censuring the group itself to censuring, to
different degrees, the members of the group. So a proportionate distribution scheme, even
more than an equal distribution scheme, looks less like merely punishing the group and
distributing the harms among members than like punishing the members themselves.
Note, however, that my critique here is not that a proportionate distribution of
harms would be unfair in the sense in which I claimed that an equal distribution, and even
moreso an unpatterned distribution, would be unfair. As I have indicated, I’m ultimately
sympathetic to the approach of focusing on individuals, holding them accountable for
what they actually did to contribute to the larger endeavor. Rather, my claim is only that a
proportionate distribution scheme of collective punishment is not really collective
punishment at all. Such a scheme, in practice, would amount to what is the predominant
practice in international criminal law today, in which judicial institutions make individual
assessments of guilt and punish individual offenders according to what they themselves
did to contribute to (or in some cases, did not do to help stop) the group’s enterprise.
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Ultimately, I doubt that the practice of collective punishment with the harms
distributing among group members is intrinsically justifiable. The burden distributed in
equal or unpatterned schemes is genuinely a punitive burden, not merely compensatory,
and is unfair to those who played no role in the crimes. By contrast, proportional
distribution schemes are much fairer, but they no longer count as genuine instances of
collective punishment, punishment of the group as a group. In the next section, I consider
whether collective punishments whose harms are distributed equally, or randomly, among
group members might be all-things-considered permissible, even if presumptively
unjustified, because of the net benefits such schemes of punishment produce.

III. Overriding net benefits of collective punishment?
As we’ve seen, the key move for accounts that attempt to justify some distribution
scheme in its own right is to claim that the distributed burdens don’t amount to
punishment of the group members, to which we typically object for reasons discussed
above. Rather, such schemes impose burdens of compensation on group members, and
such burdens are somehow justifiable. I have argued that such distribution schemes are
best understood as genuine punishment of group members, and that they are not
defensible in their own right. But perhaps it is nevertheless all-things-considered
permissible to impose punitive harms that will be borne even by those who did not
contribute to the group’s wrongs, if the net benefits of collective punishment are
sufficiently great. Anthony Lang, in endorsing regime change and lustration as state
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punishment, admits that “this punishment might result in the harm or death of individuals
who had nothing to do with the policies of the government.”26
As with any use of force in the international system,
avoiding such deaths should be a primary goal. Nonetheless,
concern with such deaths cannot prevent the use of punitive
measures to enforce norms. Indeed, one might argue that
the seriousness of genocide demands that punitive
measures be employed even knowing there is a significant
chance that innocents might die, and regrettable as that is.27
For Lang, collective punishment might be justified (or required), even if some of
the group members punished contributed nothing to the group’s crimes, if such a scheme
were an effective way of preventing atrocities such as genocide. It’s worth considering,
then, whether the net benefits of collective punishment would be sufficient to render
presumptively unjustified punishment of group members all-things-considered justified.
There are, I suggest, reasons to be skeptical of this claim.
In evaluating Lang’s claims about the net benefits of collective punishment, it’s
important to bear in mind the distinction between, on one hand, the use of force against
some perpetrator state as a means of warding off its attack against some victim group and,
on the other hand, the use of force to punish a perpetrator state. Typically, self-defense or
defense of others is understood as the imposition of force on perpetrators to stop them
from committing (or continuing to commit) some wrongful act. Punishment, by contrast,
imposes harm on offenders not to ward off their impending or ongoing attacks, but rather
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Lang, “Crime and Punishment,” p. 255.
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Ibid. Also see p. 253.
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in response to some wrongdoing they have already committed.28 Lang appears to conflate
these two distinct notions — stopping crimes that are being committed and punishing
crimes that have been committed — when he writes that one effect of punishing states
may be “retributive, in that the specific state committing the crime would be forced to
stop.”29 But we cannot defend collective punishment, including the regrettable killing of
innocent group members, by appeal to the overriding benefits of the use of international
force to stop some ongoing genocide. Rather, collective punishment must be defensible
as an imposition of harm on some state for crimes it has already committed.
As discussed earlier, one commonly cited rationale for holding groups
collectively responsible is that in many cases the group itself is best understood as the
criminal agent, and thus a full assignment of responsibility requires that the group itself
be held accountable. Philip Pettit contends that assigning responsibility solely among
those individuals who enact the group’s plan “may leave a deficit in the accounting books,
and the only possible way to guard against this may be to allow for the corporate
responsibility of the group in the name of which they act.”30 Assigning responsibility
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If the aim of punishment is to deter potential wrongdoers from committing future offenses, then
punishment may appear more closely analogous to self-defense. Indeed, a number of authors have
attempted to justify deterrent punishment by appeal to considerations of self-defense. Nevertheless,
inflicting harm in self-defense and inflicting harm as deterrent punishment are distinct notions in need of
distinct justifications. The former involves using force against some attacker who is actually threatening or
inflicting harm in order to prevent or stop the attack. The latter involves harming an offender in response to
some already-committed act, with the aim of discouraging the offender or other potential offenders from
acting similarly in the future.
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retributive punishment.
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solely among individual group members may leave this “deficit in the accounting books”
because the group’s institutional structures and the relations among group members may
play some causal role in the crime as well. Holding the group itself accountable may
better ensure a full assignment of responsibility for the crime.
Ensuring this sort of complete accounting might be regarded as valuable in its
own right, especially by those who take retributivism to be the goal of an institution of
punishment. In my view, however, the central aim of the practice of punishment is
deterrence rather than retribution.31 Thus the relevant question is whether a system of
collective punishment would sufficiently promote the aim of preventing future
perpetration of international crimes so as to override the presumptive injustice of
imposing punishment on citizens who did not participate in the state’s crimes.
First, we might consider the relative deterrent impact of collective punishment on
those group leaders who develop and initiate the criminal plan. In these cases, it’s
doubtful that such a punishment scheme would be more effective as a deterrent than
individual prosecutions and punishments. Presumably, these leaders would prefer
collective punishment in which the harms are distributed among community members.

pp. 78-82; Kirsten Ainley, “Individual Agency and Responsibility for Atrocity,” and Arne Johan Vetlesen,
“Collective Evildoing,” in Jeffery, Confronting Evil in International Relations.
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Many contemporary scholars argue instead that the central aim of punishing international crimes is to
express condemnation of the crime to the perpetrators, the victims, or to the international community
generally. See, e.g., Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law. In my view, however, although
there is a genuine expressive aspect to punishment, the relevant question for accounts that appeal to this
aspect is why it is sufficiently important to justify punishment. Typically, expressive accounts will appeal to
the role such condemnations can play in preventing future atrocities or to the intrinsic value of expressing
deserved censure of wrongdoers. Ultimately, then, I believe the expressivist justifications of punishment
are best characterized either as deterrent or retributive in their aims.
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Given the disproportionate role the leaders play in perpetrating the crime, they would
have good reason to think they’d fare comparatively better in a collective punishment
scheme — in which harms are distributed equally, or randomly, etc. — than if everyone
were punished individually in proportion to what she actually did.32
Perhaps, instead, the threat of collective punishment would be more effective than
individual punishment at deterring potential minor participants, those who might not
develop or initiate the plan but nevertheless might play some active, culpable role in the
criminal endeavor. Or maybe the threat of collective punishment would more effectively
deter those who might otherwise be complicit in the crime — that is, those who, though
they are not the principal planners or actors, nevertheless through their actions or failures
to act might make the crime more likely to occur.33 In one sense, this appears more
plausible than in the case of leaders, given the greater likelihood that minor participants
or those who aid or abet the principal agents might slip through the net of individual
prosecutions and punishments, whereas they would be liable to share the punitive harms
of collective punishment.
Suppose it’s true that the threat of collective punishment would better discourage
potential minor players than would the existing system of individual prosecutions and
punishments. We might take this either as a point in favor of collective punishment or as
32

It’s true that the prospect of collective punishment in addition to (rather than instead of) traditional
individual prosecutions and punishment might yield some additional deterrent effect, although this isn’t a
given. I say more below about collective punishment as augmenting rather than replacing the traditional
scheme of individual punishments.
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a reason to continue to develop and improve the existing system. In other words, as we
ask whether collective punishment would yield sufficiently greater deterrent effects to
override the presumption against it, the appropriate comparison class is not necessarily
the current system of individual prosecutions and punishments, but rather the best
realistically attainable version of such a system. Under the current system, prosecuting
and punishing large numbers of the minor players or accomplices in mass atrocities may
be so expensive or time-consuming as to be a practical impossibility. But there might be
ways to develop and improve the current system, to address these practical issues.34 If so,
then the ostensible comparative advantage of collective punishment in deterring minor
contributors would be diminished, or even negated.
In fact, however, there is reason to doubt that the threat of collective punishment
would be more effective as a deterrent of potential minor players than would a scheme of
individual prosecutions and punishments — even an imperfect scheme in which some
contributing parties slipped through the cracks. Consider which would more likely deter a
potential minor participant: (a) the prospect that, if the crime is prosecuted and punished,
each group member will share the punitive harms regardless of her involvement, or lack
thereof, in the criminal endeavor; or (b) the prospect that, if the crime is prosecuted and
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For instance, a number of scholars have expressed tentative optimism about the gacaca courts being
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156

punished, individual determinations will be made based on what role each person played
in the larger endeavor (as planner, enactor, accomplice, etc.). Assuming she is not herself
capable of stopping the crime, then if the crime is successfully prosecuted, (a) threatens
punitive harms regardless of whether she participates or not; (b), on the other hand,
represents the opportunity to escape eventual punishment by not contributing. Thus
whereas (b) offers her a clear reason not to participate, or aid or abet those who do
participate, (a) offers her no real reason not to contribute to the enterprise. In a collective
punishment scheme, if the crime is not successfully prosecuted, a group member escapes
punishment whether or not she contributes; if the crime is successfully prosecuted, she
shares in collective punishment’s harms to the same degree whether or not she
contributes. Thus, in this sense, collective punishment appears to represent a less
compelling deterrent threat for lesser participants and accomplices than does a scheme of
individual prosecution and punishment.
One might object that if enough citizens either did not participate or actively
worked to prevent their state’s crime (by undermining the government’s efforts, or even
ousting the leadership), the crime might be averted. And the threat of collective
punishment might better deter this way, by motivating dissent among the state’s
membership, than would the threat of individual punishments.35 Similarly, even if the
35
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state carried out the crime, the imposition of collective punishment might be sufficiently
burdensome for citizens that they would be motivated to work to prevent such crimes in
the future (again, perhaps by undermining the leadership’s efforts or overthrowing it
entirely). Notice, however, that the relative deterrent advantage of collective punishment
in these cases depends on the citizens’ each believing that enough other citizens will act
the same way that their efforts to prevent the crime will succeed. By contrast, if a citizen
believes the crime will or won’t occur regardless of what she does, then as the previous
discussion indicated, the threat of collective punishment will give her less reason not to
contribute than would the threat of individually determined punishments. Also, among
those opposed to or at least ambivalent toward their government’s activities, the
imposition of collective punishment could foster resentment of the punishing entity for
harming indiscriminately, and perhaps even increased solidarity with their own leaders.
The decades-long U.S. trade embargo against Cuba, for instance, has by many accounts
tended to increase the Cuban people’s solidarity with the Castro regime. For all of these
reasons, then, I am skeptical of the claim that the threat or imposition of collective
punishment would foment more resistance to perpetrator regimes than would individual
punishments to a sufficient degree to override the presumption against collective
punishment.
The considerations discussed here are not, I recognize, conclusive, but they need
not be. We began with a presumption against collective punishment, because it imposes
harms on individuals for what others have done — thus it fails to respect them as
autonomous moral agents. If one is nevertheless to endorse collective punishment
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because of the overriding net benefits it yields, the burden falls to the advocate to present
a compelling case for these benefits. Unless this can be done, collective punishment will
be an inappropriate alternative to individual punishment.
Perhaps, though, even if the benefits of collective punishment alone are
insufficient to override the presumption against it, we should still endorse collective
punishment in addition to (rather than instead of) individual punishment.36 Now, however,
we have the opposite problem from that with which we started. As discussed earlier,
those who support collective punishment often cite what Pettit calls “a deficit in the
accounting books” left from individual punishments alone. By punishing the entire group,
as a group, we ensure that all group members are held accountable (even, unfortunately,
those who did not contribute to the crime). But if we layer collective punishment on top
of individual punishments, there’s a worry that we may instead be left with a surplus in
the accounting books. At least, we need to be clear about what exactly is the crime for
which we’re punishing the group, and what are the crimes for which we’re punishing the
group members. The relationship between the group’s crime and the group members’
crimes shouldn’t be that of a whole to its parts, or this would amount to an
overassignment of criminal responsibility. And because the collective punishment’s
harms would distribute (equally, randomly, etc.) among group members, there’s a
significant likelihood that some group members (those who have been prosecuted and
punished as individuals) would be doubly punished — that is, they would bear punitive

36
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burdens for their own contributions to the crime, and they would bear additional punitive
burdens as members of the group that committed the crime. It would be essentially
equivalent to punishing a three-person team of bank robbers for their recent robbery, and
also punishing the first member for helping plan the crime and driving the getaway car,
the second member for helping plan the crime and holding the gun, and the third member
for helping plan the crime and issuing the demand.
Note that my concern here is not, strictly speaking, with the severity of the harms
imposed. It would seem strange indeed to worry that a leader who developed and initiated
a genocidal plan resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths might not only, say, receive
a sentence of life in prison but might also be forced to pay an equal share of some
monetary sanction imposed on the group. My objection, rather, is with requiring that he
suffer whatever harm is deemed sufficient for his contribution to the group’s crime, and
then also requiring that he suffer additional harm for being a member of the group that
committed the crime. In section II, I discussed the worry that collective punishment
schemes would impose genuine punishment (not merely compensatory burdens) on
innocent group members. Here, the additional worry is that such a punishment scheme, in
tandem with individual punishments, would in effect punish guilty group members twice
in response to the same crime.37 Thus the presumption against such a punishment scheme
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In fact, something like this occurs at the domestic level in U.S. criminal law. Douglas Husak describes
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160

should be even stronger than before, and again, it’s not apparent that such a scheme
would yield sufficiently greater deterrent effects, compared with the best feasible system
of individual prosecutions and punishments, to override this presumption.
Rather than punishing the group (and by distribution, group members) for
committing the crime and then punishing group members individually for their roles in
committing the crime, we might endorse punishing citizens for their individual
contributions to the crimes and then punishing the group collectively for allowing itself to
be structured and organized in such a way as to allow the crimes to occur.38 Thus the
relationship of the state’s crime and the citizens’ crimes wouldn’t be that of a whole to its
parts. This appears more promising, in that it appears to avoid unfairly punishing some
members of the state twice for the same crime. Still, I contend that such a scheme would
be ultimately unfair to those citizens who are not responsible for helping to create the
institutional, cultural, or other factors that facilitated the state’s criminal acts. The
unfairness of imposing burdens on innocent citizens for the crimes of others sets the
presumptive bar against collective punishment quite high, I believe, and it’s just not clear
that the added deterrent impact of such a scheme, whether instead of or in addition to
individual punishments, is sufficient to overcome this presumption.

but a single crime.” In my view, imposing multiple punishments on an individual for the same criminal act
is unjustified whether at the domestic or international level.
38
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One way to avoid this worry about overpunishing some group members would be
to devise a scheme according to which collective punishment’s harms would not
distribute. I turn now to consider the possibility of nondistributive collective punishment.

IV. Nondistributive collective punishment
Suppose individual group members could be punished for their contributions to a
crime, and also the collective itself could be punished, but the collective punishment’s
harms would not distribute among the group members. Such a scheme would have the
merit not only of avoiding overpunishment of guilty group members, but punishment of
innocent group members as well. In addition, it would presumably satisfy advocates of
collective punishment who contend that such punishment is necessary to ensure a full
accounting for the mass atrocity.
But how might nondistributive collective punishment work? How could groups be
punished in such a way that the punitive harms would not trickle down to members of the
group? Certainly monetary sanctions would impact group members, as would embargoes,
boycotts, or the targeted military strikes such as Lang endorses. It’s not immediately clear,
then, how a punitive burden could be imposed on the group itself with this burden
ultimately being distributed among some number of group members.39
Advocates of holding groups collectively responsible typically contend that the
actions of the group itself are often not entirely reducible to the contributions of the
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individual leaders, participants, accomplices, etc.40 On one version of this claim, the
corporate structure of the group itself, the institutional decision-making procedures,
distribution of authority, etc., play a causal role in the perpetration of the crime that
cannot be accounted for among the contributions of the individual group members. If so,
then we might think that nondistributive collective punishment could target these
institutional aspects of the group, replacing the problematic procedures and structures
with more appropriate ones. This might be a way of inflicting harm on the group itself, by
encroaching on its sovereignty and altering its structure, and also expressing
condemnation of it. Thus it might be seen as genuine punishment of the group itself. The
question is whether the harms associated with such punishment would ultimately
distribute among group members.
On one hand, if the newly imposed institutions were more effective, less
susceptible to corruption, etc., than those they replaced, this might on average benefit
group members. On the other hand, it’s hard to imagine how such institutional
restructuring could be accomplished without some individuals being harmed, most
obviously through loss of their jobs. To the extent that those most likely to be harmed by
the institutional restructuring may be the group leaders and other active participants in the
international crime, we may not be particularly troubled by this prospect. Regardless of
which individuals bear the burdens of punitive institutional restructuring, however, so
long as individuals do bear these burdens, this will not count as a case of nondistributive
40
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collective punishment. Rather, it is an instance of distributive collective punishment, and
as such it is subject to the concerns I raised in sections II and III. In particular, if those
harmed by punitive restructuring are the leaders and other active participants, the specter
of double punishment again arises, given that what’s at issue here is the prospect of
collective punishment alongside individual punishments.
There might, of course, be other ways to punish collectively with nondistributive
harms. Perhaps, for instance, the international community might take away some of a
state’s territory. If the territory in question was populated, however, questions would
arise about whether this would represent a harm to those residents. Even if the territory
was unpopulated but contained significant natural resources, questions of harm might
arise with respect to loss of use of those resources.
Ultimately, I’m skeptical about whether a state can be harmed without the harm
distributing to any of its citizens. If the international community imposes some burden on
a state, the state itself cannot be the bearer of that burden independently of its members.
Even if the state in fact consists in more than just the aggregation of its members — even
if, e.g., it also consists in the institutional structures that govern its members’ interactions
— these institutional structures themselves aren’t the kind of things that can be harmed,
because they aren’t the kind of things that have interests. It appears, then, that for any sort
of collective punishment we consider, either (a) it will harm some members of the state,
or (b) it will not harm at all. If (a), then it will be distributive collective punishment, and
as such it will face the objections raised in sections II and III. If (b), then it will not
properly constitute punishment, given that the imposition of harm is an essential feature
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of punishment. In the end, then, it looks as though the notion of collective punishment
with nondistributive harms is not only practically intractable, but perhaps conceptually
mistaken.

VI. Conclusion
Despite the appeal of collective punishment as a means of ensuring that full
responsibility is assigned for international crimes, I have argued that difficulties arise in
how such a punishment scheme could be implemented. Given that distributing the harms
of punishment among group members ultimately amounts to punishing group members,
such an approach will almost certainly result in the harming of those who played no role
in (or even worked against) the crime. And if the distributive collective punishment
scheme operates alongside a system of individual punishments, there will be the
additional hazard of subjecting some group members (i.e., leaders and participants) to
double punishment. Either way, such a punishment scheme appears presumptively unjust,
and it’s doubtful whether the ostensible gain in deterrent impact from such a scheme
would be sufficient to override this presumption. By contrast, nondistributive collective
punishment appears, in principle, consistent with respecting individual group members as
moral persons. In practice, however, it’s not clear how we might punish the group itself
without the punitive burdens being borne by its members.
It’s worth emphasizing, in conclusion, that although I oppose collective
punishment, I recognize the imperfections of the current system of international criminal
law. Existing legal institutions don’t have sufficient financial or human resources, or time,
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to prosecute and punish all those who, through their participation or their complicity,
contribute to genocides and other mass crimes. And as a practical reality, even with
modifications and improvements, a system of individually focused punishments may
never be able to assign full responsibility for such crimes. Some responsibility may
inevitably slip through the cracks, either in the form of structural or institutional forces
that facilitated the crimes, or individual citizens whose contributions, though real, are
small enough to escape attention. Nevertheless, given the significance of what’s at stake
with punishment, and the strong presumption in favor of respecting people as
autonomous moral beings — which involves treating them according to their own
voluntary acts and omissions — I suggest the international community should continue to
focus on individual criminal prosecutions and punishments rather than collective
punishment.41
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